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Chapter 1: What is Emotional Intelligence (EI)? 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of this PhD was to examine a new definition of Emotional Intelligence 
(EI) using laboratory studies of the physiological correlates of EI processes and 
traditional psychometric methods (e.g., factor analysis). This multi-method approach 
was used to blend the strengths of experimental and psychometric designs. This 
thesis is specifically concerned with the 'mood regulation' aspect of EI for reasons 
explained below. 
In this chapter background information is provided about El, emotion, and 
intelligence. This material is necessarily introductory in nature as volumes could be 
written about any of these topics. The introduction wi ll cover the constructs and 
issues of contention. 
Chapters 1 through 3 will contain summaries before the main text of each to ensure 
the clarity of the chapter content. 
1.2 Intelligence, IQ, and 'intelligences' 
Because any discussion of EI must refer to intelligence theory, a very brief 
introduction to IQ and intelligence theory will be presented. 
Mental ability testing dates back to ancient China (Jensen, 1981). More recently, 
Binet and Simon introduced the process of assessing individuals' performance of a 
series of tasks as a means of measuring their mental ability (Jensen, 1981). Tests of 
mental ability have been improved and adjusted over the past century to resemble 
what we now know as IQ tests (e.g., WAIS III-R, Ravens APM, etc). Modern 
intelligence tests (i.e., IQ tests) involve an assortment of tasks that have been 
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selected to assess mental abilities primarily in the verbal and problem-solving 
domains. Thus most modern IQ tests have mathematical, vocabulary, reading 
comprehension, analogical reasoning, pattern-detection, and other sorts of items. 
Due to the century of debate and research that has characterised their history (see 
e.g., Deary, 2000; Jensen, 1980; 1981) these tests have virtually unassailable 
construct validity and reliability. 
For the purposes of this PhD, the word 'intelligence' wi ll refer to an individual's 
score on an IQ test. Of course this definition leaves out some aspects of intelligence, 
but as will be elucidated below, it is the most sensible and certainly the most well-
supported scientific definition of intelligence. This seeming tautology will be 
clarified further below, but it suffices to say that the vast quantity of literature in 
support of IQ and the lack of any sensible alternative definition seem to justify this 
definition. 
1.2.1 Factor Analysis and Intelligence 
It is not possible to discuss intelligence without referring to the g factor of 
intelligence tests (Spearman, 1904 cited in Kline, 1996) or factor analysis. Factor 
analysis is a process by which the item covariances on a test are standardised and 
manipulated to produce a reduced number of 'factors' with corresponding 
eigenvectors, eigenvalues, and estimates of how much of the overall covariance is 
explained by each of these 'factors'. However, any 'factor solution,' or a decision of 
how many factors are necessary to explain the variance in a test, is almost always 
accompanied by 'rotation.' Factor rotation is a procedure in which the loadings of 
individual items on factors are forced into 'simple structure' or an approximation 
thereof: items are allowed to load only on one factor each. This greatly improves the 
interpretability of the results. As Kline (1996) and Jensen (1981) explain, factor 
rotation also allows us to determine whether two or more factors share variance 
themselves (i.e., are 'oblique' to one another and can be explained by a higher-order 
factor) or are uncorrelated (i.e., are 'orthogonal' to one another and should be 
considered as separate factors). Thus the factor analytic procedure results in a 
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number of factors which either function separately or together to explain a set of 
item interconelations. 
As Kline (1996) explains, the process of factor analysis has resulted in one of the 
most reliable psychological findings in existence. Simply put, intelligence tests items 
are positively correlated. This 'positive manifold' has been explored using factor 
analysis innumerable times and the reliable outcome of such analyses is that the flrst 
factor explains a great deal of the variance in all of the items. The clarity of this 
finding has strangely lead to a great deal of debate. 
Although the positive manifold is widely agreed upon, IQ researchers argue about 
how many factors should be extracted from the positive manifold and the 
relationship between these factors. Spearman advocated that a single factor, g, 
(general intelligence) was sufficient because it explained considerably more than any 
other factor and because if other factors were included, rotation revealed an oblique 
relationship between the factors and thus that the higher-order factor, g, underpinned 
any additional factors. However, Thurstone, a contemporary of Spearman, advocated 
9 'primary factors' (Kline, 1996) based on his orthogonal rotations of factors. 
Guilford (1967, cited in Kline, 1996) suggested that 120 factors are· necessary to 
understand IQ scores. Gardner (1983) made a similar suggestion that there are 
numerous 'intelligences' which differ markedly from 'traditional' IQ, many of which 
can not be directly assessed. The current consensus is that the g factor is better split 
into at least two 'second-order factors' -fluid g and crystallised g (Carroll, 1993; 
cited in Deary, 2000). These second-order factors combined explain at least as much 
variance as the non-separated g does and also strengthen IQ theory by accounting for 
the variety of 'styles' of intelligence (e.g., composers, writers, mathematicians, etc). 
However, this debate is far from concluded. The legacy of this 'multiple 
intelligences' debate has been influential on EI theory. 
Argument about factor structure aside, IQ tests are extremely well-researched and 
well-supported. Despite considerable controversy and argument about interpretation, 
the findings of IQ researchers are so robust as to be included in books ranging from 
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first-year texts (e.g., Gleitman, Fridlund, & Reisberg, 2004; Smith et al., 2003) to 
books written for postgraduates and researchers. Experimental studies, behavioural 
genetics studies, correlational studies, and brain imaging studies have all suggested 
that IQ tests measure a 'real', meaningful construct (Kline, 1996), and as such it is 
probably acceptable to use it as a working definition of intelligence: 
1.2.2 Mismeasurement and Mental Abilities 
However, intelligence research has a chequered and contentious past. Gould (1981) 
critiqued the notion of mental testing on several fronts. According to Gould (1981), 
cases such as Sir Cyril Burt's duplicity, the errors of phrenology, and the abuses of 
eugenics should cause scientists and laypeople to be highly sceptical of the entire 
enterprise of mental testing. He also notes that the concept of intelligence testing 
fails because it is an example of the ' reification fallacy' in which we inappropriately 
assign 'real' existence out of an abstract, simplified representation of a complex 
series of processes. In essence, Gould's (1981) point is that the entire idea of mental 
testing is flawed because it is no more than an 'entity' - a score, a construct, a 
'thing' - that has been created out of a complex, abstract process. The issue is that 
we've inaccurately assigned meaning to this 'thing' when by its very nature it can 
not be 'real'. In a word, just because something as vast and complex as intelligence 
could be reduced to a single score, it does not follow that it should be so reduced. 
Thus Gould (1981, pg. 239): 
The principal error, in fact, has involved ... reification- in this case, the notion that such a nebulous, 
socially defined concept as intelligence might be identified as a ' thing' with a locus in the brain and a 
definite degree of heritability- and that it might be measured as a single number. 




The reification argument should be taken seriously, especially if considered 
alongside the history of debate about factor analysis and the g factor extracted from 
IQ tests. If ever there was a case for this reification argument, then it should be made 
against factor analysis- g exists only in a sample's factor-analysed results and can 
not be directly assessed, "it is not a 'thing' with a physical reality" (Gould, 1981, pg 
250). Indeed, it would not be scientifically sensible to discuss something that has no 
physical representation (ignoring of course the difficulty in defining 'physical 
representation '), so perhaps Gould is making an important claim. · 
As it turns out, this criticism of mental testing, or even g, fails for several reasons. 
Chief amongst these reasons is the ambiguity of the argument. It is unclear what 
Gould is criticising with his argument. That is, it is not certain whether it is: a) the 
simplification of a complex process; b) the factor analytic process itself or the 
seemingly-arcane g; or c) the assignment of scientific value to something that 
doesn't have a 'physical reality'. He does successfully attack the straw man of 
irresponsible methodology and the errors of past researchers, but it is not always 
clear what exactly he is arguing. These possible variations on the argument are taken 
in tum. 
Possibility a) is probably accurate to some degree but it seems that Gould is being 
unduly harsh with IQ testing. Of course, one of the aims of science is the 
simplification of complex processes- the reduction of an unintelligible mass of data 
into succinct, interpretable reports. Indeed, all of our descriptive statistics serve 
exactly this purpose. Yet Gould is probably right in that simplifying complex 
processes can be problematic if it reaches some point of 'oversimplification.' IQ 
tests are certainly a simplification of a complex process but it seems inaccurate to 
claim that they are oversimplifications of this process. IQ tests do everything we 
could reasonably expect a measure of intelligence to do (Deary, 2000; Jensen, 
1980;1981) and to put it simply, this definition of intelligence (simple as it might be) 
works extremely well. Nearly a century of research indicates as much. Perhaps the 
best response to a) is to point that no definition of intelligence is likely to capture all 
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of the vast, complex process that is intelligence- data loss often accompanies data 
simplification or reduction -but it certainly captures a great deal. 
Possibility b) fares little better. Gould's assertion that factor analysing IQ test results 
is analogous to searching for a g factor in "my age, the population of Mexico, the 
price of Swiss cheese, my pet turtle's weight, and the average distance between 
galaxies in the past 10 years" (Gould, 1981, pg 250) is somewhat inappropriate. The 
items of the former are clearly related before the factor analysis takes place and there 
is converging evidence for their interconnection (i.e., verbally astute people tend to 
be good at maths both in ' real life', school, and on IQ tests). We would expect 
intelligent people to be better at a range of cognitive activities almost by definition. 
In contrast, the items of the latter may be explained by a 'time' factor, but there is no 
a priori reason to suspect that they should be related to one another at aU! There are 
indeed flaws in factor analysis, but b) only succeeds in knocking down a straw man 
-the spectre of poor factor analytical methodology. Kline (1996) notes that there are 
issues that any responsible researcher must be aware of when using. factor analysis: 
unrotated solutions are less informative than rotated solutions; factor solutions can 
be subjective; and the meaningfulness of a factor analysis is limited by what is 
analysed. Gould does not tell us anything we did not already know. 
The final interpretation, assigning scientific value or "physical meaning" (Gould, 
1981 , pg 250) to things without 'physical reality,' is perhaps more Incisive as it not 
only applies to poor factor analyses but to the entire enterprise. However, he does 
not argue that all factor solutions lack scientific value, only some of them. In 
Gould's words (pg 250), "Sometimes this is justified ... But such a claim can never 
arise from the mathematics alone, only from additional knowledge"(GouJd, 1981, pg 
250). It is unlikely that any psychometrician would disagree with tl+is statement. It is 
also unclear why factor analysis of IQ test results is not justified. Surely if a test is 
designed to measure a single entity (i.e., IQ) then it is appropriate to use factor 
analysis to determine if this is the case. Gould seems to assume that intelligence can 
never be measured and that any attempt to simplify IQ for the purpose of 
measurement would be flawed, but he does not support this hypothesis particularly 
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well. Quite simply, Gould only has on ly presented half an argument. His assertion 
that some factor analytic results are scientifically meaningless is correct but be 
doesn't provide any reason to believe that factor analyses ofiQ tests are, especially 
given the amount of evidence in favour of such tests. He makes excellent points 
about poor methodology, the sins of previous researchers, and how our a priori 
assumptions can lead to grave errors, but in the end his work is merely based on 
different a priori belief from psychometric researchers and is not particularly 
compelling. A psychometric researcher works from the belief that it is important to 
measure constructs and compare individuals to one another because if we do not 
have a measure to go along with a construct, even something that stands out as 
clearly as intelligence would be difficult to quantify. Gould seems to think that this 
process 'pins down' or simplifies intelligence too much. Discussion of these 
viewpoints could take volumes and due to space constraints, it shall suffice to say 
that this thesis proceeds from a psychometric standpoint as far as intelligence is 
concerned. 
1.2.3 Other Complaints and Responses 
Gould's (1981) claim, and others like it, attack the intelligence testfng process by 
calling into question the 'physical reality' of IQ tests. It has already been shown that 
Gould's claim fails, even if it is interpreted charitably, but it is possible to hamstring 
his claim or similar attacks at the 'physical reality' of IQ tests through other means. 
Obviously the fact that IQ tests provide a paper or electronic recor~ of a person' s 
score confers some kind of 'physical reality' , but there are numerous other more 
substantial independent physical correlates of IQ. They predict criteria we expect 
them to: scholastic and occupational performance, socioeconomic status, and other 
related criteria such as myopia (Jensen, 1981). They also fai l to predict criteria we 
don't expect them to predict, such as neuroticism or agreeableness (Bastian, Bums, 
& Nettlebeck, 2005). There is also experimental evidence for the connection 
between IQ and reaction time, resting EEG potential (Kline, 1996), inspection time 
task performance (Deary, 2000) and specific brain activity in ERPs (Jausovec & 
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Jausovec, 2005). To put it simply, there is a great deal of 'physical reality' to IQ tests 
because the number and IQ test returns is far more meaningful than just a number. 
There is a wealth of converging evidence from different source~ means that it is not 
tautological to declare that ' intelligence is what IQ tests test.' IQ tests only test 
verbal, spatial, mathematical, and other reasoning types yet they correlate with all of 
the above theoretically-linked criteria, so it is unlikely that there is a logical circle at 
play here. It is also worth noting that casual efficacy is not necessary for 'physical 
reality. ' Even if IQ scores do not cause scholastic performance, the mere connection 
between the two still suggests that IQ scores are meaningfuL 
1.2.4 'Intelligences' 
Gardner (1983), amongst others, has suggested that IQ alone fails to accurately 
describe intelligence. He argues that IQ is indeed 'an intelligence' but that it is only 
part of a larger number of intelligences such as kinaesthetic, musical, and 
inter/intrapersonal 'intelligences'. He also argues for 'interpersonal; and 
'intrapersonal intelligences' which have clear similarities to the interpersonal and 
intrapersonal facets of El. 
Gardner (1983) lists some criteria that are necessary for a construct to be called 'an 
intelligence.' It must have psychometric support, be isolatable by brain damage, 
identifiable as a core set of operations, and have a developmental pathway, amongst 
other criteria. This initially seems acceptable but closer inspection reveals that 
Gardner's ' intelligences ' often fail to meet his own criteria! 
Gardner' s (1983) theory lack internal consistency because his 'intelligences' do not 
meet some of his own criteria. For example, we would have to be pretty generous in 
our interpretation of 'psychometric support' if we tried to find evidence for 
'kinaesthetic/bodily intelligence' or 'musical intelligence'. They can be tested (e.g., 
with sports ability or recital perf01mance) but measures could hardly be considered 
psychometric. Worse, not only has Gardner himself not published any method of 
testing these ' intelligences, ' but he also disavows all responsibility .to do so by 
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claiming that testing leads to labelling and stigmatisation. This view would be 
unacceptable to any psychometrician. Worse, his criteria lead to a sort of reductio ad 
absurdum. Personality and frontal lobe 'inhibition ' both have a core set of 
operations, can be isolatable by brain damage, and meet his other criteria for 'an 
intelligence' yet they are clearly not 'intelligences.' It may be possible to make a list 
of things which define 'an intelligence,' but Gardner's initially promising attempt 
ultimately fails. Thus it is probably not scientifically rigorous to call something 'an 
intelligence' , at least until it is clear that the criteria to make this ' intelligence' are 
internally consistent, psychometrically meaningful , and externally verified. 
It may be that Gardner and Gould have attempted to disentangle the word 
intelligence from words such as 'valuable' or 'good.' This is almost certainly a 
valuable point to make. We live in a culture where intelligence (i.e., IQ) is rewarded 
but obviously in many other cultures being able to do complex maths problems (or 
any other task involving intelligence) would be of precious little use. Responsible 
psychometric researchers would not assign any value label to intelligence and this 
thesis certainly makes no arguments. There are multiplicity of skills which are of 
great use, value, and even 'goodness', and Gardner and Gould are wise to point this 
out, but these skills are not intelligence. A responsible intelligence researcher would 
probably also allow for the probability that some intelligent people do not have high 
IQs (e.g., people who 'don't test well') and that some high-IQ individuals are perhaps 
not particularly intelligent (e.g., the absent-minded professor). 
1.2.5 Section Summary 
It has been shown that when discussing intelligence, the best definition researchers 
have is one that defines intelligence as IQ test scores. This definition is not 
tautological because there are numerous sources of converging evidence that provide 
independent support for the meaningfulness of IQ tests. Some complaints have been 
lodged with the process of intelligence testing, but these complaints fail because they 
are poorly argued (e.g. , they only attack a straw man) or because the body of 
evidence in support of IQ nullifies them. 
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Alternative definitions of intelligence, such as Gardner' s (1984) multiple intelligence 
theory, are intriguing in light of 'Emotional Intelligence' but Gardner's theory fails 
to be internaJiy consistent, let alone psychometrically viable. Multiple intelligence 
theory also fails because the criteria for ' an intelligence' do not exc.Jude constructs 
which are obviously not intelligences (e.g., personality). His list of criteria, as well 
as its failure, pre-sages some theories of EI and will be discussed below. 
Thus there appears to be no compelling reason to not accept the definition of 
intelligence used in this thesis. There is no sensible alternative to this definition and 
the attacks against IQ testing also seem to faiL In addition, even a brief trip to any 
psychology library will reveal that there is a vast body of work which supports the 
definition of intelligence used in this thesis. Intelligence is what IQ tests test. The 
debate around this subject has been heated, possibly due to the lay appeal of the 
construct and its social importance, but ultimately the psychometric definition seems 
sound. 
1.3 The 'Emotion' in El 
There has also been considerable debate about what exactly emotions are and 
because emotions are central to any theory of EI, a very brief introduction to emotion 
theory is included here. This thesis is solely concerned with how to measure 
emotion, not necessarily which of the theories of emotion is most accurate. A brief 
introduction to the myriad theories is included because emotion is so clearly central 
toEL 
A physiologically oriented approach to emotion was taken for this thesis for two 
reasons. Firstly, although there are some EEG/ERP studies of EI (Jausovec & 
Jausovec, 2005) there are (at time of writing) no studies of the psychophysiological 
correlates of El. Secondly, it was decided that a more 'objective' measure of 
emotional state might be informative in EI research which is usually assessed with 
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self-report measures. The use of this approach neither excludes nor diminishes other 
approaches, it is simply the approach used here. 
1.3.1 Definitional Plurality 
The first notable quality of emotion theory is that it lacks anything approaching the 
clarity present in intelligence theory. There are literally dozens of important 
emotions theorists, all of whom espouse different definitions of emotion, the 
important facets of emotion, and even what constitutes an emotion or a theory of 
emotion. Even if humanistic or phenomenological theories are excluded and only 
psychological theories are examined, theories range from the strictly physiological or 
neuroscientific (e.g., Bradley, 2000; James, 1894 cited in Strongman, 2003) through 
the cognitive-physiological view suggested by Shachter and Singer (1962) to the 
'positive psychological' books by Seligman. As Power and Dalgleish (1997) note, 
even within a specific type of emotion theory (e.g., cognitive theories) there are 
numerous sub-theories (e.g., appraisal theory, network theoties) each with 
suggestions from different authors (e.g., the Schachter, Oatley-Laird, Lazarus, and 
Scherer theories). There is little common ground between these different standpoints 
and it is very difficult to be certain that any one is superior to the others. Thus 
emotion theory differs from intelligence theory in two important ways: there are 
many more theories and there is little consensus between theorists. 
In addition to the quantity and diversity of these theories, emotions theories differ in 
what criteria are used to evaluate the quality of a theory. Some theorists suggest a 
phenomenological understanding of emotion and value ecological validity, others 
prefer a neuroanatornical understanding of emotion and value the seeming clarity of 
psychophysiological studies. In other words, emotions theories differ 
psychologically and epistemologically. To make matters more confusing. most 
theories have been supported well in journals which share their epistemological 
viewpoint. These differences in theory and rationale make it virtually impossible to 
come to a firm conclusion about which theory is 'best.' 
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1.3.2 From Plurality to Physiology 
However, the physiological facet of an emotional response is unequivocal. Like 
intelligence research, the biological bases of emotion are so well-known as to be in 
first-year textbooks (e.g., Gleitman et al., 2004). Oatley and Jenkins (1996), amongst 
others, provide a succinct summary of the history of our understanding of the 
physiological aspect of emotion. 
It is well known that the peripheral and central nervous systems are involved in 
emotion perception or production. The hypothalamus, thalamus, a~ygdala, limbic 
system, and the neocortex, not to mention the myriad neurotransmitters and other 
chemicals all have clear emotional effects (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996). Brain lesion 
and selective stimulation studies of animals and humans has shown that CNS activity 
seems to play an important causal role in emotion expression and perception whilst 
activity in organs innervated by the peripheral nervous system (e.g., heart, 
integument, pupils, muscles, etc.) seem to be re]jably correlated with, if not causally 
responsible, for affective experience (Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2000). The activity 
of these organs, also known as 'arousal,' is as reliable correlate of emotional 
perception or production as IQ is a correlate of academic attainment. So it would 
seem that it is perfectly reasonable to use physiological arousal as an indicator of 
affective state. 
Physiological indices of emotion are not always useful for measuring complex 
emotions such as guilt, annoyance, jealousy, etc. Self-report indices might be better 
suited for these emotions. Brain imaging technology could potentially circumvent 
this issue, but for a number of reasons, such technology was not used in any of the 
studies here. An obvious workaround to this flaw with physiological indices is to 
simply examine simpler emotions such as general anxiety or general happiness, both 
of which can be easily induced using standard procedures such as affective pictures 
(e.g., lAPS, Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) 
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1.3.2 For the Present Purposes 
As was noted previously, this thesis is only concerned with measuring indices of 
affective state, not disproving or supporting any theory of affect. The scope has so 
limited in order to prevent theoretical and methodological aimlessness: it is better to 
examine one experimental instantiation in detail than give superficial coverage to 
many. This thesis covers EI, not emotions theories, of which any number could be 
supported. It may appear blindly empirical to focus entirely on affect measurement 
and remain agnostic on emotion theory, but this approach is defensible. 
Firstly, unlike in intelligence theory, it is defensible to separate measurement from 
definition when discussing emotions. This is because intelligence research examines 
how people differ and emotions research is more (but not solely) concerned with 
how people are similar. It would hardly be sensible to claim that intelligence is an 
ability that differs between people without some sort of measure to accompany the 
claim. Thus although measurement of emotion can inform emotion theory, it is not 
necessary to equate definition with measurement in the same way as is necessary in 
intelligence theory. Secondly, it is self-evident that two researchers could use 
identical measurement methods (e.g., self-report Likert scales) to arrive at different 
theories of emotion. Unlike in IQ research, measurement techniques are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for a definition of emotion and as such it is defensible to 
select a technique without accepting a specific theory. In emotions research, 
researchers with very different theoretical perspectives might make use of identical 
indices of affective state but in IQ research, the overwhelming consensus is that 
intelligence is IQ. 
For the laboratory studies included in this thesis, it was decided that physiological 
measurement of emotion would be the most suitable. The exact definition will be 
discussed in detail below, but at present it suffices to say that physiological 
indicators of affect are of primary interest in this thesis. This measurement technique 
is ideal because it entirely escapes self-report measurement techniques which are 
endemic to many EI tests - thus it provides an index of emotional state which is 
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entirely independent of self-report. Because self-report indices of emotion were used 
in most of the few experimental studies of EI there are, this is both novel and 
theoretically important because the results from these lab studies will inform 
researchers about how well EI fares when self-report methods are not used. 
It should also be made abundantly clear that due to the limited scope of this thesis, it 
can not be argued to provide a fuU account of emotional experience. As has been 
noted, it is very difficult to arrive at a conclusive definition and so it is hoped that by 
taking a very specific approach it will be possible to avoid confusion and 
unnecessary argument. This thesis is solely focused on general affective response 
and will not investigate discrete or more sophisticated emotions. It is not concerned 
with moods and great care has been taken to avoid the phrase 'mood regulation.' As 
will be explained, the studies in this thesis merely involved induction of general 
positive and general negative affect and not any specific emotions (e.g., happiness, 
sadness, etc). To avoid confusion, it should also be noted that the word 'general 
affect' and the word 'arousal' will be used interchangeably in this thesis due to their 
intimate association, especially in the measures used in these studies. This reduction 
in scope is necessary for the goal of creating controlled laboratory studies and 
although the interpersonal , cognitive, and other aspects of emotional response are 
therefore lost, it was felt that the control was worth sacrificing 'bandwidth'. If there is 
any evidence in these studies for the conjecture presented in this thesis, then a logical 
next step would be to probe these other theories of emotion, but a limited set of goals 
is probably appropriate at these early stages. 
1.4 In the Beginning ... 
Gardner's (1983) multiple intelligence theory offered two 'intelligences' which may 
have been the precursors to EI: intrapersonal and interpersonal ' intelligences.' These 
' intelligences' refer to an individual's ability to engage with and function effectively 
with others and with one's self. The similarities with some branches of some EI 
theories are obvious. 
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Usually EI is attributed to an article by Salovey and Mayer (1989/90, pg. l89) where 
it is defined as "the ability to monitor one's own and others' emotions, to 
discriminate among them, and to use the information to guide one's thinking and 
actions". Later (Mayer and Salovey, 1997 cited in Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & 
Sitarenios, 2003) clarified this definition into four 'branches', or skill groups: a) 
emotion perception; b) use of emotions to guide thought; c) understanding emotion; 
and d) managing emotion. The abil ity to manage emotion is of particular interest in 
this thesis as it is the focus of all the laboratory studies here and it will be discussed 
in more detail below. 
Two questions present themselves immediately. Firstly, because the definition of 
'emotion' is such a contentious issue, using such a term in a construct seems 
dubious. More importantly, the 'intelligence' aspect of EI must be inspected. 
As was mentioned in the discussion of Gardner' s theory, we must question whether 
or not a set of abilities constitutes 'an intelligence.' For the sake of discussion, it is 
assumed that 'an intelligence' is a meaningful label that actually can be applied to a 
potential construct, though this is far from certain. Clearly, Salovey and Mayer have 
been influenced by the thinking of Gardner's (1983) interesting but. flawed multiple 
intelligence theory. It seems to be assumed by Salovey and Mayer (1989/90) that 
what constitutes 'an intelligence' is a collection of abilities. 
This definition seems to allow for obvious non-intelligences, as a simply analogy 
should show. 'Automobile intelligence' is (at least) the ability to d~press then release 
the clutch while depressing the gas, the ability to judge distances and speeds, and the 
ability to operate to maintain a constant velocity whilst operating the transmission. 
Clearly, the idea of an automobile intelligence is nonsense, yet it is a collection of 
abilities, so by the Salovey and Mayer (1989/90) definition, it could be considered an 
'intelligence.' In other words, this definition of 'an intelligence' allows for non-
intelligences as well as EI and it is difficult to tell which is worthy of the 
designation. In an interesting but perhaps under-researched article, Locke (2005) 
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argues that EI is flawed because it seems very broad, unrelated to intelligence, and 
because 'one can not reason with emotions, only about emotions' (Locke, 2005, pg 
427). 
Not much has been offered in response to this argument, though Mayer, Salovey, 
and Caruso (1999) clarify their initial definition by suggesting that not only is El 'an 
intelligence' (again, assuming that this is a meaningful phrase) because it is a set of 
abilities, but also because these abilities are inter-correlated and share some variance 
with 'pre-existing intelligences' (Mayer et al., 1999, pg. 267) and because it 
increases with age and experience. 
This refinement further reveals the influence of Gardner on EI theory but these 
criteria still fail. They fail to rule out the 'automobile intelligence' discussed before 
(because high-IQ individuals are almost certainly better drivers and it is without a 
doubt that driving ability increases with age and experience) and they provide 
another loose reductio ad absurdum for the entire notion of 'multiple intelligences.' 
By these criteria, many skill sets could be considered intelligences, including some 
that would normally be considered unintelligent (e.g., street fighting). In short, 
Mayer's attempts to distinguish a 'competency' from an 'intelligence' fail because 
they do not exclude ridiculous constructs. This does not imply that EI is not an 
' intelligence' but it does suggest that any argument that EI is an 'intelligence' will 
need to proceed from a different angle. It could be argued that EI is related to 
intelligence because EI exists as some sort of orthogonal relationship to intelligence. 
The existence of autistic individuals with great logical abilities does seem to indicate 
some connection between these constructs, but this is a clinical comparison and it 
would be more interesting to see how the constructs would be related in the normal 
population. 
Perhaps the crucial criterion for an 'intelligence' is that it should be almost perfectly 
cognitive in nature. This might be tacitly assumed in Mayer et al.'s (1999) work, but 
it certainly isn't in Gardner's (1983), which calls for kinaesthetic and musical 
intelligences, amongst others. If this cognitive criterion is combined with the other 
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criteria Mayer eta!., (1999) set out, we do arrive at something approximating a 
sensible definition of 'an intelligence.' EI would seem to meet these criteria as EI 
involves words like thinking, monitoring, discriminating, and other distinctly 
cognitive words. In a word, an 'intelligence' that is not cognitive is simply a set of 
skills and abilities. This is not to say that 'automotive intelligence' or 'kinaesthetic 
intelligence' are not valid collections of s.kills, merely that they are not intelligence. It 
is cognition that sets intelligence aside from a set of abilities. 
Even with this refinement, a more conservative label than El should probably be 
used. This would avoid considerable confusion and debate about the 'intelligence' 
facet of EI. A phrase like Emotional Competency would be more appropriate, but for 
the sake of convention EI is used here with the above caveats in mind. 
1.5 But whose El do we discuss? 
The definition offered by Salovey & Mayer (1989/90) is not alone, although it is the 
only one which has claimed that EI is 'an intelligence' and suggested criteria for 
what 'an intelligence' is. Bar-On offered an alternative definition ofEI in his earliest 
(EI related) peer-reviewed article as a 'Noncognitive intelligence .... defined as an 
array of emotional, personal, and social abilities and s.kills that influence an 
individual's ability to cope effectively with environmental demands and pressures' 
(Bar-On, 2000, pg 1108). It is strange that Bar-On should argue that Emotional 
'intelligence' is non-cognitive, but this issue is bracketed for the sake of discussion. 
Additionally, a multitude of definitions are available in 'popular psychology' texts 
(for a brief review, see Ciarrochi, Chan, & Caputi, 2000); none are worth 
considering in any depth as they differ little from the Bar-On definition or each 
other. There has been considerable debate about which theory of EI is 'the best' (see 
Matthews, Roberts, & Zeidner, 2002, for an introduction to this debate). The central 
issues of this debate are the same issues that are used to criticise EI more generally 
and these shall be addressed below. At present, researchers seem to have agreed to 
separate the existing theories into different sub-types. 
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Mayer et al., (1999) suggested that EI theories be split into either mixed theories or 
ability theories. Mixed theories of EI are those theories which consider EI as a 
collection of behavioural and personal dispositions and ability theories are those 
which consider El a collection of specific 'emotional skills.' This distinction is not 
particularly convincing because it inappropriately suggests that self-report tests can 
be used to measure an ability. This seems awfully unlikely given that we would have 
little patience for self-report measures of cognitive ability or any other ability for that 
matter. In a word, Mayer et al., (1999) argued a theoretical split which 
inappropriately ignores the testing procedure used. 
Such a split is inappropriate because if only a theoretical distinctio~ is made, it is 
possible to arrive at psychometric absurdities. For example, there are self-report EI 
tests which were created to test ability EI (e.g., the Schutte EIS, discussed below). 
This doesn't seem to be a sensible approach simply because it is self-evidently 
dubious to measure an ability simply by asking someone his opinion of his own 
skills. At the risk of adding too much brevity to this discussion, the world would be 
full of far more intelligent people than it actually is if it were assumed that cognitive 
ability could be measured by asking people 'how smart are you?'. 
Petrides and Furnham (2000) made a more sensible distinction based on testing 
methods. They argue for a theoretical and psychometric split between trait and 
ability EI in which the former is a collection of vaguely cognitive abilities which are 
tested using a collection of objective tasks and the latter is a collection of 
behavioural dispositions which are tested using self-report questionnaires. This 
distinction seems more sensible as it keeps the two theories and related psychometric 
practices entirely separate. To put it simply, trait EI is a collection of behavioural 
tendencies and self-beliefs measured with questionnaires whereas ability EI is a 
collection of emotion-related skills measured with purportedly objective measures. 




Despite the definitional issues that beset EI, there is a notable and growing body of 
evidence that support its meaningfulness as a construct. Trait El has been especially 
favoured by researchers, for reasons that will be addressed below. 
1.6.1 The Schutte et al. (1998) EIS 
There are numerous tests of trait EI. Perhaps the most widely used is the un-named 
Schutte et al., (1998, 2001) EI scale. This measure is 33 items long and, like all trait 
EI tests, assesses EI with a Likert scale in a manner similar to personality 
questionnaires. 
Factor analytic studies of the Schutte et al., (1998) measure have yielded equivocal 
results. Petrides and Fumham (2000) enumerate various reasons for caution with this 
measure. Chiefly, they note that the factor structure of the test is unclear: a 
unifactorial ( overa!t EI) solution failed and the number of factors extracted depended 
too heavily on the extraction ' rule' used. Additionally, the four-factor solution they 
found only accounted for 40% of the variance in test responses and thus left 
considerable error variance. Petrides and Fumham (2000) note that there is a paucity 
of reverse-keyed items in this measure and thus bias from acquiescence is a potential 
issue. The content of the test favours a one-factor solution although the four-factor 
solution is tenable. Austin, Sakofske, Huang, & McKenney (2004) offer a more 
encouraging study. These researchers presented a 41-item variant of the Schutte et 
al. (1998) measure with a larger number of reverse-keyed items and showed in a 
large sample that both this variant and the original measure were reliable and had a 
reasonably clear factor structure, although they decided on a three-factor rather than 
a four-factor solution. Additionally, it was shown that both of these tests correlated 
moderately with another trait EI test (EQ:i, discussed below). Other researchers 
(Saklofske, Austin, & Minski, 2003; Gignac, Palmer, Manocha, & Stough, 2005) 
have found a four-factor solution, although some fit indices were less than ideal. 
1.6.2 The EQ-i 
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This measure was developed by Bar-On (Bar-On, 1997) to measure overall EI as 
well as fifteen EI subscales including Self Regard, Optimism, Problem Solving, and 
Assertiveness. This test is owned, scored, and distributed by a corporation called 
MHS. 
VanDerZee and Wabeke (2004) performed one of the few independent 
investigations of the factor structure of the EQ-i. They used principal components 
analysis to extract three factors from fifteen subscale scores they analysed. Although 
their factor analytic procedure (PCA) and their criteria for accepting factors 
(eigenvalues greater than 1) are assailable, their results support what is claimed by 
Bar-On regarding the factor structure of this test. A similar study of the 'youth 
version' of the EQ-i was perfonned by Parker et al., (2005) in a sample of aboriginal 
and non-aboriginal North American youth. This test appears to have a four-factor 
structure rather than the three-factor structure of the normal EQ-1 (Parker et al., 
2005). Thus it seems that the EQ-i is a more psychometrically sound instrument than 
the EIS, with two important caveats. The EQ-i is not a free instrument and although 
MHS do provide raw item data and sub-scale data, they do not provide scoring keys 
for these data and thus all scoting procedures are carried out by the test distributor. 
1.6.3 Other Measures 
Alternatives to the longer EQ-I and the short, factorially opaque EIS have been 
developed, including a short-form of the EQ-i. Most notable of these are the TEIQue 
(Petrides & Furnham, 2003) and the SUEIT (Swinburne University" Emotional 
Intelligence Test), both of which are the focal point of major EI research groups. 
There are also numerous tests which are presented and supported in single articles 
and have not received the quantity of attention the aforementioned tests have (e.g., 
Wong & Law, 2002). It is possible that these newer EI measures may address some 
of the limitations in the EIS. 
1.6.4 Construct Validity 
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Many researchers have shown that trait E1 test scores correlate with a large number 
of hypothetically relevant criteria. It would be expected that people who are more 
emotionally competent would score higher on other measures. Because emotions are 
central to both negative affect and social ability, it may be that high EI would 
provide insulation from negative affect and greater social abilities. The positive 
relationship between EI test scores and extroversion and agreeableness scores and 
negative re.lationship between EI scores and neuroticism scores has been confirmed 
many times (e.g., Bar-Onet al. , 2000; Dawda & Hart, 2000; O'Connor & Little, 
2003; Saklofske, et al., 2003). It is likely that trait EI is inextricable from personality 
scores, and in the absence of statistical controls it is possible that th~ predictive value 
of EI is due to its relationship with personality. 
Schutte et al. (1998) showed that high-EI individuals perform better at university 
than low-E! individuals, possibly because their EI allows them to manage the social 
and personal difficulties of late adolescence better. High EI seems to protect a person 
from some personality disorders, perhaps because high-EI seems to· result in more 
emotional stability and more positive affect and these effects prevent clinical levels 
of distress (Leible & Snell, 2004). Similarly, EI also seems to predict life satisfaction 
(Gannon & Ranzig:n) perhaps because fewer bouts of negative affect result in a 
generally happier life. So it seems that EI tests are correlated with both personality 
and personality-relevant processes. 
In addition to these personality-relevant correlations with EI, the convergent validity 
of EI tests is supported by findings that confirm that certain 'foundational' constructs 
are linked with El. For example, EI is negatively associated with scores on 
alexithymia tests (Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998; Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 
2001) which suggests that the ability to access one's own emotions·co-occurs with 
the ability to perform high-level tasks with emotions- this is exactly what would be 
expected if EI is meant to be a skill set with some kind of hierarchical organisation. 
In a similar manner, high EI is associated with high empathy (Schutte et al., 2001) 
and greater affect intensity (Engelberg & Sjoberg, 2004; Dawda & Hart, 2000), 
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which would be expected given the affective quality of these two constructs. At a 
' lower' level, EI tests seem to predict performance on emotional inspection time 
tasks similar to those used to test IQ (Austin, 2004,2005). These IT/EI correlations, 
which will be discussed in detai l below, have been interpreted in some cases as 
evidence for or against the claim that self-report EI tests measure an actual abilitiy. It 
has also been shown that trait EI scores correlate with reactivity to mood induction 
(Petrides & Furnham, 2003; Ciarrochi et al., 2000). These studies will be discussed 
in detail below but it suffices to say that trait EI tests have a behavioural substrate in 
addition to predictive validity. Also, EI is positively associated with constructs such 
as positive parental attachment (Kafetsios, 2004). Thus the construct validity of EI 
seems well supported not only because EI has important personality implications, 
but also because EI test responses correlate with other related constructs. Some 
reservations are discussed below. 
1.7 AbilityEI 
1.7.1 The MEIS/MSCEIT 
This is the most well-known of the ability EI tests. This measure began as the MEIS 
(Mayer EI scale) and has gone through successive iterations and alternations and is 
now known as the MSCEIT v2.0 (Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso EI test; Mayer, 
Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002). This test is 
a collection of emotion-related tasks which measure the four branches with a total of 
eight tasks: 1) facial emotion recognition; 2) pictures of stylised emotions and 
landscapes; 3) matching sensations to emotions; 4) judging which mood would 
facilitate which cognitive task; 5) combining two emotions to create a third; 6) 
deciding which emotion is made from the intensification of another emotion; 7) 
selecting an action to obtain a specific emotional outcome; and 8) judging which 
action would be best for regulating another's feelings. Pelfonnance on these tasks is 
measured by comparing a test-taker' s responses to those of a norm and expert group. 
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There has been some controversy over these scoring procedures (see Matthews, 
Roberts, & Zeidner, 2002) and this will be discussed below. 
This test and its iterations have been the subject of several detailed studies. 
Ciarrochi et al. (2000) indicated that the factor structure of the MEIS did not match 
what was predicted by the theoretical framework the test was based on. The 
MSCEIT, which is simply an adapted and expanded version of the MEIS, has fared 
better. Day and Carrol (2004) found either a two- or a four-factor solution. Similarly, 
Palmer, Gignac, Manocha, and Stough (2005) showed that the four-factor structure 
suggested in the test manual and in a recent report by the test's creators (Mayer et 
aL, 2003) fits the data, as do other solutions. 
1.7.2 Construct Validity 
Ability El test scores COJTelate with some of the same variables as trait EI scores but 
are more strongly correlated with measures of cognitive ability and less strongly 
correlated with personality test scores (Ciarrochi et al., 2000; Mayer et aL, 1999; 
O'Connor & Little, 2003; Schulte, Ree, & Carretta, 2004; Warwick & Nettelbeck, 
2004). Some studies have shown that ability EI tests fail to predict the same 
hypothetically-relevant criterion as trait EI tests do (e.g., Gohm, Corser, & Dalsky, 
2005), but this is not surprising given that trait and ability EI tests are not strongly 
correlated with one another (Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2005; Bastian et al., 2005). 
There are few experimental studies of ability EI but it appears that performance on 
inspection time tasks correlates with scores on the MSCEIT in a similar manner as it 
does to trait EI tests (Farrelly & Austin, in press). 
1.7.3 Section Summary 
This introduction to the literature shows a flawed but maturing construct. There are 
at least two notable different definitions of EI and at least three major tests of these 
26 
27 
types of EI. The debate about which of these theories and which of these tests is ' the 
best' will be addressed below, but a brief summary of the empiricaf evidence 
presented suggest that both types of EI have some validity. If nothing else, it is clear 
the EI is a construct with notable predictive power and thus is worthy of 
consideration, despite definitional issues. 
In terms of sheer numbers of studies, trait EI seems superior. More9ver, there 
appears to be more laboratory evidence of a connection between trait EI scores and 
low-level experimental tasks (Austin, 2004;2005). As noted, trait EI seems to predict 
everything it would be expected to, although this could be due to the file-drawer 
problem (Scargle, 2000). Ability EI receives slightly more support, as has been 
stated, but it has a smaller body of evidence in its favour. 
The psychometric status of the MSCEIT is superior, with some caveats. Compared 
to other tests, its factor structure is clearer and more similar to what was 
hypothesized by the authors (Palmer et al., 2005). It has been shown that some sub-
scale reliabilities of this ability test are low, but overall reliability is high and 
certainly on par with personality measures so this flaw does not reduce its relative 
quality as a test. McCann, Roberts, Matthews, and Zeidner (2004) suggest that 
'proportion ' and 'mode' scoring were preferable to consensus scoring although some 
advanced techniques could be used to correct for the flaws of consensus scoring 
(e.g., low reliability). A more serious flaw should be noted. With precious few 
exceptions (Palmer et al., 2005) studies have not been carried out on raw item data 
simply because MHS does not always provide raw item data. It is difficult to reach a 
scientific consensus when scientists are denied access to raw data. 
Possibly the most sensible way to think of the trait and ability distinction is to 
examine of the component 'skills' usually attributed to EI and to discuss what each 
theory suggests this skill actually is. For example, emotional sensitivity (i.e., 
sensitivity to others' emotions) is often considered to be a facet of EI. An ability 
theorist would argue that this is a skill which should be measured by objective 
indices of such a skill. A trait theorist would argue that emotional sensitivity is a 
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behavioural disposition. These viewpoints are probably both sensible as long as trait 
EI measures are not used to measure ability EI or vice versa. 
1.8 'An Elusive Construct'1 
There are profound differences between trait and ability EI theories though these 
theories use similar language. The debate about which is superior surrounds several 
issues which will be discussed. 
1.8.1 Incremental Validity 
As has been noted, EI tests correlate with personality and IQ tests (see Van Rooy & 
Viswesvaran, 2004, for a summary) and it is self-evident that the theoretical 
language used to describe EI is similar to that used in IQ and personality theory. 
Thus the incremental validity of this construct is a chief concern for many 
researchers. 
There have been a number of studies of the incremental validity of trait and ability 
EI (e.g., Bastian et al., 2005; Brackett & Mayer, 2004; Ciarrochi et al., 2000;Gannon 
& Ranzijn, 2005;Schulte et al., 2005), most of which have shown that EI generally 
predicts about 5% of variance in various outcomes above and beyond personality, 
IQ, and demographic variables. Interpretations of these clear facts vary. 
There seems to be evidence for the incremental validity of trait EI tests. Gannon and 
Ranzijn (2005) reported an R2 change of .01 above personality and demographic 
variables. Bastian et al. (2005) reported an R2 change of .05. There 'is similar 
evidence for the incremental validity of ability EI tests. Bastian et al. (2005) suggest 
that MSCEIT subscales show R2 changes ranging from .01 to .06. Brackett and 
Mayer (2004) report an R2 change of .05 and Ciarrochi et al. (2000) found an R2 
change of .04. Despite the similarity of findings between the two types of test, 
1 Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998 pg 989 
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different writers arrive at different conclusions about whether or not either type of EI 
test has incremental validity over personality, IQ, and demographic. variables. 
It may be possible that the differences in opinion are due to the seemingly small 
effect size- an increase of 5% of variance explained is not large. For example, in 
Bastian et al (2005) the 5% is added to an R2 of .35, for a total R2 of .40, thus the r 
increases from .59 to .63. This seems small, but it is meaningful be9ause of the shape 
of the r- R2 function. That is, if we plotj{r) = R2 it becomes immediately apparent 
that small changes in rare more meaningful (i.e., significant) as r increases. Thus a 
change in r from .59 to .63 is as unlikely to happen due to chance as is a change in r 
from .00 to .22, hence the high significance of these seemingly meaningless changes. 
Mathematically speaking, there is clear evidence of incremental validity. 
Authors (e.g., Bastian et al., 2005) who draw the same distinction between statistical 
and psychological significance seem to agree with Rosenthal and Rosnow (1991), 
but this perspective fails to take into account the fact that small effect sizes can be 
observed across populations and across the lifespan. A 5% difference in predictive 
power may be psychologically meaningful when it is viewed across the population, 
across an individual's lifespan, or across the lifespan of a population (cf. the role of 
intelligence on cognitive aging across the population). Thus it is probably reasonable 
to suggest that this 5% difference is both psychologically and statistically 
meaningful. Also, EI appears to have incremental predictive power over 
demographic and other hypothetically relevant predictors (Gannon & Ranzijn), not 
just IQ and personality. Thus, because there is statistical and psychological evidence 
for incremental validity and because this incremental validity supersedes a number 
of predictors, it is hard to call the incremental validity of EI into question. This 
endorsement is irrespective of the test used because there is similar evidence for the 
incremental validity of trait and ability tests. 
Even if it was the case that EI tests failed to show incremental validity over IQ and 
personality, which it isn't, EI could still be defended from the incremental validity 
complaint with an appeal to efficiency. If a researcher wished to measure EI and EI 
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tests were excluded because of a lack of incremental validity, he/she would be forced 
to use a combination of IQ and personality measures instead. This seems less 
sensible than retaining EI which seems to represent part of the theoretical space of 
both of these other constructs. 
1.8.2 Scoring Issues 
As Matthews, Zeidner, and Roberts (2002) note, the scoring procedures used in both 
types of EI test are problematic. Trait tests are answered with a self-report Likert-
type scale and ability tests are answered by comparing participants' responses to 
those of either experts or a group consensus. 
These approaches all have weaknesses. Obviously assessing IQ (i.e., intelligence) 
through self-report would be ludicrous (for some summary and an investigation of 
perceived intelligence, see Furnham & Buchanan, 2005) and it is common 
knowledge that people over-estimate their own intelligence. Similarly, it is silly to 
suggest that a consensual understanding is either necessary or sufficient to make an 
answer 'correct' (e.g., most people don't know calculus, but it is still mathematical 
fact). Having experts provide correct answers may seem more sensible, but it is 
unclear how expert opinions on a 'sample' of simple emotional tasks could 
accurately represent the multiplicity of emotional situations in the real world. 
The difficulty may lay in the expectations for 'objectivity' that the 'intelligence' part 
of the EI label confers. If EI is meant to be 'an intelligence' similar to IQ, then it 
should be as objective and clear-cut as IQ is. It is hard to conceive of 'an 
intelligence' that is tested with a scale that has ' no right or wrong answers'! 
The strong form of this argument reads: 
1) Trait EI fai ls as a construct because it is not objective en0ugh 
It becomes clear that this criticism is a red herring. The utility or value of the EI 
construct is not dependent on its objectivity. The value of the construct is dependent 
on its validity, the reliability of test results, and the robustness and variety of 
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research which supports it. Moreover there are certainly 'non-objective' self-report 
measures (e.g., personality) with nearly unassailable psychological value. 
Additionally, Austin (2004; 2005) has used an emotional inspection-time paradigm 
(nearly identical to the inspection time tasks used in IQ research) to show that self-
report EI tests correlate with clear, low-level objective tasks. This does not mean that 
EI tests are objective, but it does mean that they measure something that predicts 
objective task performance. Thus we must discuss the meaningfulness of a construct 
independently of its 'objectivity' (whatever that is defined as). 
Still, 1) is an understandable complaint, given the claims made by some authors and 
a weaker form of this attack is more threatenjng: 
2) Trait EI fails as 'intelligence' . That is, if 'an intelligence' is something that is 
objective, it must have objective questions that are either correct or incorrect. Trait 
EI tests do not have these objective questions, therefore EI can not be 'an 
intelligence.' 
This attack is not easily sidestepped, primarily because El is usually advertised as 
some form of intelligence. It is possible that this issue would disappear if we 
removed 'intelligence' from EI. Obviously it is not necessary for something to be 'an 
intelligence' in order to be a useful construct. Also, this complaint is somewhat 
superficial as it condemns the construct simply because it may not meet all the 
expectations that a label such as 'emotional intelligence' mjght bring with it. Surely it 
is empirical investigation that should decide whether a construct is useful, not a 
cursory inspection of lay associations with the construct's label, 
The fact that ability tests are scored by comparing participants' responses to those of 
an expert and consensual group does not mitigate claim 2). Although the MSCEIT is 
made of tasks rather than self-report statements, one can still question whether or not 
ability EI is 'an intelligence.' 
Clearly consensual agreement is hardly necessary or sufficient for a 'correct' answer. 
Several more subtle points should be noted. Firstly, if 'correct' is defined as 
consensual agreement then the immediate implication is that an 'emotional genius' 
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must appeal to everyone - a mediocre genius indeed. Few geniuses (by the 
psychomenic definition) can even be understood, let alone appreciated, by everyone. 
Also if 'correct' is simply agreed-upon, then it is not possible that a person might 
bring external insight to the majority view- a stagnant and self-referential system is 
hardly ' intelligent' . This arrangement would exclude Einstein because his work did 
not fit in the majority view of physics! Thirdly, this type of scoring is a form of blind 
empiricism not unlike the MMPI that is dependent entirely on norm-group 
expectations which will almost certainly change as time passes- we don ' t really call 
something this malleable 'an intelligence.' Thus consensus scoring seems no more 
viable than self-report in light of argument 2). It may be argued that intelligence bas 
a normative element and thus a 'common appeal' element to intelligence is merely 
part of its placement in the social arena, but intelligence also has a largely objective, 
performance-related element, so it seems sensible that intelligence should be 
objectively indexed. 
Expert scoring (a process which results in nearly identical results according to Mayer 
et al., (2003)) may be the best option in light of 2). If expert scoring is used, EI tests 
become more like 'exams' which are marked according to what 'experts' 
(researchers in emotion, according to Mayer et al., 2003) know or think about 
emotional situations. Of course it is far from certain what exactly ~akes an 
emotional 'expert' , let alone that such expertise is granted to emotions researchers. It 
is certainly possible that test-takers might disagree with expert views on emotional 
situations, but like students that disagree on interpretations of factor analysis, they 
might not be wrong but they are further from 'correct'. The only issue that remains is 
the problem of blind empiricism -scoring depends on potentially mercurial 'expert' 
opinions. 
Because of the difficulties associated with scoring procedures for both types of EI 
test, it is really not reasonable to say that either is better. Although expert scoring is 
probably superior to self-report or consensual scoring and thus ability EI is probably 
superior in that there is more experimental research supporting trait EI, so it is 
difficult to recommend one over the other. 
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1.8.3 Convergent/Divergent Validity 
Another contentious issue is the amount of divergent validity shown by EI tests, 
specifically trait tests. Simply put, because EI tests correlate highly with personality 
measures (see references above or Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004, for a review) 
many (e.g., Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts,2002) have argued that EI is simply 're-
inventing the wheel.' Although incremental validity studies have shown this is not 
exactly true, it is still worth examining. 
Both types of EI tests correlate with personality tests and indexes of intelligence (if 
not IQ itself), but the relationship between trait EI and IQ is weaker and less robust 
than that between ability EI and IQ. Moreover, trait EI tests share considerable 
variance with personality measures (e.g., Bastian et al., 2005). These facts have been 
used to argue that trait EI is less 'intelligence-like' than ability EI. There is very 
little in the way of a rejoinder to this critique. If something is meant to be 'an 
intelligence' it really ought to correlate with intelligence. The fact that trait EI tests 
do not do so has been argued to reduce their convergent validity but in fact this lack 
of correlation supports the divergent validity of trait EI. This type of EI has not been 
argued to be a set of skills but a collection of behavioural tendencies, so the lack of 
correlation is entirely acceptable or even preferable to a connection between El test 
scores and cognitive ability. 
However, a similar complaint can be lodged at ability EI. If it is meant to be 
'emotional' intelligence, then it should be expected to be influenced by personality, 
especially neuroticism (i.e., emotionality) and extroversion. The fact that ability EI 
tests are rather weakly correlated with these measures seems to suggest that their 
convergent validity is also questionable. 
1.8.4 Concluding Thoughts 
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The three topics discussed here have been focal points of the EI debate but neither 
theory ofEI seems to be unequivocally superior. The incremental validity of the two 
types of EI tests seems to be roughly equivalent, both have scoring issues, and both 
have some issues with convergent/divergent validity. 
It is fairly clear that EI is a heterogeneous construct: ability EI is defined in a manner 
somewhat reminiscent of IQ in that it is argued to be a collection of skills and trait 
EI is defined similarly to personality in that it is a collection of behavioural 
tendencies and self beliefs. These similarities start in theoretical language and run 
through psychometric techniques to predictive power. Thus it is somewhat 
unreasonable to compare them directly to find the ' better' theory. This is probably 
what Mayer et al. (1999) had in mind when they suggested that trait and ability EI 
are completely different constructs. 
If we view these two theories independent of the 'intelligence' label which has 
confused the issue, trait EI seems to have slightly more in its favour. The criticisms 
levelled at trait EI can be applied to ability EI with slight alterations and although 
ability tests have some unique strengths (e.g., the psychometric clarity of the 
MSCEIT), they are countered by unique weaknesses (the poor value-for-money of 
the MSCEIT). More importantly, there have been more studies of the predictive 
validity of trait EI by a greater number of research groups (across the world even) 
and there are also a greater number of freely available trait EI tests. 
As was discussed before, the notion that EI is 'an intelligence' has some serious 
flaws. Simply put, it may be unreasonable to expect that EI is analogous to either IQ, 
personality, or both. It is probably more sensible to consider it separately from these 
constructs. This seems obvious, but researcher have not always ensured that 
hypotheses are derived from the description of the construct' s constituent parts rather 
than the name of the construct. 
1.9 El and Affect Regulation 
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Both trait and ability EI include the ability to regulate moods or emotions. Because 
this ability is the focus of chapters 5-8 in this thesis, some space will be devoted to it. 
1.9.1 What is Emotion/Mood? 
As was noted above, it is not immediately clear even what 'mood' and 'emotion' 
refer to. Forgas and Cromer (2004), amongst others, suggest that 'moods' differ from 
'emotions' in that they are long-lasting, less consciously accessible, and have a 
stronger effect on other cognitive processes. It is unclear why in this same study 
(Forgas & Cromer, 2004) they contradict themselves by using film stimuli (very 
'emotion' like- consciously accessible and usually not capable of long lasting 
effects) to induce 'mood', but this method of discrimination may still be useful. A 
definition of emotion is similarly elusive and contentious, despite agreement about 
facial expression and emotion (e.g. , Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Fridlund, 1991). Like 
EI, it seems that mood and emotion are aspects of behaviour that everyone 
understands but no one can agree upon. If it were even possible to reach a 
consensual definition of emotion, such a project would require volumes and might be 
of limited use. 
The word 'affect' will be used here in place of either mood or emotion for two 
reasons. Firstly, the term affect is used because the methods used to induce either 
'mood' or 'emotion' are nearly identical to one another, as are the self-report scales 
used as indices of 'mood' or 'emotion,' so methodologically it seeniS that a general 
'affect' label is appropriate. This thesis is chiefly concerned with a very specific 
aspect of affect- physiological arousal. Secondly, it seems appropriate to simply 
refer to affect because the 'mood regulation' component of EI would probably be 
expected to play a role in regulation of either moods or emotions. That is, it would 
be expected that high-EI individuals would be better at regulating their general, 
unconscious mood states as well as their momentary, consciously-experienced 
emotions. It would seem that as far as EI is concerned, it is unimportant whether a 
person experiences a mood or an emotion; as long as it is affect-related, EI should 
play some role in its regulation. 
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Physiological indices of affect are used in this thesis as the primary operational 
definition of affective response. Specifically, skin conductance measures are used. 
The physiological correlates of affect are well-known, robust, and nearly 
consensually recognised (Bradley, 2000). It does not appear that peripheral nervous 
system activity is a cause of affective experience (unlike activity in some parts of the 
CNS) but it seems that it is a reliable correlate of affect. Amongst these PNS 
correlates of affect experience are heart rate increases and decreases, pupil dilation 
and contraction, zygomatic and other muscle activity, amongst others. According to 
Bradley (2000), each of these peripheral systems or organs is uniquely sensitive to 
either the valence (pleasure) or intensity of an affective stimulus. Skin conductance 
appears to be an excellent indicator of changes in stimulus intensity but is less 
informative about changes in stimulus valence whereas heart rate changes are 
strongly correlated with changes in stimulus valence but are poor indices of changes 
in stimulus intensity. Owing to its purely sympathetic innervation, skjn conductance 
is a measure of flight-or-fight arousal. 
The use of physiological indices of affect necessitates a simplification: the vast 
complexity of affect response is ' reduced' to physiological arousal. Although this 
issue is ameliorated in chapters 7 and 8, it is impossible to escape the fact that this 
thesis pays the price in ecological validity for what it gains in precision. Thls would 
be the case for any study which used physiological indices of affect but there are 
issues spec~fic to skin conductance. Specifically, because skin conductance measures 
are good indices of the intensity of affect experience but not valence the most 
appropriate way to use skin conductance as a measure is to present only stimuli 
which are either generally positive (i.e., arousal decreasing) or generally negative 
(i.e., arousal increasing). Similar allowances would need to be made for other 
physiological indices but regardless of which indicator is used, it is clear that 
physiological studies of affect omit some of the subjective and experiential aspects 
of affect. This simplification and its importance are discussed in more detail in 
chapters 6 and 9. 
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It may also be blindly empirical for this thesis to be solely concerned with 
physiological arousal because such a focus does not require or entail any theory of 
affect. This complaint fails for several reasons. Firstly, this criticism merely knocks 
down a straw man- it is not claimed that affect is only physiological arousal (this 
was disproved in Schacter & Singer, 1962, if not earlier) solely that affect is 
operationally defined as physiological arousal for the purposes of this thesis. This 
claim also fai ls because it is simply wrong - if what is needed is a theoretical 
explanation, surely the text-book standard (see e.g., Gleitman, Fridlund, & Reisberg, 
2004) explanation of the link between arousal and affect should suffice. Thirdly, the 
approach used here may be reductive, but what it lacks in application to the 
complexity of affect it more than makes up for in rigour and 'objectivity'. Finally, it 
is unclear from this complaint which of the innumerable (and often contradictory) 
theories of affect should be adopted rather than the present suggestion and how 
entertaining the present suggestion precludes other theories of emotion. 
Again, it should be clarified that this thesis only examines affect. The induction 
techniques used and the dependant variables used to measure reaction to them all 
pertain to general affective state, also referred to as general arousal. The scope has 
been limited because it is so difficult to arrive at a certain definition of emotion. 
There are a multiplicity of theories of emotion, each of which could draw this thesis 
in a number of different theoretical directions and it would not be possible to 
investigate all of them in any detail. A limited scope allows greater.depth and it was 
the goal of this thesis to examine the connection between EI test scores and measures 
of general affect in some detail. Care has been taken to only use the word 'emotion' 
where it is strictly appropriate. 
1.9.2 What Is Affect Regulation? 
As Gross (1999) notes, affect regulation is a difficult term to define. There are 
numerous issues to contend with even once a suitably specific definition is adopted. 
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Firstly, a number of definitions for this process could be offered. At least one is not 
sensible. 
1) Affect regulation is the ability to control one's affect 
This definition begs the question. Specifically, the word 'control' automatically 
implies regulation. Thus it is necessary to define this process in another manner 
2) Affect regulation is the ability to change one's affect 
This works slightly better but seems to lead to some new issues. It is unclear from 
this definition what a good 'affect regulator' changes his/her affect to and under 
what circumstances this person changes his/her affect. People might change their 
affect to be more positive or negative, but it is unclear from this definition which 
direction they actually choose. It is also unclear from this definition whether we are 
to assume that good 'affect regulators' are always in an affective state of their 
choosing - if they can change it at their leisure, are we to assume that if they aren't 
changing it, they're satisfied with it? 
To address these flaws, affect regulation will be defined as 
3) The ability to return one' s own affective state to some 'baseline' level following 
any affectively positive or negative disturbance from this 'baseline' level. 
This definition is not perfect. For example, the exact mechanisms involved in this 
process are obscure even at the level of flowchart models, let alone at the 
physiological level. It may also be asked if people actually live at a 'baseline' level 
of affect. Resolving these profound issues is beyond the scope of this PhD but given 
the experimental evidence in a variety of modalities for affect regulation processes 
(e.g. , Butler et al., 2003; Gross & John, 2000) it seems that it can not be immediately 
dismissed. 
1.9.3 El and Affect Regulation 
Affect regulation is an integral aspect of EI in most definitions (e.g., Mayer et al., 
1999). It is expected that people higher in EI will be better at mood regulation. The 
implication for the studies in this thesis is that according to ability EI theory, the 
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higher a person's EI, the better he/she will be at returning his/her affective state to 
some 'baseline' level. In physiological tenus, it would be expected that high-EI 
individuals would be less physiologically reactive (i.e., smaller changes in arousal 
from baseline) to the stimuli due to their increased affect regulation abilities. As such 
it is critical to note that this thesis measures affect regulation indirectly by examining 
participants' changes in physiological arousal. This approach to measuring affect 
regulation has a precedent in the studies discussed in chapter 2. Of course, it would 
be ideal to measure affect regulation directly, but doing so would result in reliance 
on self-report measures. It would seem unproductive to use EI test questions to ask 
participants if they regulate their affect and then to simply repeat a similar question 
in a laboratory situation. However, self-report indices of affective state could be a 
useful supplement to physiological indicators and this combination is used in later 
studies in order to hone in on the relationship between EI test scores and 
physiological reactivity (and thus, affect regulation) from multiple 'angles.' 
It also may be the case that higher EI is related to less effective affect regulation. 
Perhaps high-EI individuals are more sensitive to affective and thus react more 
strongly to affect induction. This thesis will examine both of these possibilities by 
using skin conductance activity as an indicator of affective reactivity. In these 
studies, reactivity and regulation are effectively inverses. Higher reactivity suggests 
less regulation and lower reactivity suggests more regulation, and vice versa. It 
should be noted that, strictly speaking, regulation is not the inverse of reactivity. 
Reactivity refers to how much an individual reacts to a stimulus and regulation refers 
to the degree to which this person alters or neutralises his affect, after the reaction 
has already taken place. Thus, unlike in reaction time studies, regulation is not the 
direct opposite of reactivity - regulation is sufficient but not necessary for reactivity. 
However, it seems sensible to suggest that participants' reactivity will be lower when 
they are specifically instructed to regulation their affect and as such, reactivity is 
used here as an indicator of regulation. In later chapters, self-report. measures of 
reactivity are used alongside physiological indicators. This method indirectly 
assesses regulation and accomplishes one of the purposes of this thesis, which was to 
circumvent self-reports of EI-related behaviours. 
39 
40 
1.10 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter the definitions of emotion and intelligence to be used in this thesis 
were introduced and defended. It was also suggested that EI has some definitional 
issues related to the word 'intelligence' but that these definitional issues have been 
somewhat resolved by splitting EI into two sub-constructs known as trait and ability 
EI. These sub-constructs are theoretically different but it is differences in 
measurement procedures which are used to categorise the sub-constructs. Trait EI 
tests are more numerous than ability tests but tend to have more confusing factor 
structures. The nomological net of trail EI is better understood. The debate about 
which EI sub-construct has revealed a number of issues which apply similarly to 
both trait and ability EI tests but trait EI is recommend over ability simply because 
of the increased research attention paid to it, the preponderance of free tests, and the 
promise for the future that this attention grants. The operational definitions of affect 
and affect regulation that will be used for the remainder of this thesjs were also 
introduced and defended. 
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Chapter 2: Experimental Investigations of El 
Most studies of EI to date have been correlational studies. The purpose of this 
chapter is to discuss experimental studies of EI in detail. This coverage also 
complements the evidence that has clarified the nomological net of EI tests. In 
particular, this chapter will cover studies by Ciarrochi et al. (2000),.Petrides and 
Furnham (2003), and Austin (2004;2005), the theoretical relevance of their findings, 
and some specific experimental directions left unexplored. 
2.1 Ciarrochi et al. (2000) 
This is one of the oldest large-scale studies of EI and it is one of the first 
experimental studies ofEI. Although this study actually involved several conjoined 
tasks, the discussion here will focus on their investigation of how people with 
different EI levels reacted to mood manipulations. 
Ciarrochi et al. (2000) expected that having high EI would shield a person from the 
effect that an irrelevant mood might have on a judgment task. It is known that moods 
can influence performance on cognitive tasks (e.g., Forgas, 1998) and it was 
assumed in this study that participants would wish to minimize the impact that an 
irrelevant mood had on their task performance. The critical issue was whether or not 
high-EI individuals would be more capable of avoiding the influence of the 
irrelevant mood. That is, although everyone would want their cogni'tive procedures 
to remain unaffected by moods, only high-EI individuals might be able to ensure this 
was the case. The researchers also expected that the greater mood regulatory abilities 
associated with high EI would result in evidence of 'mood maintenance' and 'mood 
repair' strategies: a) high-EI individuals were expected to recall more positive 
memories than low-EI people after either a positive (to 'maintain' their mood) or a 
negative (to ' repair' their mood) mood induction; and b) hlgh-EI individuals were 
expected to report more positive mood after either a positive or negative mood 
induction, as a result of these processes. Thus a mood x EI interaction was predicted 
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in both the judgment task and the self-report mood state task. They also examined 
whether EI or IQ is a better 'insulator' from the effect of moods. 
134 participants, most of whom were female, took part in a four-phase study to test 
these hypotheses. EI was tested with the MEIS, an ability EI test which was a 
precursor to the MSCEIT. Mood was induced first for ten minutes using a comedy 
programme clip (positive), a film on architecture (neutral), or a cancer death (ten 
minute negative). The judgment task followed this induction and after the judgment 
task, five minute clips were used to induce affect. After the five-minute induction, 
participants recalled memories from school and the positivity of their memories was 
used to test a different hypothesis. 
The predictions were partially supported. The predicted mood x EI interaction did 
not occur for the judgment task, nor was there any mood main effect. There was a 
mood x IQ interaction, which suggested that high IQ does shield a person from the 
influence of irrelevant moods. There was a mood x EI interaction on the memory 
task: high-EI individuals recalled more positive memories in the positive and 
negative mood conditions than did low-EI individuals, although there were no 
differences in the neutral mood conditions and these effects were only observed for 
the first memory recalled after mood induction, not the second or third. Finally, it 
was shown that high EI individuals did report more positive affect after recalling 
positive memories, but not after neutral or negative memories. 
The findings from this study suggest that EI effects are not always predictable and 
that IQ may be more useful in preventing the influence of irrelevant moods, 
depending on the task. The unpredictability of EI effects is something that will be 
observed in all of the studies reviewed in this chapter, as well as the studies in this 
thesis. Ciarrochi et al.'s (2000) study seems to call either EI theory or testing into 
question. 
2.2 Petrides and Furnham (2003) 
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These researchers' intent was to investigate the relationship between the emotion-
regulation facet of EI and performance on laboratory-based tasks. This study was in 
fact two experiments and because the first was concerned with face perception, a 
topic which is addressed again below, each will be reviewed in turn. 
2.2.1 Study 1, Trait El and Emotional Face Perception 
Part of EI is the ability to accurately determine the emotional state of another. 
Petrides and Fumham (2003) predicted that because faces are so critical to emotion 
expression EI would include the ability to read emotions from facial displays. High-
Er individuals were expected to identify facial displays of emotion more accurately 
(a Ia Ekman faces) than low-EI individuals. 
The researchers split thirty four participants into high- and low-scoring EI sub-
groups of equal size, based on their respective scores on the EQ-i. These participants 
then viewed movie-like frames of a face transforming from a neutral face to one of 
the 'basic' emotions (Ekman & Friesen, 1996): three 'films ' each for anger, sadness, 
surprise, happiness, disgust, or fear. These 'film' clips were actually still images 
arranged in order that presented each still image for two seconds before moving to 
the next automatically, as in an automated slide presentation. Each emotional 'film' 
was comprised of 21 still images. The mean latency for identification of each 
emotional expression as well as the number of images required for identification was 
recorded. 
The hypothesised difference in ability to identify emotional expressions was 
supported, with high-EI individuals recognising emotions faster and (necessarily) 
with fewer stills. Thus this study provides support for EI theory by showing that in 
lab tasks, EI differences correspond to task performance differences. There were 
perhaps issues which could be improved in this study: the EQ-i does not contain any 
facial emotion recognition items and the task itself was fair ly unchallenging, even 
for low-E! individuals. These types of flaws are hardly insurmountable and a 
replication that used a different EI test or perhaps a slightly more difficult task 
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(perhaps using faces for 'gui lt' or other complex emotions) could be easily done. As 
Petrides and Furnham (2003) note, the fact that the task performance differences 
exist even with a limited test such as the EQ-i only serves to support the suggestion 
that EI tests to seem to test some kind of emotional competence. As an aside, it 
would be interesting to determine if performance on this task correlated with 
performance on the facial perception component of the MSCEIT, as the two tasks 
seem very similar. It may even be the case that the task used here could be adapted 
as an alternative to the MSCEIT. 
2.2.2 Study 2, Affect Regulation 
Their second experiment is of particular note for this thesis. Petrides and Fum ham 
(2003) investigated affect regulation using a different logic to arrive at an opposite 
hypothesis from that of Ciarrochi et aJ. (2000). Based on their first study which 
showed that higher EI is associated with more accurate emotion detection, they 
predicted that high-EI individuals would be more 'susceptible to affect' (Petrides & 
Furnham, 2003, pg 46). That is, it was predicted that EI test scores would be 
associated with greater reactivity to affect induction (cf. chapters 5-8 of this thesis, 
Ciarrochi, 2000).This is an interesting prediction to make because EI is not only 
characterised by greater emotional sensitivity, but also greater emotional control. It 
is hard to know which would be visible in behaviour! Here, Petrides and Fumham 
(2003) highlight one of the key difficulties in EI research: in a word, hypotheses can 
go in many directions with equally compelling logic on each. It should be noted that 
this is an issue which does not apply to trait EI because this form of EI allows for 
people to hold mutually exclusive self-beliefs or engage in contradictory behaviours. 
The issue of 'confl icting abilities' is more of a dilemma for ability theory. 
In this study, high- and low-scoring groups of fifteen were made from previous 
participants who were re-contacted. The researchers also residualised the 
participants' TEIQue scores for personality differences so the final ranking of 
participants from high to low had any personality variance controiJed for. In a mood 
induction paradigm, participants completed an emotional status questionnaire upon 
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arrival at a lab (baseline), after viewing a distressing film (negative), and after 
viewing a comedic film (positive). Responses to this questionnaire can be summed 
for a tension, depression, anger, vigour, confusion, and overall general negative 
affect score. 
The prediction of greater impact of affect induction was supported in all of the 
emotional state scales (e.g., anger, tension, etc) with the exception of 'confusion.' In 
addition to this overall tendency toward greater reactivity, it appears that high-EI 
individuals are more affected by changes in mood stimuli than low-E! individuals 
are: the negative film clip seemed to distress them more and the positive film clip 
seemed to 'restore' more positive affect than low-E! controls. 
It is difficult to fathom why Petrides and Fumham (2003) found a relationship where 
Ciarrochi et al. (2000) found none. It may be the case that these differences are due 
to differences in experimental procedure: Cianochi et al. (2000) used a more 
complex method of measuring mood reactivity- through judgment tasks and 
memories - than did the other researchers. It also may be the case that trait EI, 
examined in Petrides and Fumham's (2003) article, predicts behaviour in a different 
manner than does ability El. It could also be the case that the discrepancy in findings 
is due to the residualisation process that Petrides and Fumham (2003) used to control 
for personality variance- their findings may more accurately reflect how EI 
connects to behaviour than other studies. 
Because these two studies yielded different findings implications for EI theory, a 
replication would be enlightening. It would be a simple process to examine the 
residualised scores and compare them to EI results that had not been residualised, in 
order to determine if the residualisation process was responsible for these findings. 
Other methodological differences could be ruled out by a series of replications. The 
more important theoretical questions are less easily resolved. 
It is not immediately apparent why 'sensitivity' seems to win out over 'control' in 
this experiment or indeed why one facet ofEI would oven·ide another in any 
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experiment. It may be the case that if EI is a hierarchical construct (e.g., Mayer, 
1999, but see chapter 1 for issues with factor structure ofEI tests), the 'lower-level' 
abilities such as emotion recognition are dominant in the absence of any requirement 
for 'higher-level' activities. That is, perhaps the 'sensitivity' response wins out over 
'control' if there are no requirements for such a 'high-level' ability ." In Ciarrochi et 
al. 's (2000) study, participants had a cognitive task to perform after mood induction 
(the judgment task) whereas in Petrides and Furnham's (2003), there was no such 
task, so there was no real need for any kind of 'control'. An experiment which 
manipulated whether or not high-EI individuals were told they would need to 
'control' would determine if this is the case and such an experiment is carried out in 
Chapters 6 and 7. Alternatively, the dominance of 'sensitivity' could be due to it 
being more 'instinctual' than 'control' -perhaps it is an automatic response that 
must be actively suppressed in favour of 'control'. It may also be the case that trait 
EI scores are positively associated with emotional sensitivity whilst ability EI scores 
are positively associated with emotional control. However, these possibilities fail to 
account for Ciarrochi et al' s (2000) inability to reject the null hypothesis in some 
cases and it is hard to substantiate some of these suggestions without any 
experimentation. Part of the purpose of this thesis was to address the paucity of 
experimental studies of EI and although it has been geared to answer a specific 
question about a specific conjecture about EI, chapters 5-8 also serve to replicate 
findings about affect regulation and El. 
It may also be argued that the potential 'conflict' between sensitivity and control is 
more of an issue for ability EI than it is for trait El. Because trait EI is a collection 
of behavioural dispositions and self-beliefs, it is perfectly reasonable to predict that 
people's beliefs about and tendencies towards both control and sensitivity would 
correlate with objective indices of their levels of control and sensitivity. On the other 
hand, an ability theorist would have to explain why it is not clear a priori which of 
these two skills will 'take control' in a given experiment. 
2.3 Austin (2004,2005) and Farrelly and Austin (in press) 
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Austin (2004,2005) has carried out a number of experiments which have examined 
the correlation between EI score and perf01mance on an emotional face inspection 
time task. Although her methodology differs from that of Petrides and Fumham 
(2003), she has found similar support for EI by showing that higher trait and ability 
EI is associated with better performance on emotion-relevant tasks. 
2.3.1 Austin, 2004 
The prediction for this study is simple and is analogous to the predictions made 
about the correlation between IQ and reaction/inspection time. Simply, Austin 
(2004) predicted that higher EI scores would be associated with better performance 
on an emotional inspection time task. 
Undergraduates and members of a more mature volunteer panel completed the 
NART, a personaJity measure, the adapted version of the EIS (Austin et al., 2004), 
and completed three experimental tasks: a face inspection time (IT) task (either sad 
or happy), a control symbol ( + x) inspection time task, and an untimed Ekman 
emotion recognition task. The emotional inspection time task differed from the 
Ekman task in several important ways. First, each trial had a face-neutral mask-
prompt form, whereas the Ekman task had a single face with a multiple choice 
prompt. Secondly, the IT task was timed with the emotional face presented for a 
fixed duration no longer than 350 ms. 
The hypothesised correlation between EI and IT performance was partially 
supported. The 'appraisal' aspect of El, arguably the most immediately relevant to 
emotion perception, was sign ificantly positively correlated with performance on the 
two emotional IT tasks and the correlation between this EI sub-scale and the Ekman 
task approached significance. Because the IT tasks were intercorrelated, the variance 
attributable to the Symbol IT (control) task was partialled out and the correlation 
between EI and Sad IT remained. 
The results of this study suggest that trait EI does correlate with performance on 
objective emotional tasks in the lab, albeit not very strongly. This correlation 
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remains after controlling for participants' general IT ability. It is strange that Austin 
(2004) observed a significant correlation only for those EI items that measure 
emotional appraisal when Petrides and Fumham (2003) found similar results without 
any appraisal items. Still, these findings suggest that trait EI measures something 
' real.' They also suggest that trait EI is a useful way of measuring objective skills 
because it is clear that people who say they can perceive emotions well clearly do 
perceive emotions well. 
2.3.2 Austin, 2005 
This study was a replication of the previous study with several variations. In addition 
to the Ekman face task and the sad/happy IT task from Austin (2004), this study 
included a word inspection task. This word inspection task was actually two tasks: to 
decide whether a word is emotional or non-emotional and whether a letter string is a 
word or a pronounceable non-word. Also, the EQ-i short form was used to measure 
EI as well as a shorted version of the adapted (Austin et al. , 2004) EIS and the 
Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices was used to test fluid abi lity. Participants 
were all drawn from a volunteer panel of older individuals. 
The results from this study were similar to those of the previous study although the 
EI correlations were less robust. The 'interpersonal' facet of the re\'ised EIS 
correlated with performance on the combined emotional IT task. It does not appear 
that this correlation was calculated after controlling for general IT ability as was 
done previously. 
This article appears to be further evidence for the predictive validity of trait EI tests 
in the lab. However, some important caveats to this statement mustbe noted. First, 
the correlation between EI test scores and IT performance was weaker than in the 
previous study (Austin, 2004). This could be due to the age of the sample because 
the prior study had been carried out largely on young people. It could also be due to 
the EI test that was used, but this would be strange in tight of Petrides and 
Fumham's (2003) finding that the EQ-i predicts emotional face perception ability. It 
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must be asked why only a specific aspect of EI correlates with emotional IT 
performance if emotion perception is so fundamental to EI. To put ~t baldly, there is 
far too much variation between these experimental studies to allow any kind of 
consensus, except possibly on the finding that 'interpersonal/appraisal' EI correlates 
with emotional IT performance. These IT-EI studies have not been widely replicated. 
It may seem that the evidence does not outweigh the probability of a simple Type 1 
error but the specific nature of the findings above seems to hamstring this argument. 
Also, it may not be justified to expect that all EI sub-scales correlate with IT task 
perfonnance- not all IQ tests correlate with IT tasks either (e.g., the NART, Austin, 
2004). In ail, these studies provide some introductory evidence in favour of the 
construct validity of trait EI and although the support must be taken with the 
proverbial pinch of salt, it does appear that trait EI tests do index an objective 
ability. 
2.3.3 Farrelly & Austin, in press 
This article was similar to the prior studies (Austin, 2004;2005) but also addressed 
the dearth of experimental studies of ability EI in the lab. A correlation between 
MSCEIT score and emotional inspection time task performance is especially 
relevant because the MSCEIT itself contains tasks that are similar to the emotional 
IT task and because MSCEIT scores tend to correlate with IQ test scores, which are 
correlated with IT performance. Farrelly and Austin (in press) also predicted that the 
two types of EI would correlate with one another and that IQ would cmTelate with 
scores on the MSCEIT. 
The first experiment in this study examined the correlation between scores on ability 
(MSCEIT) and trait (Austin et al., 2004 variant) EI, intelligence (measured with the 
Gf/Gc Quickie Test Battery) performance on the IPT-15, a task that measures the 
ability to detect lying and social roles based on verbal and non-verbal cues, and 
performance on the emotional face and neutral symbols tasks. 
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Some of the hypotheses were supported in this study. Scores on the ability and trait 
EI measures correlated positively with one another as was expected, but scores on 
the IQ tests did not correlate with MSCEIT scores. The lack of correlation between 
IQ and ability EI seems at odds with the predictions and findings of Mayer et al. 
(1999). MSCEIT scores did not correla~e with any of the emotional IT tasks, but they 
did correlate positively with performance on the IPT-15 and, counter-intuitively, 
they correlated negatively with neutral symbol IT performance. Trait El test scores 
correlated with IPT-15 but not the emotional IT task. 
These results contradicted past results (e.g. , Austin, 2004;2005) in studies of both 
types of EI test. The second experiment was performed to determin~ if the findings 
of the first experiment were anomalous. The second experiment used more 
participants, a different measure of fluid g (Raven's APM), the Ekman faces task in 
addition to the IPT-15, and the EQ-i short-form instead of the Austin et al. (2004) 
variant of the EIS. Also, the happy face portion of the IT task was omitted but the 
sad face and symbol parts were retained. 
The results from this study supported the hypotheses to a greater extent than the 
those of the first study. Scores on the MSCEIT correlated positively with crystallised 
g but not fluid g, the Ekman faces task but not the IPT-15, and the sad IT task but not 
the symbol IT task. Scores on the MSCEIT and the EQ-i were correlated positively 
but EQ-i scores were not correlated with any of the lab tasks. 
The findings from these two studies seem to suggest that the MSCEIT measures an 
actual ability that is recognisable in similar laboratory tasks. The results of the 
second experiment seem to suggest that the MSCEIT predicts objective task 
performance better than trait EI tests, although the results from the first experiment 
differ. However, these reasonably clear findings come packaged with some odd 
findings. The correlation between MSCEIT and the IPT-15 was not replicated in the 
second experiment and it is suggested that low reliability could have caused this. 
However, it is unclear why a task with such low reliability was used in the analyses 
at all. Additionally, there were unexpected patterns of correlations between the 
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measures of fluid g and the tests and tasks in both studies. Despite claims to the 
contrary, ability EI tests scores tend to not correlate with measures of fluid ability 
(e.g., Ciarrochi et al., 2000), so perhaps these correlations are understandable. The 
finding that performance on the emotional IT task did not correlate with fluid ability 
initially seems problematic for the paradigm used in these studies, but because the 
correlation between IT tasks and fluid ability varies from study to study (Deary, 
2000), Scores on the trait EI tests failed to predict any of the lab tasks, but this is 
hardly surprising given that overall EI did not predict task perform~nce in either of 
the prior studies (Austin, 2004;2005) either. The finding that performance on only 
part of some ability EI tests correlates with IT task performance seems especially 
anaemic in light of the robust correlations between the MSCEIT and these same 
tasks. 
It also may be the case that the connection between ability EI test scores and IQ is 
simply due to the psychometric overlap between the two constructs. As ability 
theorists are quick to point out, this type of EI is theoretically and psychometrically 
related to IQ. It may be the case that all that the correlation between MSCEIT and IQ 
scores demonstrates is that some MSCEIT processes are similar to IQ test processes. 
Perhaps this correlation merely demonstrates that content overlap leads to 
psychometric overlap. This possibility might not trouble an ability theorist, however, 
as he might simply reply by saying that the purpose of the MSCEIT was in fact to 
test El like IQ is tested. Also, this criticism could be levelled at the trait theorist as 
well: perhaps the association between personality and trait EI is merely due to a 
similarity in how the questions are asked. 
2.3.4 Concluding Thoughts about Austin (2004;2005) and Farrelly & 
Austin (in press) 
It is difficult to be certain what these experiments show us as there are some issues 
that cloud the otherwise clear results. The IT task, at least in the most recent article, 
does not appear to correlate with fluid ability in a manner we'd expect an IT task to. 




very basic emotion perception, but given that Farrelly and Austin (in press) 
themselves note that inspection time tasks are usually correlated with fluid ability, 
the lack of any similar correlation is somewhat disconcerting. Perhaps a replication 
with a different IT task may yield similar results, although Burns and Caryl 
(manuscript in preparation) have found null correlations between trait EI and IT task 
performance when using a different task. There is some further confusion as the 
findings do not consistently replicate across studies and it is not immediately clear 
whether this is due to the low reliability of some tasks as well. 
These studies still shed a great deal of light on the construct validity of EI. They 
effectively doubled the experimental EI literature, presented a novei experimental 
paradigm, investigated both trait and ability EI, and also replicated/challenged 
findings about IQ and EI. In addition to these qualities, they also indicate that both 
trait and ability EI tests seem to measure something that can be independently 
measured with experimental tasks, even if one might disagree with the task used 
here. These studies also suggest that when the conditions are right, ~he MSCEIT is a 
better predictor of lab-based tasks. 
2.4 Interpretation and the Relevance of Experimental Studies to Theory 
These studies are important because some of them allow some preliminary causal 
inferences to be draw and because they shed light on how objective· abilities (e.g., 
facial display perception, affect regulation) correspond with different levels of trait 
and ability EI- this would not have been possible without experimentation. 
Ciarrochi et al. ' s (2000) and Petrides and Furnham' s (2003) studies showed that 
high- and low-E! sub-groups react differently to mood induction from one another. 
This is similar to the lab studies of extroversion and physiological arousal. Although 
these two studies yielded different results, it is certainly clear that there are 
meaningful differences in emotional sensitivity and emotional regulation between 
high- and low-E! individuals. These are precisely the results that would be expected 
according to EI theory and the fact that they were found in different labs with 
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different tests stands as convincing if preliminary evidence that EI tests measure the 
abilities they is advertised to measure. The results of Austin's (2004;2005) and 
Farrelly and Austin's (2005) studies are also very informative. Their facial 
perception task results suggest that there are basic tasks at which high-EI individuals 
outperform low-EI individuals. Again, these findings support the claims that EI 
theorists make. These studies also used laboratory tasks with pre-defined correct and 
incorrect answers which allowed for greater precision in interpreting results 
compared to the self-report methodology used in most questionnaire studies. 
Although participants' EI levels were not manipulated such that it is possible to be 
certain that EI differences cause skill differences, the different 'experimental' groups 
still perform differently and as such it is possible to draw preliminary causal 
inferences. 
These experimental studies are especially informative because they bypass the 
correlation-causation problem that is endemic to correlational studies. Although (see 
chapter 1) it certainly appears that EI tests measure something that correlates with 
many hypothetically predicted criteria, the wide range of the correlations and the 
overlap with other important variables (e.g., personality) make it hard to rule out the 
possibility that EI is caused by the criteria or a third variable. It is easier to argue that 
higher EI causes better task performance in such experimental studies as the samples 
are presumably random and thus not meaningfully different from one another, save 
in EI levels. Also, it is hard to think of a way that task performance which occurs 
after an EI test could affect EI test scores. Of course, it is possible that a third 
variable is causing the EI-task link given that EI tests correlate with other variables, 
but based on Austin's (2004;2005) and Farrelly and Austin's (2005) work, it 
probably isn't crystallised g, and it certainly isn't fluid g. Future studies could be 
designed to include other EI correlates such as personality in order to ensure that 
only EI is used to separate participants into high/low sub-groups. Yet although these 
studies leave many questions unanswered, they seem to suggest that when EI differs, 
behaviour on a number of objective, lab-based, emotion-related tasks changes as 
well. This is precisely what would be predicted according to EI theory and these lab 
findings greatly augment the questionnaire results reviewed in chapter 1. 
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2.5 Future Directions 
In addition to some refinements to the IT studies, it would be interesting to replicate 
and expand upon the affect regulation results obtained by Ciarrochi et al. (2000) and 
Petrides and Furnham (2003). As was noted above, the findings of these two studies 
were opposed, which is interesting in light of an EI theory that suggests a unitary 
construct - it is unclear how to reconcile the simultaneous, opposing action of two 
constituent parts of a single unitary construct. Additionally, there are some 
methodological changes that could be made to improve our understanding of the 
construct. 
Specifically, both of the affect regulation studies discussed previously relied on self-
report methodology to assess emotional state. There has not, at present, been a study 
of EI and affect regulation that has used an objective index of emotional state. This 
is more important than is initially apparent. Because both of the prior studies of EI 
and affect regulation have used self-report methodology to assess mood, it is 
possible that some sort of self-report response bias has contaminated the prior 
studies. It is possible, even plausible, that people who score highly on self-report EI 
questionnaires, specifically on items that measure mood regulation (e.g., 'I am good 
at controlling my mood'), would self-report their own emotions in ~ way that 
confirms their own self-perceptions. This may be an unavoidable consequence of 
self-report methodology and it was hoped that using physiological indices of affect 
in this thesis would circumvent this issue. In other words, it may be the case that any 
observed link between high EI and better affect regulation is simply due to people 
fibbing or reporting whichever emotional state that would prevent cognitive 
dissonance, probably not even intentionally. The use of an objective index of 
affective state would allow researchers to circumvent this issue because such an 
index would be independent of a participants' self-evaluation of EI level or affect. 
Although this is covered in greater detail in chapter 5, a number of 'objective' 
measures of affective state exist. Psychophysiological measures such as skin 
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conductance response, pupil dilation, heart rate, and zygomatic eye muscle activity 
(amongst others) each have unique advantages and disadvantages (Bradley, 2000) 
and would all would be suitable here. They are all presumably independent of one' s 
self-reported affective state in that most people are probably unlike~y to alter their 
skin conductance simply for the purpose of fooling an EI researcher. In other words 
it seems unlikely that these indices would suffer from self-report bias because they 
are not self-report measures. Also, as was noted in chapter 1, these indices are 
independent of the theory of emotion a researcher endorses, so it may be easier to 
interpret studies that examine the psychophysiological correlates of El without the 
theoretical 'baggage' attached to theories of emotion. All of the experimental studies 
in this thesis use psychophysiological methodology. 
A psychophysiological study of EI might also be useful in settling the 
aforementioned confusion about why some EI-related skills seem to override others. 
It was suggested that this discrepancy was due to one study involving a 'high level' 
task that required clear thinking and the other only involving self-report ratings. 
More attention is given to this possibility in chapter 3. It would be straightforward to 
design a study which manipulated how explicit the affect-regulation requirements 
were to participants and such a study would help determine what conditions result in 
an increased role of which EI-related skill. It is exactly this kind of experiment 
which is the subject of chapters 6 through 8. 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, a number of experimental studies of trait and ability EI were 
examined in detail. Although the results were in some cases contradictory and in 
other cases made unclear by additional questions, there can be no mistaking the 
finding that EI is linked to objective indicators of affective state. These studies also 
suggest that ability EI test scores, under the right circumstances, correlate more 
reliably with task performance than trait EI test scores. The value of these studies 
was highlighted and suggestions for their improvement were made. Special attention 
was given to the possibility of similar lab studies which used physiological methods 
55 
56 
instead of self-report indices of mood regulation. At this point, current EI theory and 
those EI studies of note have been covered in some detail, and in the next chapter, 
the awareness and flexibility conjecture will be introduced. 
56 
57 
Chapter 3: The Awareness and Flexibility Conjecture 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have introduced some of the antecedents of EI and some of 
the essential issues surrounding the construct. Several important experimental 
studies of EI have also been discussed in detail. Through this discussion it has 
become clear that EI is a construct beset with some definitional difficulties that it 
seems to be increasingly well supported in the literature in spite of these difficulties. 
In this chapter, it is suggested that current EI theory omHs an important piece of 
theory. This conjecture will be presented, critiqued, and examined for hypothetical 
implications. 
3.2 The Hole in Current Theory 
Present theory suggests that EI-related skills (e.g., facial display detection, affect 
regulation, etc) are on a continuum that relates to the EI test score continuum in a 
simple, linear manner. That is, high-EI individuals are thought to be better that affect 
regulation than low-E! individuals, just as high-IQ individuals tend to be better at 
maths than low-IQ individuals. 
This is perfectly reasonable but it fails to account for the ambiguity that characterises 
emotional tasks. The tasks and abilities that comprise IQ have obviously correct and 
incorrect answers and because of this it is possible to say that higher IQ leads to 
better (i.e., more correct) performance. Emotional tasks and abilities lack these kinds 
of clear, right/wrong answers and as such it is not possible to assu~e that higher EI 
will necessarily relate to 'better' performance. It is likely that 'better' performance 
on an emotional task would be a different, perhaps even contradictory, response in 
different situations. A confrontation with a loved one provides an anecdotal 
example: in some cases it may be 'better' to pursue the matter and settle it 
immediately, in some cases it may be 'better' to let the issue wait for a future date-
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it depends on the actors and the situation. In a word, being right/wrong depends 
entirely on the situation, and current EI theory does not take this into account. 
It is possible that EI tests may not relate in a simple manner to performance. In the 
example above, it is possible that the same high-EI individual might respond in an 
entirely different manner given two subtly different situations. Or two equally high-
EI individuals might respond differently to the same item simply because they 'read' 
the item in subtly different manners. Both solutions are probably correct, but present 
EI theory does not account for this possibility. 
3.3 The Awareness and Flexibility Conjecture 
What is proposed for this thesis is an addition to current EI theory. It should be made 
clear from the beginning that this conjecture does not replace current theory, it 
merely augments it. In fact, one branch of this conjecture clearly works hand-in-hand 
with the skills associated with current EI theories. Simply put, the conjecture is that 
EI is greater awareness and flexibility. Awareness refers to sensitivity to the 
intricacies of emotion-related 'problems' and the variety of manners in which one 
can approach these dilemmas. Flexibility refers to the ability to actualise these 
varieties of solutions. Awareness would be a necessary, but not sufficient condition 
for flexibility and the latter would be the more sophisticated of the two components. 
It is worth discussing these in greater detail before moving on to discuss 
experimental implications. 
It may seem that awareness is already included in present EI theory as the 
'emotional perception' facet of EI, but this is not the case, although the two are 
complementary. Awareness refers to a very specific type of emotional perception: 
recognition that there are often multiple solutions to a problem and ·only specific 
situational constraints can illuminate which is the ideal solution. It may seem 
obvious that many emotional 'problems' have multiple solutions, but anecdotally, 
most people could probably list people they knew who reliably take the same 
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approach to interpersonal challenges, regardless of who is involved or what the 
specific situation is. And constructs such as the autism spectrum (non-clinical; 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) suggest that some 
people don't think about even the most simple emotional ramifications of 
interpersonal relations, let alone a variety of approaches to solve an interpersonal 
dilemma. Of course, awareness and simple emotion perception are intricately linked; 
awareness is actually just a specific type of emotion perception that is not currently 
part ofEI theory. Thus this conjecture simply adds an incremental theoretical step to 
EI theory. 
Flexibility has a small amount of conceptual overlap with current EI theory but is the 
more important, measurable aspect of this conjecture. There is anecdotal support for 
this addition to EI theory in that everybody probably knows people who always take 
the same (usually extreme) interpersonal approach to all problems, regardless of who 
is involved or the subtleties of the situation. There have also been several decades of 
personality research has shown that some people are optimistic, pessimistic, 
aggressive, passive, neurotic, extroverted across situations (see any introductory 
personality or general psychology textbook; e.g., De Raad & Perugini, 2002; 
Gleitman et al., 2004) and there is little doubt that these general traits extend to 
emotional 'problems.' It is self-evident that employing an identical _interpersonal 
approach to nearly all situations is generally a poor idea and there is some intuitive 
appeal to suggesting that part of EI is the ability to be flexible in solving an 
emotional dilemma. We normally associate EI with people who can deal with a 
variety of situations in different manners- good leaders adjust their leading style to 
accommodate the needs of their subordinates. The awareness mentioned above is 
important for determining what potential situations there are, but withoutjlexibility 
in response to this perception, no real effect is discerned. 
This conjecture may be construed as being too similar to some existing constructs, 
notably self-monitoring and the blanket term 'social skjlls,' but this is not the case. A 
close inspection of self-monitoring scale (Snyder, 1974) items reveals that this 
construct has much more to do with manipulation and fac;:ade than it does about 
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emotions. The self-monitoring scale does not test the component abilities of EI, let 
alone the awareness andjlexibility suggested here, thus it is unlikely that this 
conjecture is a simple re-packaging of self-monitoring. It is possible that this 
conjecture overlaps with 'social skills' but this seems unlikely. Frankly, the 'social 
skills' label is sufficiently broad to apply to nearly any interpersonal ability (EI, 
personality, perhaps even IQ, etc) and because it is broad and rarely defined in a 
precise manner, it is difficult to even know what such a claim means. It is not likely 
that there is a 'social skills' test which measures what this conjecture proposes, so it 
is difficult to argue that the awareness and flexibility conjecture is psychometrically 
redundant. Perhaps the claim is that this conjecture merely presents a single skill that 
is part of a larger set of 'social skills,' and therefore the conjecture is not worth 
investigating. But this is hardly a convincing argument against this conjecture. It 
would be less than compelling to argue that IQ a negligible concept simply because 
it falls under a broad umbrella term such as 'human abilities', and thus by analogy it 
is probably silly to argue that this conjecture fails simply because it might fall under 
an umbrella term like 'social skills.' 
An example might be useful in clarifying this conjecture but because this conjecture 
is concerned with behaviour across situations or individuals, multiple situations must 
be represented. In the previous example of confrontations with a loved one, 
according to this conjecture a low-EI individual would be expected to be oblivious to 
his/her partner's emotional state or other subtle situational variations during these 
confrontations and consequently, would handle each such confrontation in exactly 
the same manner. It is possible that in addition to across-situation similarity, low-EI 
individuals would display across-individuals similarity: different low-EI individuals 
handle confrontation in a similar manner, despite the subtle differences between 
these confrontations (e.g., a caffeine-deprived partner or a happy, confident partner, 
etc.). In other words, low-EI is characterised by internal and perhaps external 
similarity. High-EI would be characterised by an increased awareness of the 
situational variability that characterises emotion-laden situations and consequently, 
greater internal variability. High-EI individuals would be less likely to handle similar 
situations in a similar manner. Rather, they would be more likely to note the subtle 
60 
61 
differences between (what would appear to low-E! individuals as similar) situations 
and behave vruiably in response to them. There is also likely to be little similarity 
between high-EI individuals in how they address such confrontations. In other 
words, according to this conjecture low-E! individuals are likely to be internally 
(same person, across situations) and externally (different people, same situation) 
similar and high-EI individuals are likely to be internally and exten1ally dissimilar. 
This conjecture leads immediately to testable hypotheses. 
3.4 Experimental Applications 
This conjecture leads to a number of clear hypotheses which fall into at least two 
categories: test-based hypotheses and experiment-based, EI skill-related hypotheses. 
A number of these will be discussed and some will subsequently be tested in this 
thesis. 
There are clear testing implications for the awareness and flexibility conjecture. If 
high-EI individuals see greater subtlety and variability in emotional situations and 
respond more flexibility in response to this variability, it is would be expected that 
high-EI individuals would respond more variably to EI test items than low-E! 
individuals. Trait EI test items (e.g., 'I am good at handling my emotions', 'People 
find it easy to confide in me') are simple statements that are written to represent and 
distil a variety of situations. Because of their greater awareness, high-EI individuals 
might read the item in numerous ways. In other words, the external variability 
proposed to characterise high-EI individuals would be visible on EI tests. On the 
other hand, low-E! individuals would be expected to view these items in a similar 
manner to one another due to their external similarity. In psychometric terms, these 
differences between sub-groups in item interpretation would be expected to lead to 
differences in factor structure and the explanatory power of each factor. This 
hypothesis will be explored in chapter 4. Another competing possibility is that high-
EI individuals select more 'neutral' self-report responses on trait EI tests, owing to 
the fact that they are more likely than low-E! individuals to claim that their response 
'depends on the situation.' It would also be worthwhile seeing whether or not a test 
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designed to test EI as envisaged by this conjecture predicted any useful outcomes 
and this possibility is examined in chapter 8. 
There are also numerous experimental implications, but given that these skills are 
numerous (especially in some trait EI theories) for brevity's sake, only affect 
regulation will be discussed here. One immediate hypothesis is that given an 
emotional situation with some degree of ambiguity, higb-EI individuals would be 
expected to use affect regulation variably whilst low-EI individuals would be 
expected to regulate affect in a predictable manner due to the greater number of 
ways high-EI individuals 'read' a situation and respond flexibly in response to it. 
This hypothesis is tested in chapter 5. If this is the case, it is worthwhile to see if 
manipulating the clarity of the situation removes this ambiguity- if they are told 
precisely what to do, high-EI individuals are probably better at affect regulation. 
This possibility is examined in chapters 6 through 8. There are nu~erous other 
hypotheses which follow from this conjecture. In a free-response paradigm, it would 
be expected that high-EI individuals could list a greater number of situations in 
which affect regulation would be a 'good' or a 'bad' idea. The assertion that high-EI 
individuals ' read' situations better than tow-El individuals could be tested by asking 
high-EI individuals to list the ramifications and solutions they see in an emotional 
situation and determining whether or not their lists are longer and more detailed than 
low-E! individuals' . 
3.5 Current El Theory 
Throughout this thesis, comparisons between 'current' or 'present' EI theory and the 
conjecture are made. Of course, given the amount of debate and controversy about 
this construct, it is probably inaccurate to say that there is simple one EI theory. If 
nothing else, there is at least trait and ability EI to contend with and it is not clear 
which this phrase refers to. 
The predictions made in this thesis were designed so that they wou~d follow from 
either trait or ability EI. The studies here deal with either affect regulation or 
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psychometric variability and both types of EI theory would make similar predictions 
for these two outcomes. Specifically, both trait and ability EI theories would predict 
some sort of connection between EI test scores and reactivity to affect induction -
either a positive association suggesting that high-EI individuals are more sensitive to 
affect or a negative association suggesting that high-EI individuals are better at 
regulating their affect- and both theories would probably predict that EI tests 
measure people on the same continuum. So the phrase 'current EI theory' is an 
oversimplification but it is used so that it is clear that the predictions based on 
'current EI theory' were designed to fit well in both trait and ability EI theory. 
That said, a pure trait theorist might argue that this thesis primarily. deals with ability 
EI theory because some of the studies investigate a EI-related skill. Certainly, affect 
regulation is a skill which seems to fit better into ability EI, which postulates that EI 
is a collection of skills, than trait EI, which postulates that EI is a collection of 
behavioural tendencies and self-beliefs. Strictly speaking, trait EI does not demand 
that high-EI be equated with objective indices of affect regulation because this type 
of EI does not claim that EI is a set of skills. This is similar to the fact that 
personaJjty theorists do not claim that, for example, extroverts actually are more 
socially apt. However, these same personality theorists most certainly do argue that 
extroverts believe that they are socially skilled and that these self-beliefs are often 
associated with real-life performance. A similar situation is actualised in these 
studies. Trait theory does not predict that high EI is equated with greater affect 
regulation, but it does predict that self-beliefs about one's tendency to regulate affect 
would have some sort of connection to objective indices of affect regulation. If this 
were not the case, the experiments described in Petrides and Furnham's (2003) 
would not make any sense. 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, a deficiency in current EI theory was noted and the awareness and 
flexibility conjecture was presented to address this deficiency. This conjecture 
complements, rather than opposes, current EI theory, and simply suggests that in 
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addition to the EI skills already proposed, the ability to discern multiple solutions to 
emotional problems based on situational variations in seemingly similar dilemmas 
and the ability to be flexible in response to these different potential solutions. The 
experimental implications of this are clear and a number of hypotheses were 
discussed, including several that are tested in chapters 4-7. 
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As was previously mentioned, the conjecture immediately leads to a factor analytic 
hypothesis. The purpose of this study was to test this hypothesis using several large 
data sets from numerous projects. 
4.1.1 The Logic of the Current Study 
The awareness and flexibility conjecture suggests that EI is more than simply a 
collection of abilities which people differ in. Rather, EI is also the differences in how 
aware people are of which EI skill is most appropriate in any given situation and 
how flexible people are in employing their array of EI skills. Thus, a high-EI 
individual is one who uses different skills in different situations, not one who always 
employs one 'emotional technique' regardless of situation. In other words, high-EI 
individuals use their EI skills differently than low-EI individuals. 
The logic behind this study and its relevance are explained below after certain 
assumptions are set out. It is a core assumption of classical test theory that tests 
measure high- and low-scoring individuals on the same dimension. In other words, 
no matter how high or low an individual ' s ability is, it is assumed that the test still 
measures the same ability. For example, it is assumed that a ruler measures tall and 
short people on the same dimension (i.e., height) and if this were not the case, we 
would probably be very sceptical about the utility of that ruler. It has not been 
determined whether or not EI tests meet this assumption but it seems that one of the 
tacit assumptions of current EI theory is that they do indeed display this 'factorial 
invariance'. 
The conjecture makes a slightly different prediction because EI test items contain 
considerable ambiguity. For example, the item 'I can deal effectively with people' 
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could represent numerous social and personal situations (e.g., at a party while feeling 
gregarious, at home while relaxing, etc) and it is left up to the test-taker to 
contextualise the item appropriately. This is no different from personality items. 
Thus the logic for the present study works as follows: 
(1) If the conjecture is true, then EI should be understood as greater awareness of 
the 'emotional approach' to take in any given situation and greater flexibility in 
response to it. In other words, given a diverse collection of situations, high-EI 
individuals would be expected to behave differently (more variably) from low-E! 
individuals in response to this collection of situations. 
(2) EI tests are ambiguous, thus they (by definition) represent a multitude of 
possible 'situations.' 
(3) Therefore, high-EI individuals would be expected to behave differently (more 
variably) from low-E! individuals in response to EI tests. 
(3) can be thought of a 'differentiation' hypothesis and will serve as the null 
hypothesis for this study. The single positive prediction for this study is based on the 
'factorial invariance' assumption above: that EI tests will measure high- and low-
scorers on the same dimension. The conjecture-driven hypothesis is clearly the 
opposite of what would be expected based on current EI theories. Yet it is still of 
interest whether or not EI tests meet the factorial invariance assumption, even if the 
conjecture is not supported in this study. Thus the findings of this study bear on EI 
theory regardless of whether the awareness and flexibility conjecture makes accurate 
predictions. 
4.1.3 Differentiation 
Spearman (1927, cited in Deary et al., 1996) introduced psychometric differentiation 
in his 'law of diminishing returns' (LODR). Differentiation simply refers to a 
difference in behaviour between two groups. In the case of LODR, it refers to a 
specific difference between high- and low-IQ individuals: g would predict less 
variance in the IQ scores of high-IQ individuals than in low-IQ individuals. He 
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expected that there would be differentiation by IQ score because high-IQ individuals 
use their intelligence in different manners - some intelligent people read 
Shakespeare and some arrange Schubert. 
LODR has been equivocally supported since Spearman's initial suggestion. For 
example, Deary et al. (1996) found differentiation by IQ score in a large general 
population sample although it seems that the extent of the differentiation depended 
on the IQ sub-scale used to create sub-groups. Additionally, Deary et al. (1996) 
showed that by creating several sub-populations (i.e., more than simply a high- and 
low-scoring group) one could reveal more fine-grained differences in the 
explanatory power of g. Jensen (2003) found similar results but argued that only two 
sub-groups should be fo1med and it is acceptable to create them by using overall IQ 
scores. However, Hartmann and Teasdale (2004;2005) found that differentiation did 
not occur when they examined test scores from a very large sample of the Danish 
general population. Differentiation has been explained by using an economic 
analogy: perhaps people high in IQ 'spend' their intelligence in a variety of different 
manners (e.g., maths or verbal skills) and as such g explains less variance than 
amongst those low in IQ who are more 'bound' by their low IQ. In other words, high 
IQ leads to an increased role of preference, but low IQ individuals lack this freedom 
and their responses are better predicted by g. 
Other EI-related constructs also seem to show differentiation of some kind. 
Personality tests appear to differentiate by IQ level (Austin, Deary, & Gibson, 1997; 
Austin, Hofer, Deary, & Eber, 2000; Harris, Vernon, & Jang 2005)"with high-IQ 
individuals displaying more variance in personality item responses. This area of 
research has been less well-examined but these findings do appear fairly clear. This 
differentiation by IQ could occur because intelligent people detect more subtlety in 
personality items (similar to the awareness suggested) and consequently respond 
more variably to them (Austin et al., 1997). 
Regardless of whether the economic metaphor or the 'subtlety' explanation work, or 
even if differentiation findings are robust, the methodology for differentiation studies 
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has been clarified recently. Research in these areas also provides additional 
justification for examining differentiation in EI tests beyond the awareness and 
flexibility metric. The economic metaphor could easily be extend to include EI: high-
EI means being capable of 'spending' one's EI to be a good affect regulator or being 
better at emotion perception in others. Or it could be that hjgh-EI means being better 
at detecting the subtlety of EI test items. This study will proceed from the awareness 
and flexibility conjecture but these possibilities are explored in the discussion 
section. 
4.1.4 Differentiation Methodology 
The most detailed recent articles (Hartmann & Teasdale, 2004; 2005; Jensen, 2003) 
present a clear method to studying differentiation and these methods will be used for 
this study. 
There are two primary questions that a differentiation study can be used to answer. 
Firstly, it can be determined whether or not the factor structures of the test scores of 
the two sub-groups are similar. That is, by using congruence coefficients (CC) and 
Cattell & Baggaley's (1960) salient similarity index, s, it is possible to see whether 
the item factor loadings of the factors in two sub-groups are similar. If the item 
factor loadings are dissimilar, then it can be stated with some certainty that the factor 
structures differ between the sub-groups. 
Secondly, it is possible to see if the first unrotated principal atis factor explains more 
or less variance in two sub-groups. Harmann and Teasdale (2004) a_dvocate the use 
of principal axis factoring (P AF) instead of principal components analysis (PCA) 
because PAF examines only the common variance of the correlation matrix, rather 
than both the common and unique (error) variance in the correlation matrix. 
Regardless, the g estimate extracted from this procedure is informative only if the 
factor structure of the sub-groups is nearly identical (Jensen, 2003 suggests ICCI > 
.95), otherwise one is effectively comparing apples and oranges. 
68 
69 
Assuming the factor structures are nearly identical, the explanatory power of g in 
each group can be converted into an F ratio by simply dividing the g estimates 
(higher variance-explained value as the numerator). This F ratio can be tested for 
significance by using F(n1-1, n2-1) =X (where n1 is theN for the group expected to 
have more variance and n2 theN for the group expected to have less). Degrees of 
freedom terms are large because each g value is a variance estimate within groups, 
not between groups. 
Some other precautions must be taken in order to ensure that the g estimates 
extracted from factor analysis. The cut-off point (e.g., IQ score of 95) on the test 
used to create sub-groups must ensure nearly equal standard deviations on this 
outcome measure (e.g., IQ standard deviations in both sub-groups of 15.5 and 16.1). 
Secondly, a reliability estimate must be taken for the item responses in both sub-
groups to ensure that any differences in the variance explained by g are not simply 
due to overall differences in variability between groups. 
Essentially, the procedure is as simple as dividing the sample into two subgroups 
based on a cut-off score that ensures equal standard deviations in both groups, factor 
analysing the test results of the sub-groups with PAF, calculating CC' s and s, then 
calculating and comparing the variance explained by g. This procedure will be used 
for the EI test results examined for this study. 
4.1.5 S, the Salient Similarity Index 
Cattell and Baggelley (1960) introduced this statistic, s, as a non-parametric 
alternative to CCs. In order to calculate either a CC or s, a factor analysis must be 
performed and the item factor loadings for any relevant factors must be examined. 
The method for calculating this is explained in detail elsewhere (Zack, Toneatto, & 
Streiner, 1998) but the easiest approach is to count the number of irrelevant (i.e., 
either or both factor loadings are JrJ < .1), concordant (i.e., both loadings are JrJ > .1 
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and have the same sign- e.g., .40 and .35), and discordant (i.e., both loadings are lrl 
> .1 and have different signs -e.g., .40 and -.35) loadings. These loadings then allow 
the s value to be calculated for each factor in each sample as follows: 
s= c - d 
[c +d)+ .5i 
Where c is the number of concordant loadings, dis the number of discordant 
loadings, and i is the number of irrelevant loadings. 
This index ranges from -1 to 1 and is interpreted in roughly the same manner as a 
cc. 
4.1.6 Hypotheses 
The awareness andjlexibility conjecture make several immediate predictions. The 
first is that because EI tests are made of items that are ambiguous, the factor 
structure of high-EI individuals' responses will be dissimilar to that of low-EI 
individuals' responses. Specifically, based on this conjecture it is predicted that the 
CC and s values for the factor structure of the two subgroups will be considerably 
less than identical (i .e., ICC!< .8). Additionally, it could be predicted that although 
the factor structure of the subgroups' responses will be highly similar, there will be a 
difference in how much variance the first principal axis factor (known hereafter as 
emotional g) wi ll explain in the two subgroups. This hypothesis depends upon the 
confirmation of the first and will be tested in turn. Current EI theory would predict 
that the factor structures will be highly similar and because this is a positive 
prediction, it will serve as the 'experimental' hypothesis while the conjecture-driven 
hypothesis will serve as the 'null' hypothesis. 
For the sake of clarity and because the same method was used for all samples, only 





A total of five data sets which were collected at different times in either Scotland or 
Canada. With the exception of Samples 1 and 2, which completed the same 
questionnaire, all completed different measures. Details on the measures are below. 
Sample 1 was 196 University of Edinburgh students. Twenty six did not provide 
gender information, 51 were male and 121 were female. The participants ranged in 
age from 18 to 46, though the vast majority were aged between 18 and 21. These 
participants completed the 41-item variant of the EIS. 
Sample 2 was comprised of 623 Canadian ( 445) and Scottish (178) .undergraduates 
of which 431 were female and 187 were male and five did not disclose their gender 
and whose ages raged from 16 to 81 (M = 28.5, SD = 14.8). These participants are 
identical to the sample used in a recent study (Austin, Saklofske, & Egan, 2005) and 
completed the same EIS variant as Sample 1. 
Sample 3 was comprised of 500 participants of either Canadian (340) or Scottish 
(160) nationality for a recent study (Austin & Saklofske, 2005). There were 374 
females and 126 males in this sample and ages ranged from 17 to 59 (M = 24.2, SD = 
6.6). These participants took the un-adapted 33-item EIS. 
Sample 4 was made of 537 participants of Canadian nationality who were sampled 
as part of the same research programme as Sample 2 (Austin, Saklofske, & Egan, 
2005). These are different participants from Sample 2. 377 of the participants were 
female, 156 were male, and 4 did not provide gender information. Ages in this 
sample ranged from 18 to 58 (M = 24.3, SD = 6.8). These participants completed the 
short-form Bar-On EQ-i test. 
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Sample 5 was of 99 Edinburgh University students. Seventy were female and 29 
were male. The mean age was 22.4 years (SD = 8.0). These participants completed 
the MSCEIT v2.0 (Mayer et al, 2002) as part of a study that is currently in 
preparation (Austin, submitted) This ref needs to be changed, it is Study 1 from 
Farrelly & Austin (in press). 
4.2.2 Measures 
33-item EIS. This measure, (EIS; Schutte et al, 1998), is a 33-item self-report (5-
point Likert) measure which assesses the EI framework proposed by Salovey & 
Mayer (1989): overall EI or the Optimism/Mood Regulation, Utilisation of Emotions 
or Appraisal of Emotions subfactors. Some of the items are reverse keyed and its 
internal reliability here is high (u = .89). 
41-item EIS. This variant of the EIS, developed by Austin et al. (2004) has slightly 
more items and more reverse-keyed items. This test has 41 items, of which roughly 
half are reverse-keyed. It is answered in the same self-report manner as the 44-item 
EIS. The total scale internal consistency here was acceptable (u = .85). 
EQ-i Short Form. (Bar-On, 2002) This trait EI test measures total EI and five EI 
sub-factors: Interpersonal EI, Intrapersonal EI, Adaptability, Stress Management, 
and General Mood. There are also several items that check for 'positive impression' 
bias which were omitted from the analyses here as they are irrelevant to the 
hypotheses. This test has 51 items in total and had high internal co~sistency in this 
sample (u = .90). 
MSCEIT v2.0. This test is owned and distributed by Multi Health Systems and is 
reported by its authors to have high (i.e., u > .8) internal reliability (Mayer, Salovey, 
& Caruso, 2002). MRS does not furnish researchers with item data, and as such 
analyses have been perfo1med on the sub-scale scores which are returned by MRS: 





Participants completed the tests at different places and times. Sample 5 completed 
the online MSCEIT 2.0 and the remaining samples completed pen-and-paper EI 
tests. All were given instructions on how to complete the questionnaires and were 
informed of the purpose of the study in debriefing. Additional detail is available in 
the above articles. 
To test the hypothesis, high and low groups were created. Because the sub-scales of 
EI tests are contentious (e.g., Petrides and Furnham, 2000, Davies et al., 1998, 
Ciarrochi et al., 2000), groups were separated by an overall EI score that ensured 
equal standard deviations in both sub-groups (after Jensen, 2003). 
4.3 Results 
Descriptive statistics show that these samples display the well-established gender 
difference. Table 4.1 shows a breakdown of the samples, the cut-off score that was 
used to divide them into high- and low-scoring groups, and also presents a 
significance test for the male-female EI difference. 
Table 4.1 Cut-off scores, descriptive statistics, and male-female differences 




Score Deviation N F-M T-test 
~~~~--------------------
Low El High El LowEI High El 
1 EIS-44 145 7.11 7.12 84 112 
2 EIS-44 144 10.39 9.99 146 477 
3 EIS-33 119 10.96 7.68* 201 299 
4 EQ-i 31 2.33 2.24 141 396 
5 MSCEIT 95 5.34 5.29 44 55 
Note: EfS-44 refers to the 44-item EIS variant, EIS-33 refers to the original 33 item 









El>, <= Score refers to the cut-off score from which greater than or less than or equal-
to groups were made on that test. F-M T-test sig refers to the significance of the t-test carried out 
between males and females; females scored higher than males in all tests. This test was not carried out 
for the MSCEIT data due to smaU sample size. 
Factor structures differed between EI tests. To find appropriate solutions for these 
data, principal axis factoring with oblique rotation was used (after Austin et al., 
2004) because EI has historically been argued to be a hierarchical construct. There 
was limited similarity in factor solutions between tests. The scree plots indicated a 
three-factor solution for samples 1 and 3, and a two-factor solution for samples 2 and 
3. The MSCEIT data favoured a three-factor solution as no additional factors had 
initial eigenvalues greater than 1. In all samples, additional factors explained less 
than 5% of the variance and in samples 1 through 4, the first factor was the only 
factor to explain more than 10%. Five and even six-factor solutions could be 
defended on the grounds that additional items load uniquely on them. However, a 
factor that only accounts for one variable is hardly important, especially in light of 
the fact that some items did not load meaningfully on any factors. The solutions here 
for samples 1, 2, and 3 are similar to previous work (e.g., Austin et al., 2004; 
Petrides & Furnham, 2000) and the solution for sample 4 is novel but the solution for 
sample 5 differs from the four-factor structure previously found (Parker et al., 2005), 
possibly 
because only sub-scale data could be analysed. 
As Table 4.1 shows, the sub-groups were split such that sub-groups had nearly 
identical standard deviations. All standard deviation values were converted to an F-
ratio (high group standard deviation/!(low group standard deviationi and tested 
using a simHar procedure explained above. All differences in standard deviation 
between the two sub-groups were nonsignificant with the exception of Sample 3. 
The differences in standard deviation in Sample 3 should be taken into account 
during discussion of differences in the explanatory power of emotional g. 
To test the first hypothesis, two indices of factor similarity were calculated. The first 
is a CC which is calculated by considering the sub-groups' item factor loadings as 
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two separate continuous variables and then correlating them with one another. This 
process can be repeated for as many factors as is desired. The second index is the s, 
discussed above. 
It was hypothesised that indices of factor similarity would show that the factor 
structure of the two tests would be markedly different. Jensen (2003) suggests that 
for an IQ test, any CC below .9 indicates that the factor structure is notably 
dissimilar. Because El tests are less robust than IQ tests in a variety of ways 
(including factor clarity), a less stringent criterion (perhaps ICCI<.8) could be used to 
determine whether the factor structures are similar or not. The first three factors are 
examined for all five samples for two key reasons. First, based on scree plots, 
eigenvalues, and estimates of variance explained, only a three-factor solution 
accurately described all of the responses. Secondly, additional factors explain 
approximately the same quantity of variance (i.e., factors 4,5, and 6 each add 3% of 
the variance) so inclusion of additional factors would be somewhat arbitrary. 
Table 4.2 displays the indices that were calculated as well as a significance test of 
the F ratio of the variance explained by emotional g. What is immediately apparent 
is that none of the comparisons met the criteria set out here or in Jensen (2003) and 
that most factors are notably dissimilar (mean ICCI = .40, mean lsi= .34). 
It is therefore not justified to examine the explanatory power of tbe.first unrotated 
principal factor. The results indicate that the dimensions which item responses load 
differ between the two sub-groups and as such any comparison of these factors 
would be analogous to comparing apples and oranges. Moreover, the low CC and s 
values already indicate that the factor structures of the two sub-groups are different. 
Calculating and comparing the variance explained by the first unrotated principal 
factor would add little to our understanding of factor structure differences and is not, 
strictly speaking, acceptable given the low CC and s values. 
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Table 4.2 Congruence coefficients, s index values, and differences in 
variance explained 
Sample Test Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
cc s cc s cc s cc s 
EIS-44 -.09 -.19 .27 .12 -.10 .08 -.30 .08 
2 EIS-44 -.37 -.25 .19 .19 .23 .28 n/a n/a 
3 EIS-33 -.15 .32 .70* .40 .42 .20 n/a n/a 
4 EQ-i -.20 -.12 -.07 .11 .82* .25 -.45 .03 
5 MSCEIT§ .31 .57 .75* .15 .29 .33 n/a n/a 
Note: PAF1,2,3 refer to the first, second, and third unrotated principal axis factor 
CC refers to the strength of the congruence coefficient calculated between high- and low-EI groups. s 
refers to the strength of the salient similarity index. 
*acceptably high to consider as an identical factor loading structure (Jenseo,2003) 
§ MSCEIT analyses were run on sub-scale data 
Because women score higher than men on EI tests in these samples, the high- and 
low-scoring groups in these samples were confounded with gender. Men and women 
seem to show different factor structures as well as their test scores seem to show 
differences in factor structure (average ICCI = .43), so it would appear that gender 
differences and EI score differences are intimately linked. With th i~ caveat in mind, 
the results seem to indicate that the null hypothesis (i.e., the conjecture-driven 
hypothesis) could not be rejected. 
4.4 Discussion 
Only one of the indices of factor similarity met the criteria for factor similarity. 
These findings do not allow the rejection of the null hypothesis that there would be 
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no correlation between factor loadings. However, this must be tempered by the 
finding that the responses of gender sub-groups had different factor structures and 
the fact that the high-scoring group was made mostly of women while the low-
scoring group was made mostly of men. In other words, gender was a confound for 
the findings here, it is not clear whether the factor structure differences are due to 
differences in EI or differences in gender. This problem besets much of EI research 
as the gender difference is robust. A replication using high- and low-scoring groups 
with equal gender composition would be fruitful as would a more detailed 
exploration of why this gender difference occurs and what importance it has for EI 
theory. 
Alternative explanations for these findings exist. Because EI scores correlate with 
personality and IQ, it is possible that any findings here could have simply been due 
to personality or IQ differences. Moreover, it is possible that a mechanism similar to 
those proposed to explain IQ or personality differentiation (i.e., the economic or 
'subtlety-detection' explanations) operate in EI. It is difficult to determine if any of 
these should be endorsed in favour of the awareness and flexibility conjecture, not 
least because this is, to my knowledge, the first study of factor structure differences 
in EI tests. However, these explanations seem to have less currency simply due to 
reasons of parsimony and relevance. 
It is possible that the results of this study are due not to factor variability but 
insensitivity of CCs or s. The strength of these correlations might have been low due 
to low reliabilities, poor methodology, or other variables and might have nothing to 
do with factor structure. These correlations are relatively unsophisticated compared 
to techniques such as confirmatory factor analysis and are less than ideally suited to 
this study. Still, the hypotheses are simple so a simple analysis is probably 
acceptable even if more sophisticated analyses might be more revealing. Current EI 
theory would predict that EI tests measure high- and low-scoring individuals on the 
same dimensions and these simple correlational procedures fail to confirm this in 
these data. It could be argued that because the CC and s values are so weak, it is 
unnecessary to look any further with more sophisticated techniques. However, 
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techniques such as CFA or structural equation modelling could be used to determine 
whether or not the weak CC and s values are due to extraneous variables, so there is 
certainly room for their use in future studies. These correlations are too weak to 
indicate factorial invariance but it is certainly possible that these correlations were 
weak due to the presence or operation of other variables. 
The economic and 'subtlety detection' mechanisms proposed to account for IQ and 
personality differentiation, respectively, have been proposed to explain difference is 
the explanatory power of the first unrotated factor, not differences fn item factor 
loadings. In order to use these mechanisms to explain item level differences, an 
additional (or different) line of reasoning would be necessary. The same applies to 
the claim that any differences in EI test factor structure are due simply to differences 
in IQ or personality- additional reasoning would be necessary to explain how these 
differences would cause both differences in EI scores and differences in factor 
structure between EI groups. In contrast, the conjecture presented here predicts all of 
these findings without any additional explication. Obviously a great deal of 
experimental research is necessary before a firm conclusion is drawn but if nothing 
else this conjecture receives tentative psychometric support in the sense that it was 
not possible to reject the null hypothesis which followed from the conjecture. 
A more important issue is whether or not the failure to reject the null hypothesis (i.e., 
factorial variability, no correlation between factor loadings) should be equated with 
retention of the null. That is, although it was not possible to reject the conjecture-
driven hypothesis (a null prediction of factorial variance) in favour of current El 
theory, it is not necessarily the case that the conjecture-driven hypothesis was 
accurate. For the reasons mentioned above, the failure to reject the null hypothesis 
could be due to other variables and the simple methods used in this study are 
powerless to reveal whether the null finding was due to factorial differences or any 
other variable. So although these results seem to contraindicate current EI theory, 
this is not a final conclusion. 
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Another issue with this study was the division of sub-groups. The high- and low-
scoring groups were created based on their overall EI test scores. However, 
participants were divided on the same tests which are later showed to lack factorial 
variability and thus the method is slightly self-referential. It hardly seems 
appropriate to argue that the tests are flawed but are also acceptable for sub-group 
creation. This criticism is mitigated by several comments. Firstly, it would have been 
necessary to know the results of the study in order to know that the tests are 
factoriaJly variable, thus the use of a different division criterion wo~ld be, by 
definition, post-hoc. Secondly, if sub-group division was not allowed to be based on 
EI test scores, then it is hard to say what exactly it should have been based on. 
Thirdly, other studies create sub-groups based on scores on tests which show 
evidence of differentiation (e.g., Jensen, 2003). Perhaps an EI test not analysed in the 
study could be used for division, but this would force a question about why this 
'selection EI test' was not analysed. Also, the conclusion that 'El tests are flawed' is a 
rather harsh conclusion in light of the possibilities discussed above, so if one wishes 
to argue that sub-group division based on flawed EI tests is questionable, then one 
must tacitly assume that these results indict EI testing in general. In a way, this 
criticism of the division methods used in this study leads to the very conclusion that 
the criticism is designed to defend against: that current EI tests are flawed. It would 
seem that there is certainly something dubious about dividing by one criterion and 
then later arguing that that criterion is flawed, and although there don't seem to be 
many alternatives, it could be that using peer ratings would address this issue. 
That said, a major issue with this study is that it is not clear what is driving the 
factorial differences observed here. These differences might have been observed if 
participants were divided according to their personality scores and as was already 
noted, gender might have played a role. This could be problematic because it 
introduces an ambiguity as to why the conjecture does or does not make accurate 
predictions in these studies. 
A replication which statistically or otherwise controlled for intelligence and 
personality when evaluating EI test scores would be ideal. More complex modelling 
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packages could be used for this purpose and would be useful in ascertaining whether 
or not any of the prior alternative suggestions should be endorsed in favour of the 
conjecture presented here. 
Additionally, sampling could have been improved in this study. The samples used 
were not as large as have been used is recent IQ differentiation studies (e.g., 
Hartmann & Teasdale, 2004). A larger, more representative sample would help rule 
out gender differences by allowing the analysis of high- and low-scoring groups with 
equal numbers of males and females. Such a sample would also circumvent the non-
representative nature of university students, however El was roughly normally 
distributed in the samples (some negative skew occurred) and because IQ and trait or 
ability EI tests are at best moderately correlated with one another, restriction of the 
IQ range should have no important repercussions. Moreover, restriction of sample 
range does not necessarily result in an underestimated population effect size. An 
similar investigation of test responses of clinical (e.g., alexithymics) groups would 
shed additional light on the viability of the conjecture presented here. 
Perhaps the most important flaw in this study is, as was previously discussed, the 
groups were split on the same measure which was later shown to be problematic. 
The most obvious adjustment would be to replicate this study but factor analyse a 
second variable rather than the El test scores. If a different, external variable (e.g., 
coping behaviour) was analysed in a similar manner to determine if higb-EI 
individuals are more variable, it would make it more sensible to divide according to 
EI test scores and would also avoid a situation where a single variable performs 
more than one purpose. 
Additionally, experimentation will be necessary to determine whether or not this 
conjecture functions outside of the rarefied environment of psychometric testing and 
as such the following three chapters are all experimental. Still, there is evidence here 
for the awareness andflexibility conjecture in a number of samples 'which were 
collected in different countries at different times. And even if this evidence is 
tentative, it is still interesting because it stands in direct opposition to present EI 
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theory which would assume that EI tests measure identical dimensions for all test-
takers. 
4.5 Summary 
In this study, participants in several samples completed EI tests. High- and low-
scoring sub-groups were created based on their EI test scores and their responses to 
EI tests were then factor analysed and the factor structures of their responses were 
examined in detail. It was predicted according to current EI theory that the factor 
structures of the responses of the two groups would be highly similar, that the test 
would be factorialJy invariant. The opposite prediction was made according to the 
conjecture. It was observed that the factor structures of responses from the high- and 
low-scoring sub-groups were markedly different such that item factor loadings were 
uncorrelated in the two sub-groups. Thus it was not possible to confirm the 
prediction made according to current EI theory. 
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The purpose of this study was to determine if individuals with higher EI were less 
reactive to affect inductions than individuals low in EI. An introduction to SCR and 
important affect terms such as valence and arousal is presented, along with 
hypotheses that follow from the awareness and flexibility conjecture and current EI 
theory. 
5.1. Operationalising and Inducing Affect 
As was explained in chapter 1, this thesis is chiefly concerned with the physiological 
aspects of affect. The specific concern is used throughout this thesis though it should 
be noted that this definition does not preclude other definitions of affect. Indeed, in 
chapters 7 and 8, a self-report index of affect is used alongside the physiological 
index. 
There are numerous ways to induce affect. Participants can be shown film clips, 
pictures, music, their own pre-written affective memories, or they can even be asked 
to adopt a facial expression. These techniques have been compared to one another 
along a number of dimensions (Martin, 1990) such as the strength of affective 
changes, risk of demand characteristics, and the robustness of the procedures across 
studies. Some of the more obscure methods of inducing mood (e.g., computer 
programmes, listening to music) are often the least susceptible to demand 
characteristic biases but these techniques tend to result in smaller affective changes. 
In a meta-analytical study, Martin (1990) advocated the use of film clips as mood 
induction stimuli although she also noted that film stimuli suffer from demand 
characteristic bias because people who watch films with affective material generally 
know what sort of affect 'to expect.' That is, it is usually very clear what affective 
response a film has been selected to elicit, so it is possible that participants alter their 
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reactions in response to this information. Because demand characteristic bias is 
probably easier to correct (by using e.g., double-blind designs, minimizing 
experimenter interaction, etc) than a weak experimental effect, Martin (1990) argued 
that demand characteristic issues are only of secondary importance for any decision 
on induction technique. In a similar meta-analysis, Westermann, Spies, Stahl, and 
Hesse (1996) suggested that film stimuli are superior to other affect induction 
techniques in terms of effect size. 
There could be numerous reasons why film stimuli are so effective .at inducing affect 
but these possibilities are only mentioned briefly here because this thesis is only 
concerned with induction, not the reasons why a particular technique is effective. It 
is possible that they are more effective because films stimulate more sensory modes 
than most other induction techniques. Films contain both auditory and visual content 
whereas other techniques are mono-modal (e.g., pictures and music) or take place 
solely in the mind of participant. Perhaps the additional sensory stimulation leads to 
additional affective stimulation. Regardless of the reasons, it is clear both 
scientifically and anecdotally that films are effective at inducing affect- were this 
not the case, it is doubtful that Hollywood films would be nearly as memorable. 
Because of these reasons, film stimuli are used to induce anxiety (negative affect) 
and happiness (positive affect) in this study. 
5.1.2 Valence and Arousal 
Before the details of electrodermal activity (EDA) or skin conductance response 
(SCR) are discussed, two important facets of affect must be discussed: valence and 
arousal. These two dimensions represent the bare minimum of what is required to 
describe an emotional response. That is, most theorists would acknowledge that any 
affective reaction must be described (at least) in terms of its positivity/negativity and 
how strong/weak the affective response was. Bradley (2000) explains how this two-
factor distinction can be used to understand numerous affective responses, including 
reactions to lAPS pictures (which are used in this study). For example, pictures of 
babies are rated as equally positive, but less arousing than pictures of money and 
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pictures of cemeteries are rated as more negative but equally arousing as pictures of 
jails. Of course, higher-level aspects of affect add more dimensions to this two-factor 
space, but even the most reductive, physiological account of affect requires some 
allusion to these two continuums. Bradley (2000) also suggests that some 
physiological indices are better at measuring one factor than the other- this property 
of physiological measurement of affect will be returned to below. 
5.1.3 EDA and SCR/SCL 
As Dawson et al. (2000) explain, EDA is a blanket term that refers to a number of 
processes in the integumentary, central nervous, sympathetic autonomic nervous, 
and peripheral nervous systems. Simply put, the skin resists an applied electrical 
current and the differences in this resistance between different situations (e.g., at rest 
or under stress) are a psychologically meaningful index of arousal levels. The skin's 
electrical resistance or its inverse, conductance, are measured over a period of time 
to observe a 'waveform' of EDA. Chief amongst the models suggested to explain 
how the peripheral mechanisms (e.g., sweat glands, sweat ducts, dermis, keratinised 
skin cells, etc) in the skin function to create electrical activity is the two-effector 
model which posits that the electrical activity is the result of a) the filling of the 
sweat ducts; and b) the activity of some selective membrane in the epidermis 
(Dawson, 2000). However, this model has been criticised because it postulates a 
membrane which, to be blunt, may not actually exist and has yet to be located 
(Edelber, 1993). There is also evidence from lesion studies in animals that EDA is 
caused by activity in the central nervous system, specifically the limbic system and 
amygdala (Boucsein, 1992), although these CNS pathways are numerous and 
complex. It was initially thought that EDA was controlled by both the 
parasympathetic and sympathetic branches of the autonomic nervous system, but it is 
now generally accepted that only the sympathetic branch controls EDA (Dawson, 
2000). The immediate implication of this finding is that, unlike other physiological 
measures (e.g., heart rate, zygomatic muscle activity, etc), EDA is solely a function 
of the body's preparatory, 'flight-or-fight' response. As such, EDA is a measure of 
the body's state anxiety- increases in EDA suggest increases in anxiety and 
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decreases in EDA suggest decreases in anxiety. These changes in anxiety/arousal are 
used as indicators of affect for this study and the remainder of this thesis. 
There are two major approaches to the quantification of ED A. The first approach 
measures the tonic skin conductance level (SCL) over an extended period of time. 
The second measures the phasic skin conductance response (SCR) over a brief 
period of time, usually 5-l 0 seconds. In both cases, some kind of stimulus is 
presented to the participant, all that differs is the duration of the stimulus and the 
duration of EDA measurement. In the present study, a participant's reaction to a 
stimulus with a fairly long duration (one minute) is of interest, so SCL must be used. 
SCR is normally used for stimuli such as affective pictures and will be used in 
chapters 6 through 8. 
SCL has strengths and weaknesses. SCL allows researchers to investigate the 
affective state of a participant over a longer period than SCR - it is possible to see 
not only individual, momentary reactions to stimuli but also longer-term trends in the 
participant's affective state. The cost of this increased sensitivity to longer-term 
trends is a loss of experimental control. With a longer stimulus it is not possible to 
ensure that every moment of the stimulus actually contains the affective material that 
is desired by the researchers. In the case of film stimuli, the dynamic nature of the 
medium itself prevents complete certainty that the entire stimulus is violent, 
humorous, etc. This lack of control has prompted many researchers to use SCR to 
the exclusion of SCL, but this thesis contains studies which use both methods. In this 
study, an increase in anxiety is defined as an increase in SCL throughout the affect 
manipulation and a decrease in anxiety is defined as a decrease in SCL. Because 
affect regulation has been previously defined as the ability to return one's affect to 
some individual baseline, in terms of SCL, a greater increase in SCL is indicative of 




It should be noted that EDA is a measure which has been used in innumerable 
studies of affective response. As was previously explained, it is far more sensitive to 
general affective arousal than it is to discrete types of emotion. This is the case for 
most physiological indicators- they are useful as gross indicators of affective 
activity but lack resolution for complex emotions. This does not in any way suggest 
that they are inappropriate dependant variables. On the contrary, the physiological 
aspects are affective response and emotion are virtually inseparable from the 
cognitive aspects. This thesis has been designed to measure general positive and 
negative affective response and as such EDA is a sensitive, reliable, and robust 
measure to use for these studies. 
5.1.4 Logic of the Study 
As was noted previously, affect regulation is measured indirectly in this thesis. 
Specifically, this thesis examines the link between EI test scores and affective 
reactivity to affect induction with the assumption that lesser reactivity is indicative 
of enhanced operation of affect regulation. 
Prior studies which have examined the connection between EI test scores and affect 
regulation (Ciarrochi et al., 2000; Petrides & Furnham, 2003) predicted different 
outcomes based on different interpretations of current EI theory. Ciarrochi et al. 
(2000) failed to reject the null hypothesis in some comparisons and in others found 
that high-EI individuals are less influenced by affect manipulations when they 
perform a cognitive task and Petrides and Furnham (2003) found that high-EI 
individuals are more affected by affect manipulations when they simply report their 
affect. This may have something to do with methodological differences- if 
participants know that they will be required to perform a cognitive task they may 
employ their affect regulation abilities to a greater extent than if they simply report 
their affect. The differences in results between these two studies m~y also be due to 
the type of EI test used. It was acknowledged above that the logic in both previous 
studies of EI and affect regulation is equally compelling, and in spite of the 
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methodological similarities between this study and Petrides and Furnham's (2003) 
study, for the sake of continuity, based on current EI theory it is predicted that higher 
EI test scores will be associated with lesser reactivity to the affect induction. 
The conjecture makes a different prediction. Under this conceptualisation of EI, 
higher EI is not defined as simply more developed emotional ski lls, it is also a 
difference in how and when those skills are used. High-EI individu~ls are claimed to 
be more aware of the emotion content or implications of a situation and more 
flexible in response to this content. Low-EI individuals are claimed to be Jess aware 
and Jess flexible. In other words, the way in which high-EI individuals employ their 
emotional skills depends more on the situation than it does for low-EI individuals -
given a somewhat ambiguous situation, high-EI individuals will behave more 
variably than 1ow-EI individuals in response to greater awareness of the numerous 
ways that a situation could be approached. This was supported in chapter 4 which 
showed that high-EI individuals display a different factor structure in their EI test 
(i.e., somewhat ambiguous situation) responses. In terms of affect regulation, it 
would be expected that, given the same somewhat ambiguous situation, high-EI 
individuals would regulate more variably than Jow-EI individuals, because they 
'read' a greater number of interpretations of this same situation and behave in 
different ways in response to it. In other words, due to greater awareness and 
flexibility, in a somewhat ambiguous situation (e.g., an affect manipulation not 
linked to any sort of cognitive task), high-EI individuals would be expected to not 
regulate their affect in any predictable manner. Some of the high-EI participants will 
view the films and decide to become immersed in the stimuli, and some will decide 
to resist the affective content. The low-EI individuals would be expected to regulate 
their affect in line with their EI level because, according to this conjecture, they 
would not have the same kind of immerse/resist flexibility. Briefly put, in the 
positive film condition, a positive association between EI score and arousal change 
from baseline is predicted for Jow-EI individuals. In the negative film condition, a 
negative association between EI score and arousal change from baseline is predicted 
for low-E! individuals. That is, amongst relatively Jow-EI individuals, it is expected 
that greater EI will be related to increased ability to maintain a baseline level of 
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affect. No correlation between EI score and arousal change is predicted for high-EI 
individuals in any condition. Figure 5.1 illustrates what is predicted according to the 
conjecture. 
Figure 5.1: An illustration of what is predicted in this study according to the 
conjecture 
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5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Design 
Trait EI was measured and subsequently Skin Conductance Level (SCL) was 
measured while participants rested (baseline) and watched both an anxiety-inducing 
(negative) and a happiness-inducing (positive) film clip in a correlational design. 
The order of the film clips was randomised to prevent order effects~ 
5.2.2 Participants 
Forty-one participants (twenty nine female and twelve male) took part in this study. 
All were recruited using opportunity sampling and an advertisement placed on the 
University of Edinburgh Careers Service website. The questionnaire responses of 
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these participants were also used in chapter 4 (sample 1). All were postgraduate or 
undergraduate students at the University of Edinburgh and varied in age from 18 to 
41, with a majority aged between 18 and 21. One participant was excluded because 
her responses were very extreme (roughly four standard deviations from the mean) 
and were unduly influencing the overall results. They were paid £2.50 for their time. 
5.2.3 Measures 
The Austin et al. (2004) variant of the EIS was used in this study to test trait EI. It is 
a 41-item variant of the original 33-item EIS by Schutte et al. (1998) which contains 
a greater number of items of which more are reverse-keyed. Like the EIS, this is a 
self-report questionnaire on which test-takers respond to a series of.statements with a 
5-point Likert scale anchored at 'strongly agree' and 'strongly disagree'. The sample 
in this study was too small for an accurate estimate of reliability of the Austin et al. 
(2004) variant, but the responses of the larger sample (chapter 4) were highly 
reliable. 
5.2.4 Apparatus 
A computer program was designed by Dr. Paul Stevens of the Koestler 
Parapsychology Unit. This program presented all stimuli, measured SCL, and 
performed aJI calculations and transformations on the raw data. A touch-sensitive 
LCD screen was used as an interface for participants to advance through different 
stages of the experimental session. 
Standard Skin Conductance measurement equipment was used to measure EDA 
throughout the experiment. 8mm sintered Ag-AgCJ round cup electrodes filled with 
a pH balanced aqueous NaCI gel were affixed with double-sided adhesive collars. 
These electrodes were connected via a pre-amplifier to a model SC5-SA 
(Psylab/Contact Precision Instruments, London, UK) with 24-bit AID conversion. 
Raw measurement was in microsiemens (muS) at approximately 40Hz and readings 
were z-transformed. All electrodes were place on the middle phalanx of the first and 
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second digit of the participant's non-dominant hand to ensure that good contact was 
not prevented by calluses. 
Two one-minute film clips were presented to all participants. The anxiety-inducing 
film (negative affect) was a scene from a recent movie in which a character vividly 
imagines a nuclear explosion destroying a city, leaving only the skeletal remains of 
the children she watches. The happiness-inducing film (positive affect) was a clip of 
polar bear cubs playing and rolling around in the snow. These clips were piloted 
before testing and aU pilot participants reported feeling the affect that was expected. 
Physiological data were z-transformed. This process is carried out to normalise and 
to allow for individual comparisons. Because there are massive individual 
differences in Skin Conductance- in terms of mean values and variance- it is not 
appropriate to simply calculate group means or examine correlations with another 
measure, especially in a between-subjects design. It is essential that these differences 
be controlled for and z-transformation suits this purpose. Instead of raw data, z-
transformation essentially converts each raw data point into a z-score. Z-
transformation was used instead of log or In-transformation because the latter 
procedures do not allow individual comparisons. 
The formula for this procedure takes the form of ZN = (XN- XM) I crN (where ZN is 
the standardised score for each participant's raw data point, XN is the raw data point, 
XM is a participant's overall (including resting and experimental periods) mean level 
of arousal and crN is each participant's overall standard deviation o(arousal level). 
By this process, each data point is expressed in terms of a participant's unique SD 
and mean. A participant's baseline mean and SD is calculated through the entire 
session, including experimental periods, so that the baseline is not artificially low 
due to being calculated from a resting period only. It is a well known transformation 
(Boucsein, 1992) that is also used in parapsychology research (e.g . . Stevens, 2001) 
where sensitive physiological methods are commonly employed and individual 




Participants were instructed to sit down and relax in front of the experimental 
monitor with the stipulation that they not cross their legs in order to prevent artefacts 
in the results. The minor change in blood flow that is caused by crossing one's legs 
creates a small difference in SCL, as does any body movement. Practical steps such 
as this one, as well as a 5-minute relaxation phase before mood manipulation to 
allow time for an accurate baseline and for the electrode gel to set into the skin 
properly are standard procedures. 
While they were being connected to the EDA electrodes participants were informed 
about how the electrodes function and were assured that they could end the study at 
any time for any reason. After informed consent was obtained, each participant was 
attached to the electrodes and proper connection/reading was ensured. 
The experimental session consisted of four periods. The first five minutes were a 
relaxation period. After this initial period, one of the two film clips was shown at 
random in a double-blind paradigm. Participants were instructed before each fi lm 
clip to allow themselves to become immersed in the stimuli. Subsequent to this, each 
participant was instructed to relax for an additional two minutes, and then the 
remaining film clip was shown. 
Following the experimental session, each participant was debriefed and compensated 
for his/her time. 
5.3 Results 
Table 5.1 displays the means and standard deviations for the arousal measures 
calculated as well as for EI test scores for this sample for reference. The data were 
non-normal even after z-transformation (Shapiro-Wilk testing confirmed this). This 
is expected of EDA measures and curtails methodological options to non-parametric 
methods such as Spearman's Rho. The descriptive statistics for the SCL measures 
are for reference only as overall group differences in SCL change magnitude are of 
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no real meaning in this study. It is individual changes from baseline (i.e., relative 
differences) and how they relate to EI test scores that is of interest. 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics for El and SCL 
Variable M SD 







It is also possible with a SCL design such as this to observe two participants, one of 
whom regulates very well and returns his affect to baseline the other of whom 
regulates poorly and shows an increase in arousal, to both have equal mean SCL 
changes. This issue is returned to in the discussion but for now it serves to highlight 
that this is an unavoidable property of SCL designs. 
Initial investigation of the scatterplots for both conditions (Figures 5.2 and 5.3) 
suggests no correlation between EI and arousal change. This would seem to 
contradict the current-theory prediction that EI scores will correlate positively with 
reactivity to the affect manipulation. A closer examination of these scatterplots 
suggests a correlation between EI score and change in arousal from baseline for 
those that score just above the mean (cut-off score= 28, M = 25) and the 
disappearance of any correlation after this point. The direction of the correlation 
between EI and arousal change seems to depend on the affective content of the 
stimulus. These findings seem to support the hypotheses made based on the 
awareness and flexibility conjecture. 
Inferential statistics confirm the descriptive and graphical observations made 
regarding these data. As noted above, a smaller change in arousal from baseline is 
indicative of a greater extent of affect regulation. There was no overall correlation 
between EI score and arousal change from baseline in either the positive or negative 
affect conditions (p = .01 and p = .00, all ps > .5). As such, the predicted negative 
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association between EI score and arousal change (primacy of 'sensitivity' over 
'control') was not supported. 
In both affective conditions, EI score was significantly correlated with reactivity to 
induction and thus affect regulation, but only for those participants who score less 
than or equal to 28 on the EIS. In the negative condition, EI was negatively 
correlated with arousal change (p =-.56, p < .01, N = 22) amongst low-EI 
individuals, suggesting that relatively higher-EI individuals were better at 
maintaining a baseline level of arousal. A similar case was observed in the positive 
affect condition- EI scores were positive associated with arousal change from 
baseline (p = .52, p <.0 1, N = 22) suggesting a 'neutral ising' effect of EI. The lowest 
scorers were made happier by the stimuli but participants with EI scores near the 
mean hardly reacted at all. In both the positive and negative conditions, high-EI 
individuals appear to regulate their affect more variably, as evidenced by the non-
significant correlation between EI and arousal change (p = -.12 and p = -.13, all ps > 
.3, N = 17) in that sub-group. The low-scoring (i.e., scored below 28) group had less 
variable arousal responses in the positive (SD = .11) and negative (SD = .10) 
conditions than high-EI scorers (SD = .18, .16, respectively). 
Figure 5.2 Scatterplot of Arousal in the Negative Mood Condition as a 
Function of El 
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In other words, those who scored below 28 (M = 25) displayed a reliable 
'neutralising' effect of EI - greater EI was associated with smaller changes in 
arousal. The differences in direction of the association were due to differences in the 
stimulus content (stimuli which cause negative affect tend to increase arousal, thus 
'neutralising' must be a decrease in arousal). Those who scored about 28 showed no 
connection between EI test scores and reactivity to the affect induction. This what 
the hypothesis predicted: no correlation between EI test score and reactivity amongst 
high-EI individuals owing to their flexibility and awareness but this relationship 
should exist amongst low-E! individuals because they regulate in a reliable manner 
in line with their EI level. 
Figure 5.3 Scatterplot of Arousal Change in the Positive Mood Condition as a 
Function of El 
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5.4 Discussion 
This study tested two competing hypotheses. According to current EI theory it was 
predicted that EI test scores would be negatively related with reactivity to affect 
induction. Specifically, it was predicted that high-EI individuals would be better at 
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affect regulation and thus that they would react less to any affect induction. This 
hypothesis was not supported as there were no significant correlations between EI 
test scores and affective reactivity in either condition (p = .01 and p = .00, all ps > 
.5). Regardless of whether the logic of either previous affect regulation study (i.e., 
Petrides & Furnham, 2003; Ciarrochi et al., 2000) is considered sound it is certain 
that some sort of overall correlation between EI test scores and affect reactivity 
would be expected based on current EI theory. However, it was not possible to reject-
the null hypothesis which accompanied the hypothesis based on current EI theory. 
The awareness and flexibility conjecture drives a competing hypothesis. It was 
predicted that for high-EI individuals, there would be no correlation between EI 
score and affect reactivity (and thus, affect regulation), because high-EI individuals 
perceive more subtlety in affective stimuli (e.g. , the nuclear explosion could 
engender feelings of anger, shock, horror, sadness, etc) and behave in a greater 
variety of ways in response to it. This hypothesis was supported in both experimental 
conditions (p = -.12 and p = -.13, all ps > .3, N = 17). Low-EI individuals, on the 
other hand, were expected to manifest essentially what current EI theory would 
predict: an overall correlation between EI score and reactivity to affect induction. 
This prediction was also supported in both the positive (p =.52, p <.01, N = 22) and 
negative (p =-.56, p < .01, N = 22) conditions. For the sake of clarity, the roughly 
inverse relationship between reactivity and regulation should be repeated: SCL 
measures reactivity and less reactivity is interpreted as evidence of greater 
regulation. 
The relevance of these findings to this thesis is immediately apparent, as they seem 
to support the conjecture. However, this study is relevant beyond the scope of this 
conjecture as it fails to replicate any kind of overall correlation between EI scores 
and reactivity and thus affect regulation. This is a finding that runs counter to ability 
theory and because it is the first such EDA-related finding, it is of some importance 
even considered separately from the awareness and flexibility conj~cture. It is 
strange that the overall EI-reactivity (i.e., regulation) correlation here was similar to 
the null finding of Ciarrochi et al. (2000) rather than positive as in Petrides and 
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Fumham (2003), given the methodological similarities between this study and 
Petrides and Funrham's (2003). It seems that EI test scores do not correspond with 
these lab-bound indicators of affect regulation or heightened sensitivity to affect. 
As was noted above, SCL is a method with some disadvantages. Most critically, it is 
not usually possible to ensure that every moment of the stimulus contains the desired 
affective content. This loss of precision can be corrected by using an SCR paradigm 
and chapter 6 will investigate what effect this methodological change would make. 
SCL procedures in combination with z-transformation may have produced 
anomalous results. Astute readers will have noticed the high degree of similarity 
between the two scatterplots above. They were almost 'mirror images' of one 
another, with a strong negative correlation between values in each condition. 
Because z-transformation uses an 'overall' mean which is derived from the positive, 
negative, and baseline conditions, it is by definition nearly the exact mid-point 
between all of a participant's readings and as such the overall 'average' changes in 
arousal for each experimental condition could be of similar magnitude, if not sign. 
Between these factors and chance similarity between the stimuli, the similarity of the 
results of the two conditions begins to make sense. However, even though this 
overall mean splits the data roughly in half and thus explains some of the similarity 
between conditions, it doesn't compromise the correlation coefficients. It is hard to 
conceive of a way in which a simple subtraction and division procedure within a 
single variable would explain inter-variable covariance. 
Also, as will be returned to in the discussion section, the subgroups were created 
based on an arbitrary point near the mean and although the effects were notable with 
this cut-off point, the results would have been much different if a different cut-off 
point had been used. It is probably fair to point out that the purpose of this 
experiment and indeed this thesis in general was to determine if there was any utility 
in the conjecture. By using the most generous cut-off point it was possible to see if 
the conjecture functioned under ideal circumstances. Obviously, if the results 
disconfirm the conjecture-driven hypotheses even under ideal circumstances, the 
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conjecture can be easily discarded. In some ways, the failure of a theory under 
generous conditions is more infonnative than its failure under stringent conditions. 
A subtler and more interesting point is that this study only investigated un-prompted 
affect regulation and its relationship to EI, much like the study by Petrides and 
Funrham (2003). It was previously suggested that these researchers might have 
arrived at different findings from Ciarrochi eta!. (2000) because th~y used an 
incidental measure of affective state rather than requiring that participants complete 
some sort of cognitive task. It is possible that the different behaviours that high-EI 
people engage in are due to different task demands. More importantly, the language 
used in the conjecture being tested in this thesis places a great deal of weight on 
'flexibility', especially as it pertains to ambiguous stimuli, so it seems critical that 
this 'flexibility' be tested in some manner. This study showed that when presented 
with an ambiguous affective stimulus, high-EI individuals behaved in a variable 
manner and low-E! individuals simply regulated affect as best they can. To 
complement this information, an experiment which tests the converse must be 
created to determine how high-EI individuals behave when the stimulus is clear, 
rather than ambiguous. This is precisely what chapter 6 will test. 
Sample generalisability was also an issue in this study as participants were primarily 
university undergraduates. There were no significant gender differences in SCL in 
either affect condition, so the probability of gender influencing the results may not 
be as great as it might seem. Of course, most of the participants were 
undergraduates, and all of the normal problems of generalising from a student 
sample to the general population apply here as well. Future research in the general 
population would be helpful in deciding whether the effects observed here transfer to 
different samples. 
Sample generalisability also impacts these results because of its importance to the 
sub-group creation technique used here. Median and mean splits are a commonly 
used technique but these values are sample bound. That is, there is no external check 
on whether the mean value does in fact estimate the population mean. Because the 
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accuracy of the sub-group splits is so important for the clarity of the findings of these 
studies, it would be ideal to either split participants according to a normed mean or 
to use participants from the general population. This issue is partially mitigated 
because this research is preliminary, but any future research would need to use group 
splits which are externally justified. An attempt to do so is made in ~hapter 9. 
5.5 Summary 
In this study predictions were made based on existing EI theory and the conjecture. It 
was predicted according to existing EI theory that EI test scores would be positively 
associated with affective reactivity due to high-EI individuals' greater sensitivity to 
affect. This hypothesis was not supported. According to the conjecture it was 
predicted that low-EI individuals would display a 'neutralisation effect' of EI. That 
is, it was predicted that low-E! individuals would show a correlation between EI test 
scores and affect reactivity such that relatively higher EI would be associated with 
decreased reactivity. It was also predicted that high-EI individuals (i.e., above the 
mean) would show no correlation between their EI test scores and affective 
reactivity. Both of these predictions were supported. These results seem to 
contraindicate current EI theory in favour of the conjecture. 
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In chapter 5 it was shown that when presented with affective stimuli without any 
clear task, high-EI individuals will regulate their affect in a more variable manner 
than low-EI individuals. There was no correlation between EI test scores and 
reactivity to the affect induction and this seems to suggest that there is no evidence 
of great affect regulation in high-EI individuals. This appears to be the case 
regardless of whether they view positive or negative stimuli. This finding is contrary 
to what was expected based on current EI theory. The predictions made based on the 
conjecture were more successful, however. However, it was noted that the SCL 
paradigm used in chapter 5 had methodological weaknesses that could be corrected 
by using an SCR paradigm. More importantly, the role of task clarity in the 
variability of high-EI participants' responses was questioned. The purpose of the 
present study is to use SCR, a more precise technique, to determine whether the 
findings of the previous study were simply due to the Jack of a clear task. 
6.1.1 Task Clarity and Flexibility 
The chief theoretical flaw of the previous study was that it confounded task 
clarity/ambiguity with the conjecture being tested. Because Petrides and Fumham 
(2003) might have found completely different results from Ciarrocbi, Chan, & 
Caputi (2000) simply because one study included a task that clearly required affect 
regulation and one did not, it is necessary that future studies of the take task clarity 
into account. 
In addition to the evidence from current EI theory that indicates this confound is 
important, it is also relevant to the awareness and flexibility conjecture. This 
conjecture revolves entirely around choice: chapter 4 showed that high-EI 
individuals react in a greater variety of ways to ambiguous stimuli than low-EI 
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individuals and Chapter 5 showed that high-EI individuals choose a variety of 
approaches to situations whereas low-EI individuals employ the same approach 
across situations, albeit with variations in intensity. In other words, high-EI 
individuals choose a greater variety of approaches to situations but this choice is 
only possible in a task which is somewhat ambiguous as to what approaches are 
possible. If a task clearly only bas one solution, it is unlikely that high-EI individuals 
will select alternative solutions. It is more likely that the importance of awareness 
and flexibility disappears in situations with clear task demands and in these situations 
EI is identical to what cunent theory would predict. Thus a sort of interaction 
between task clarity and EI level is predicted: in the clear task condition, high-EI 
individuals would not be expected to behave more variably and thus there should be 
no evidence for the conjecture. Rather, in a clear situation it is expected that there 
will be an overall negative correlation between EI test scores and reactivity to the 
affect induction (and thus, affect regulation) owing to the greater abilities of high-EI 
individuals to regulate affect, especially when explicitly requested to do so. The 
ambiguous condition is included to test to conjecture as the presence of some amount 
of choice is critical for the conjecture. Similar findings to the previous chapter are 
expected in the ambiguous condition: a neutralisation effect (i.e., negative 
relationship between EI test score and reactivity to affect- affect regulation) of EI 
amongst low-EI individuals which disappears amongst high-EI individuals. 
6.1.2 Precision and Paradigms 
Another flaw that was discussed in chapter 5 was the Jack of precision in SCL 
paradigms. Simply put, it is not possible to ensure that every moment of a !-minute 
long film clip contains the affect that is desired by a researcher. Admittedly, a film 
clip probably only requires some minimal number of affect-laden 'moments' to 
induce affect (e.g., it only takes one 5-second grisly scene to be 'disturbing'), but it 
is entirely unclear what this minimum is. SCR paradigms are much more precise. 
Instead of a dynamic stimuli static images are presented and it is usually possible to 
determine which affect is induced by various pictures and how intensely is it induced 
before experimentation. Images are nearly as effective as films for inducing affect 
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(Martin, 1990; Westermann, Spies, Stahl, and Hesse, 1996) and image databases 
such as the lAPS (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) provide images that have been 
rated at nearly all points along the posHive/negative and intense/mild continua. 
In addition to the stimulus precision, SCR also collects data in more precise way. 
Data are collected in 5-7 second epochs rather than minute-long epochs so it is easier 
to determine how a participant reacted to a given stimulus. Although real data are 
noisy compared to the elusive 'standard' SCR waveforms (e.g., Boucesein, 1993), it 
is still much clearer and easier to interpret a group's averaged SCRs to a set of 
pictures than to a minute of film. Moreover, the amplitude of SCR is a more rigorous 
and precise indicator of arousal change than a tonic measure of SCL changes from 
baseline. Habituation effects are less likely in SCR paradigms if affective stimuli are 
randomised such that picture order effects are prevented. In sum, SCR is a more 
precise and rigorous measure of arousal and all subsequent studies will use this 
technique instead of SCL. 
The nature of SCR is also more straight-forward than SCL. A smaller SCR 
amplitude (i.e., maximum in an 'area of interest' in the waveform) indicates that the 
participant was not as disturbed by the stimulus as a participant with a larger SCR 
amplitude. Besides z-transformation, no baseline procedures are necessary and no 
'arousal change' values are necessary. SCR amplitude values are arousal change 
values. The only calculations necessary are correlations to determine whether EI is 
related to SCR amplitude in each affective and experimental condition. 
6.1.3 Affective Stimuli 
Images from the lAPS (Lang et al., 2005) were used to induce affect. The lAPS 
database contains a record of subjective ratings of the pictures for their affective 
valence and the intensity of the affect they induce. For this study, positive, negative, 
and neutral images were chosen based on how people rated them in terms of 
affective valence and intensity. More detail is provided below. In addition to 
subjective rating evidence for the experimental efficacy of affect-laden images, there 
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is substantial physiological (i.e., SCR) evidence that images are effective at inducing 
affect (e.g., Bradley, 2000). The images used in this study were selected according to 
their subjective ratings of valence and intensity. In the IAPS, ratings of valence and 
arousal range from I (low) to 9(high) with neutral images rated somewhere between 
4 and 5. For this study, images rated between six and seven on both continua were 
used as 'negative' stimuli and images rated between two and three on valence and 
six and seven on the intensity continuum were used for 'positive' stimuli. 'Neutral' 
stimuli were those which were rated at approximately one in intensity and four to 
five on affect. Several images were used to induce each type of affect. 
6.1.4 Hypotheses 
The discussion above explained how the relationship between EI test scores and 
reactivity to affect induction might be influenced by task clarity. Reactions to a clear 
request might be different from reactions to an ambiguous task. It is predicted that in 
the ambiguous task condition, a similar finding to chapter 5 will be observed: a 
negative correlation between EI test scores and SCR amplitude- a smaller amplitude 
reflects a lesser reaction to the induction -for low-E! individuals but no such 
correlation amongst high-EI individuals. In the clear task condition, current EI 
theory will hold and thus there will be a simple overall negative correlation between 
EI score and SCR amplitude. This negative relationship if found will be taken to be 
indicative of greater affect regulation abilities amongst high-EI individuals. This 
prediction follows Ciarrochi et al's (2000) finding because this study, like theirs, 
contains a clear affect regulation requirement. A group-difference (i.e., ANOV A) 
approach could also be used here, but this approach would prevent investigation of 





Skin Conductance Response and scores on the TEIQue (discussed below) trait El 
test were recorded in two within-subjects experimental conditions: a clear task and 
an ambiguous task. 
6.2.2 Participants 
Forty Edinburgh University students (fifteen male and twenty five female) took part 
in this study for £2.50. Their ages ranged from nineteen to thirty five (M = 24.8, SD 
= 4.2). Participants were recruited using an advertisement on the Edinburgh 
University student employment website and although this website is viewable by all 
students at this university, this was still an opportunity sample. Participants were 
split into high- and low-scoring groups based on their EI scores. 
6.2.3 Measures 
The TEique-SF was used in this study. This is a trait EI test (Petrides & Furnham, in 
press) designed to return a global EI score and fifteen subscale scores although the 
authors caution against liberal use of the sub-scales, presumably because these sub-
scales would be two items in length. It contains thirty items. It is responded to using 
a 7-point self-report Likert scale anchored at 'strongly agree' and 'strongly 
disagree'. The responses were fairly reliable in this sample (a.= .66) of forty 
participants. 
6.2.4 Apparatus 
The same computer and skin conductance equipment as in chapter ~ was used in this 
study with the exception of the computer program that the participants interacted 
with. The new program used for this study was written by Paul Stevens. Ten images 
from the lAPS were selected based on the criteria explained above to constitute the 
103 
104 
'positive,' 'negative,' and 'neutral' stimuli. The ten pictures were split evenly and 
randomly between the two experimental conditions. 
6.2.5 Procedure 
Participants first completed the TEique and were then attached to the SCR 
equipment. The electrodes were affixed to the medial phalanx of the index and 
middle digit of the non-dominant hand to prevent the signal from being affected or 
degraded by calluses. Participants took part in both experimental conditions in a 
randornised, double-blind paradigm. At the beginning of each condition participants 
were presented with an instruction screen on a touch-sensitive monitor which was 
used to navigate through instruction screens. These two instruction screens were 
identical save for the fact that the clear condition instruction screen included an 
instruction to 'attempt to neutralise any emotions you experience as a result of 
looking at these images. ' Verbal instructions to the participants were for them to 
'neutralise' their emotions in the clear condition and to 'do whatever they would 
normally do' in the ambiguous condition. As noted before, each condition comprised 
fifteen affective images - five of each of the three affective valences- and these 
images were presented in a random order for five seconds. After each stimulus 
presentation there was a random rest period of some length between seven and nine 
seconds to prevent expectation effects. Thus each participant completed the 
questionnaire, completed one experimental condition, then completed the remaining 
condition. 
6.3 Results 
Data in this study were z-transformed in the same manner as in chapter 5 and only 
the z-transformed data were analysed. The physiological descriptive statistics 
presented in Table 6.1 are averages of participants' z-transformed SCR peak 
amplitudes in a region of interest. Participants' SCR amplitudes are. expressed as a 
number of standard deviations from the mean thus the descriptive statistics in Table 
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6.1 below are group means of individuals' amplitudes, expressed as standard 
deviations (cr) from the mean. Again, it should be noted that it is the connection 
between individuals' SCR amplitude and their EI test scores, not group differences, 
which are of interest. 
In order to extract mean SCR amplitudes some additional procedures (compared to 
SCL) are required. First, responses in all of the picture categories are averaged 
across participants so that an 'average' waveform is constructed foF all picture 
categories in both experimental conditions. This average waveform is then used to 
identify regions of interest for the entire sample. Generally, this region of interest is 
a two-second period that occurs two seconds after stimulus presentation. After the 
region of interest is identified, SCR amplitude peaks are identified within this region 
of interest for each participant and these fonn the raw data used in further analyses. 
Table 6.1: El test score and z-transformed SCR amplitude descriptive 
statistics for experimental and affective conditions 
TEique Cneg(o) Cpos(o) Cneu(o) Aneg(o) Apos(o) Aneu(o) 
M 130 0.151 0.087 0.019 0.123 0.122 O.Q18 
S.D. 18 0.234 0.247 0.126 0.278 0.274 0.167 
Note: TEique refers to scores on the TEique Cneg refers to the negative affect pictures in the clear 
condition, Cpos to the positive affect pictures in the clear condition, Cneu to the neutral pictures in the 
clear condition, Aneg to the negative pictures in the ambiguous conclition, Apos to the positive 
pictures in the ambiguous condition, and Aneu to the neutral pictures in the ambiguous condition. 
Physiological variables are expressed in terms of standard deviations from the mean. 
As in chapter 5, visual inspection of the data as well as normality tests indicated that 
these results were non-normal and as such only non-parametric measures are used 
here. A Mann-Whitney U test revealed a significant gender difference in SCR 
amplitude in the ambiguous negative condition (U = 103.5, p < .05) but no 
significant gender difference in EI scores. 
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EI sub-groups were formed by a mean (M =130) split which resulted in a low-group 
of seventeen (nine female, eight male) participants and a high-group of twenty three 
participants (sixteen female, seven male). In the ambiguous condition, the EI scores 
of low-EI participants (i.e., those that scored under the mean) correlated moderately 
negatively with SCR amplitude in the negative affect condition (p ~ -.49, p < .05) 
but there was no such correlation between EI scores and SCR amplitude in the 
positive image condition. The correlations between EI test scores and SCR 
amplitude in the different experimental conditions and different EI sub-groups are 
presented in table 6.1 below. This relationship is depicted in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 and 
of note is the manner in which there is a strong 'neutralisation' tren~ which 
disappears when the entire sample is analysed. 
Table 6.1 Correlations between El test scores and SCR amplitude in different 
experimental conditions. 
Z-Transformed SCR Amplitude 
El Subgroup Amb. P Amb. N Clear P. Clear N. 
El test score (Overall, N = 40) 
El test score (high, N = 23 ) 










Note: Am b. Prefers to the ambiguous positive condition, Amb. N to the ambiguous negative 
condition, Clear P. to the clear positive condition, and Clear N to the clear negative condition. 
Different rows display correlations in either tbe overall sample, tbe high-scoring group, or the low-
scoring group. Bold numbers are significant at the p < .05 level. 
Figure 6.1 The relationship between El scores and SCR amplitude in 
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Figure 6.2 The relationship between El scores and SCR amplitude in 
response to negative stimuli in the ambiguous condition -entire sample. 
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Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate the awareness andjlexibility conjecture. Higher SCR 
amplitude indicates greater anxiety in response to the stimulus so it appears that 
increased EI is associated with less anxiety (i.e., affect neutralisation) up to a certain . 
point, after which there is no discernable relationship between EI at;1d affective 
reactions. In other words, given an ambiguous situation, low-E! individuals 
neutralise their affective reactions in a predictable manner in line with their EI level 
and high-EI individuals show no predictable behaviour in an ambiguous situation. 
These findings partially support the conjecture-driven hypothesis regarding the 
relationship of EI and affect regulation in ambiguous situations. There were no 
significant correlations between Eland SCR amplitude in any of the experimental 
conditions when the entire sample was examined. This finding disconfirms the 
expectation (driven by current EI theory) that EI scores would correlate positively 
with SCR amplitude in the clear condition and indicates neither greater sensitivity 
nor greater regulation amongst high-EI individuals. 
6.4 Discussion 
A moderate negative correlation between SCR amplitude and EI score was observed 
for low-EI (i.e., below the mean) participants in the ambiguous negative condition (a 
= -.49, p < .05) but no similar correlation in the ambiguous positive condition. There 
were no correlations between EI and SCR amplitude in any conditions for high-EI. 
This provides only partial support for the awareness and flexibility conjecture as it 
shows that the hypothesis based on current EI theory - that there would an overall 
correlation between EI and SCR amplitude due to increased 'sensitivity' in high-EI 
individuals- was not supported as there were no overall correlations between EI and 
affect regulation in any of the affect or experimental conditions. 
There are theoretical and methodological issues in this study. The two most 
important points cut to the core of this thesis: I) it is not yet certain that participants 
are indeed regulating affect when instructed to do so; and 2) the suitability of 
physiological indicators as a dependent variable must be defended. Once a response 
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has been made to these points, there are a number of interesting the~retical points 
which could be made about the results of this study with reference to current EI 
theory and the conjecture being tested in this thesis. 
It would be tempting to respond to 1) by simply suggesting that is certain that 
participants are regulating affect to different degrees because their SCR amplitudes 
differ from one another (i.e., that we are certain they are doing the task based on 
their score on it), but this response is a tautology. This response is circular because 
SCR amplitude is already being used as an indicator of reactivity to the affect 
induction and thus, affect regulation. In essence, to use this response would be to 
state 'SCR is being used as an indicator of affect regulation and we know 
participants are regulating their affect by examining their SCR amplitude,' which 
would be analogous to a memory researcher suggesting that 'longer rehearsal time is 
used to define depth of processing and we know participants process more deeply 
because they rehearse longer.' This difficulty is partially mitigated by the fact that 
this investigation regards the connection between EI and lab-based affect regulation 
indices (rather than a theory of what causes better affect regulation) and as such the 
index of affect regulation may be more arbitrary than, say, a memory task in a theory 
of memory. However, it is still critical to know that participants are actually 
regulating affect, otherwise any correlations found here are meaningless. It could 
also be argued that the trait EI measure used here provides an independent measure 
of affect regulation ability, but this is hardly the same as an index of affect regulation 
on a specific task. These attempts to avoid the question fail. Rather what is needed is 
a design which includes two independent measures of affect regulation in the same 
study. The previous study which used SCL only goes half way towards this aim. In 
order to bypass the tautology and to be certain that participants are indeed regulating 
affect, it will be necessary to include two measures of affective state. To this end and 
for a number of other reasons explained below, the future studies in this thesis will 
include self-report measures of affective state in addition to SCR. 
Another formulation of 1) would suggest that the differences between experimental 
conditions are due to some sort of confound, but the methodology used here makes 
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this unlikely. The experimental conditions were counterbalanced and differed in only 
two respects: the images used in each affective category and whether the task was 
clear or ambiguous. While it is possible that the different images used in the different 
conditions are responsible for the different SCR amplitudes, this is unlikely as all the 
images were selected along similar criteria and as there is no alternative to using 
difference images as the repeated use of identical images would cause habituation. 
The only remaining difference between experimental conditions was what 
participants were instructed to do, i.e., the experimental manipulation of task clarity. 
As was noted above, an independent measure of affect regulation would be 
necessary to be certain that participants were actually regulating more effectively 
than in the ambiguous condition and future studies will include such a measure. Still, 
it is safe to say that the experimental conditions were similar enough to one another 
that there is little chance that differences in SCR amplitude were due to a confound. 
The suitability of physiological indicators can be defended by appealing to the 
robustness of the method, but subjective indicators of affect might add a great deal to 
future studies. Some participants complained that it was very difficult to 'neutralise' 
affect within a five-second period. In order to determine if SCR was sensitive to 
affect regulation, the waveforms (averaged across the five pictures which formed 
each affective category) of the participants with the highest and lowest SCR 
amplitudes (i.e., most or least evidence of affect regulation) in both experimental 
conditions were examined. These post-hoc analyses suggest that there are 
meaningful differences in bow participants respond when they are explicitly told to 
neutralise their affect. All comparisons of waveforms within the same affect but in 
different experimental conditions (i.e., positive ambiguous and positive clear) 
revealed differences in peaks and forms, with the exception of one comparison. 
Figure 6.3 illustrates this finding. Participants who were 'better' at affect regulation 
seemed to exhibit greater differences between the clear and ambiguous experimental 
conditions. In short, the physiological data suggest that participants behave 
differently in the clear and ambiguous conditions- a successful manipulation. 
Moreover, the group (and extreme sub-group) data suggest that participants 
experienced smaller changes in arousal when explicitly told to regulate their affect 
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when they viewed negative but not positive pictures- in other words their 
physiological responses indicate that they regulated more effectively when they were 
explicitly told to do so. Thus it appears that the five-second stimulus duration and the 
SCR paradigm used here were sufficient to accurately measure affect regulation. 
That said, the affective response is also a subjective phenomenon and as such the 
inclusion of self-report indices of affect could only serve to improve future studies. 
It is also possible that the physiological indicators of affect used in this chapter and 
the previous chapter are overly simplistic. Even if the breadth of affective response 
is ignored and only physiological aspects or indicators of affect are examined, there 
is still considerably more to the physiology of affect than skin conductance. Activity 
in the CNS and other peripheral organs also accompanies affective response and 
although SCR is a good measure of arousal, it is relatively insensitive to affective 
valence or complex emotions. Thus it is possible to criticise this stUdy for over-
simplifying the physiological aspects of affective response. This issue is examined in 
more detail in the general discussion. 
Figure 6.3 Average SCR waveforms for each condition and affective 
category. Measurement of SCR amplitude is in microsiemens. 
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In order to circumvent the tautology discussed previously and also to cohere better 
with previous studies, further studies will include self-report indices of affect in 
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addition to physiological indicators. In similar prior studies (i.e., Ciarrochi et al., 
2000; Petrides & Fumham, 2003) subjective measures of affective state were used 
and in this thesis, only physiological, more 'objective' measures have been used. 
This methodological difference may explain why previous studies found overall 
correlations between EI scores and affect regulation and the current study did not. It 
may be that previous findings were due to some kind of self-report bias which is not 
present in this study. The purpose this thesis was to investigate more 'objective' 
indices of affect and how they relate to EI test scores, but this aim is not undermined 
by the use of self-report measures. A replication which uses self-report and 
physiological methodology would be helpful to understand the reasons for the null 
findings here. It would also improve the ecological validity of this study. Of course, 
self-report measures could not be used both as a manipulation check and a 
hypothesis test as this would require that they perform 'double duty' and would be as 
tautological as using SCR for both duties. 
It is unclear why the prediction based on the conjecture was only S\.!pported in one 
affective condition. Based on the conjecture, there is no reason to suspect that the 
connection between EI and affect regulation would be different when viewing 
different types of stimuli. Of course, there is a vast difference between 'happy' and 
'anxious,' from biology to behaviour, so it is possible that there is some complex 
interplay between affective stimuli and the way awareness andjlexibility function in 
the conjecture. Perhaps high-EI individuals are simply not predictable jn how they 
react to positive stimuli regardless of whether they are given a clear or an ambiguous 
task. Perhaps the findings in chapter 4 were a fluke. Perhaps there is something 
unique about positive stimuli that might alter the relationship between EI and SCR 
amplitude. The present study is insufficient for any conclusion on the matter and 
further replications will be necessary. 
Another troublesome issue is the lack of any overall correlation between EI score 
and affect regulation. Although similar null findings were observed in some of the 
comparisons carried out by Ciarrochi et al., (2000), current EI theory would certainly 
predict some lind of connection between EI test scores and the degree of affect 
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regulation, whether it be negative (indicating that high-EI is associated with greater 
'sensitivity') or positive (indicating that high-EI is greater 'regulation'). The results 
from this study seem to disconfirm current EI theory. Simply put, there does not 
seem to be a correlation between EI test scores and individuals' physiological 
reactions to affective stimuli and it is very difficult to reconcile these findings with 
present EI theory. There is ample reason to expect that (when presented with a clear 
task) high-EI individuals would perform better at it than low-EI individuals but this 
study and the prior study show that this is not the case. It is possible that EI does not 
function on the physiological level and the following study will replicate the current 
study to determine if this is the case. It will also include a preliminary, incidental 
probe into the connection between EI test scores and subjective indices of reactivity 
to affect induction. However, because physiological reactions are so important to 
many emotions, it seems inappropriate to suggest that physiology is out of the remit 
of EI. Future studies will be necessary to determine if these findings are robust but it 
does seem that, however tentatively, current EI theory does not make accurate 
predictions about physiological indices of affect regulation. The awareness and 
flexibility conjecture receives very little support as well. 
Of course, these results only reflect a failure of EI tests to predict a ·very specific 
physiological indicator of the affective response. It is possible that EI tests predict 
other aspects of the physiological response to affective stimuli (e.g., heart rate, pupil 
dilation, etc.) better. As was noted above, EI tests may also predict subjective 
measures of affective response reliably. The issue of how convincing or 
generalisable these findings are is taken up in more detail in the ge~eral discussion. 
It may also be the case that EI operates at different 'levels.' That is, perhaps some 
EI-related skills function at a conscious level whilst some function at a more 
fundamental or biological level. Just as performance on inspection time tasks is more 
strongly correlated with fluid ability measures (Deary, 2000; Austin, 2004) than 
crystallised ability measures, perhaps some branches of EI are more heavily 
correlated with some lab-based tasks than others. There have been some studies 
(e.g., Austin, 2004; Farreley & Austin, 2005) which have substantiated this claim but 
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it is not presently part of the core of existing EI theory. Additionally, the power of 
this defence relies on the clarity of EI factor structure which was shown in chapter 4 
to be somewhat suspect. StiJI, if the psychometric hurdles can be bypassed, it may be 
that differences in predictive validity between EI factors may account for the 
findings of this study. 
As in the previous studies, gender effects are worth discussing. For some reason 
(many possibilities present themselves) there were more female than male 
participants. As was noted above, there was a gender difference in reactivity to the 
affect manipulation but there was no significant difference in EI sc<;>res between 
genders and the gender composition of both EI sub-groups was approximately equal. 
It might seem tempting to attribute the findings of this study to a gender effect, but it 
must be recalled that the hypothesis, and even the conjecture itself, has to do with 
how EI skj))s are used, not whether one sub-group is 'better' than another. When 
men and women were analysed separately post hoc, neither gender showed any 
evidence of an overall correlation between EI test scores and SCR amplitude 
regardless of gender (all p's > .2) so it is unlikely that gender differences are 
responsible for the findings here. 
It might be argued that inducing affect in the lab lacks the ecological validity of 
other methods. This may be the case, but as was noted there is evidence to suggest 
that using images or films in the lab is an effective means of inducing affect that 
avoids demand characteristics (Martin, 1990; Westermann et al., 1996). So although 
it is probably true that there are more ecologically valid ways of inducing affect, the 
methods used here are probably acceptable on a number of other grounds: precision, 
replicability, objectivity. Unfortunately, it is usually necessary to sacrifice ecological 
validity for these other desired qualities, and as was explained in chapters 1 and 2 
this thesis is focused specifically on physiological indices of affect as they seem to 
be the most precise, replicable, and objective (ignoring the multiple ambiguities in 
this term) of affective measures. In short, it is true that this study lacked some 
ecological validity, but it also benefits from some qualities that a more ecologically 
valid study would lack. 
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There are numerous replications and extensions which could be performed on this 
study. Primarily, any replication could use self-report as well as physiological 
indicators of affect in order to address the ecological validity critique and to 
determine if the lack of an overall correlation was due to the methods used here. It 
might be useful to employ non-lAPS images as a means of inducing affect- the 
Ekman faces would probably suit this purpose equally well and might be argued to 
be more appropriate as they all pertain to facial displays of emotion. It also might be 
illuminating to see how people with different EI levels responded to some of the 
more violent or disturbing images in the lAPS, but such a study may be considered 
unethical or at least unpleasant by some. There are also numerous ways in which a 
series of experiments would take a form only vaguely similar to the series of 
experiments in this thesis: different physiological indices, a different EI-related skill, 
etc. More space will be devoted to discussion of future directions in the general 
discussion section below. 
It is also possible that the EI test used in this study caused the null findings. In 
chapter 5, the 41-item EIS (Austin, Saklofske, Huang, & McKenney, 2004) was used 
whereas the TEIQue short-form (Petrides & Furnham, in press) was used in the 
present study. The results of chapter 5 also supported the conjecture more clearly. 
Although these two tests are similar in that they are both trait EI tests, they differ in 
their factor structures, length, and construction. Given the previous evidence that 
different EI tests can result in notably different results in two similar studies (e.g., 
Austin 2004; 2005), it is possible that something similar is occurring here. However, 
because thiS study was the first SCR study of EI and affect regulation it would seem 





In this study, participants completed the TEique, a trait EI test, and viewed a series 
of affect-laden pictures while their SCR was recorded in both an ex.perimental 
procedure with a clear or ambiguous task. Based on the awareness and flexibility 
conjecture, it was hypothesized that when presented with an ambiguous task, the 
findings of chapter 4 would replicate- that the EI scores of low-E! individuals 
would correlate with their affect regulation but that this correlation would be not be 
present for high-EI individuals. It was also predicted, based on curr~nt EI theory, 
that when given a clear task, there would be an overall negative correlation between 
EI and reactivity to the affect induction and thus a positive relationship between EI 
test score and lab indicator of affect regulation. The first hypothesis was partially 
supported but the second was not. The importance of these findings, especially the 
null overall correlation, was discussed with reference to present EI theory. It was 
noted that an important replication would include both self-report and physiological 
indices of affect and it is to this replication that we now tum. 
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Chapter 7: Prompted Affect Regulation and the Awareness and 
Flexibility Conjecture- Self-report and Physiological Indices 
7.1 Introduction 
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The results of chapter 6 provided partial support for the awareness and flexibility 
conjecture, but this partial support was tempered by the lack of subjective reports of 
reactivity to the affect induction. Prior studies of EI and affect regulation (e.g., 
Ciarrochi, Chan, & Caputi, 2000; Petrides & Furnbam, 2003) have used self-report 
methods to measure affect and thus affect regulation. The studies in this thesis have 
only used physiological measures. These lab-based, physiological measures of affect 
should be complemented by subjective measures in order to increase ecological 
validity and to serve as a manipulation check. 
A subjective measure of affect could take a variety of forms, but the most relevant 
studies (i.e., studies of EI and affect regulation) use Likert scales completed by 
either the participant (Petrides & Furnham, 2003) or a group of observers (Ciarrochi 
et al., 2000). Other, non-EI related studies of affect (e.g. , Deiner, Larsen, Levine, & 
Emmons, 1985) often use similar Likert scales. Although these non-EI studies of 
affect often use these self-report measures as 'manipulation checks' rather than 
solely as dependent variables, they are still clearly used to measure .affect. This 
approach has intuitive appeal: the best way to know to what a person is thinking is 
probably to ask him/her. 
The inclusion of the subjective measure of affective state serves a number of 
purposes. Most importantly, this measure will remove the tautology discussed in the 
previous chapter. The self-report measure can be used to ensure tha·t participants are 
indeed regulating their affect whilst the physiological measure is used to determine 
how effective they are at regulation (i.e., the degree to which they react to the stimuli 
at all). The self-report measure will also add ecological validity to the study in 
chapter 6 and will increase sensitivity to attempts at affect regulation because this 
measure will be completed at the participant' s own speed and thus will not be 
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constrained by the five-second stimulus presentation time. This methodological 
improvement will also make it possible to determine if the correlation between EI 
and performance on lab-based emotion-related tasks depends on the outcome 
measure used. Simply put, including a self-report measure will allow a great deal of 
insight that would not otherwise be possible. 
In this study, the subjective indicators were not used to test the sam.e hypotheses as 
the physiological data because the subjective reports were not 'change' scores. Also, 
as is noted below, the self-report data were included as a manipulation check and it 
is not appropriate to use the same measure as a manipulation check and as a 
dependent variable. It would not be appropriate for the self-report data to be used 
both as a manipulation check and a hypothesis test. To do so with the self-report data 
would encounter the same tautology that their inclusion was designed to prevent! 
The self-report hypotheses should thus be treated with care and perhaps are best 
considered an incidental, superficial probe of whether or not subjective data mirror 
the physiological data. 
The predictions for the self-report data differ slightly from the predictions for the 
physiological data. SCR amplitude is a measure of a participant's change in arousal 
from baseline and thus is an index of his/her reactivity to the affect induction. The 
self-report indices were static ratings of the images in terms of their intensity and 
valence and thus do not represent any change in arousal. However, these static 
indices of affective state can still be used to make inferences about affect regulation. 
That is, although they do not control for baseline affective state, it is still informative 
to know ifEI test scores are associated with greater or less negativity (or positivity) 
in ratings of affect in response to negative or positive stimuli. It would be expected 
based on current EI theory that because of their greater affect regulation (or repair) 
abilities, high-EI individuals would rate their affective state as more positive after 
viewing negative stimuli. Ciarrochi et al. (2000) made similar predictions. 
Specifically, current EI theory would predict a positive association between EI test 
score and valence ratings in response to the positive and negative pictures clear 
condition- reflecting the positive impact of affect regulation. Current EI theory 
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would also prompt us to expect that because of their heightened affect regulation 
abilities higher EI would be negatively associated with ratings of the intensity of the 
affect induction in the clear condition. As was noted before, due to the importance of 
choice in the operation of the awareness and flexibility mechanisms in the 
conjecture, predictions based on the conjecture are only made for the ambiguous 
condition. The conjecture leads to the prediction that in the ambiguous condition, 
amongst low-EI individuals there would be a negative correlation between EI test 
score and ratings of intensity for positive and negative images. It would also be 
expected that that amongst low-E! individuals in the ambiguous condition there 
would be a positive association between EI test score and valence ratings for positive 
and negative images. In other words, the conjecture would predict that in the 
ambiguous condition, the results from the low-E! individuals' responses would be 
similar to what current EI theory would predict for the entire sample in the clear 
condition. The conjecture would predict no correlation between EI test scores and 
self-report indices of affect amongst low-E! individuals in the clear. condition 
regardless of stimulus valence. 
The investigation into the self-report data should be read as an interesting aside 
rather than the main thrust of this study. These measures were included to ensure that 
participants were actually regulating affect when requested to do so and also to break 
the circular argument that characterised the interpretation of chapter 6. Simply, two 
independent measures were needed: one to ensure that the manipulation was 
effective and one to test the hypotheses. It would be inappropriate to use the self-
report measures for both purposes. However, it would also be a waste to not examine 
the potential correlations between EI test scores and reactivity to the affective 
stimuli, at least incidentally. 
The physiological predictions for this study are identical to the previous study. The 
conjecture leads to the prediction that when the emotional task is left ambiguous, 
there will be no correlation between EI test scores and reactivity to the affect 
induction (i.e., SCR amplitude; affect regulation) amongst high-EI individuals whilst 
low-E! individuals will display a negative correlation between EI score and SCR 
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amplitude (i.e. , a correlation between EI scores and affect regulation effectiveness). 
Current EI theory leads to the prediction that in the clear task condition, EI scores 
will correlate negatively with SCR amplitude in the entire sample indicating that 
high-EI individuals will be less reactive to emotional stimuli owing to their 
heightened affect regulation abilities. Excepting the inclusion of the self-report 
measure and a smaller number of images for each affect category (three each for 




After completing a trait EI questionnaire, SCR was recorded while participants 
viewed positive, negative, and neutral images in two experimental conditions (clear 
and ambiguous task) and rated each of these images on two scales: one with 
'positive' and 'negative' poles and one with 'mild' and 'intense' poles in a within-
subjects, correlational design. 
7.2.2 Participants 
Forty students were recruited through the student and graduate employment service 
at Edinburgh University. However, because some participants were not native 
English speakers, incomplete questionnaire responses, and because there was a 
technical malfunction which resulted in several participants' data being over-written, 
only thiJty-three were retained. These participants ranged in age from seventeen to 
thirty eight (M = 22.8, SD = 5.4) and twelve were male while twenty-one were 




The TEIQue was used in this study, as in chapter 6. The reliability of the responses 
in this data set was high (a= .87). The self-report measures which were presented to 
participants to measure affective state were two 9-point Likert scales, one anchored 
at 'happy' and 'sad' and one anchored at 'mild' and 'intense'. 
7 .2.4 Apparatus 
The same apparatus were used in chapters 5 and 6 save for the computer program 
and the picture stimuli. The program was designed by Dr Paul Stev~ns. In order to 
keep experimental time at a minimum, three images were used for each affective 
category (i.e., three positive, negative, and neutral images) in each experimental 
condition instead of five as in chapter 6. The images used were selected based on 
similar criteria as in chapter 6. Subjective reports of valence and intensity were 
keyed in using a touch-sensitive screen identical to the screen used to navigate 
through the experiment in the previous studies. 
7.2.5 Procedure 
The procedure in this study was similar to that of the previous study. Participants 
first completed the same EI questionnaire and were subsequently connected to the 
SCR electrodes and then were informed about the experimental procedure. As in 
chapter 6, participants took part in both of two nearly identical experimental 
conditions in a counterbalanced design. In each experimental condition, participants 
viewed nine randomly presented pictures and were asked to rate each picture on two 
scales: positive/negative and mild/intense. After each stimulus, each participant 
reported how the image made him/her feel on the valence and intensity Likert scales. 
SCR was recorded during the entire session and SCR data were z-transformed as in 




Table 7.1 displays the descriptive statistics for the self-report measure of affective 
state in all of the experimental conditions. As was noted above, the self-report data 
were primarily used as a manipulation check. The manipulation seems to have 
worked, as the negative pictures prompted ratings closer to 1 (i.e., extremely 
unpleasant) than did the neutral or positive images, and the positive images 
prompted ratings closer to 9 (i.e., extremely pleasant) than did the negative or neutral 
images. In the ambiguous condition, ratings of valence for the positive and negative 
pictures differed notably from the ratings of neutral pictures. Ratings of intensity in 
the ambiguous condition differed less dramatically between the various picture 
categories than did ratings of valence, but a11 comparisons of valence and intensity 
between positive/negative pictures and neutral pictures were significant at p < .01, 
with the exception of the comparison between positive and neutral intensity. This 
seems to indicate that even in the ambiguous condition, the positive and negative 
images had the desired effect on ratings of affect. The intensity ratings were 
expected to be higher (i.e., more intense) in the ambiguous condition and this seems 
to be the case. Positive and negative images were expected to be rated as more 
intense than neutral images in either condition but were not expected to differ from 
one another. These expectations were largely borne out with some exceptions. 
Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics for self-report indices of affect 
Affective Condition 
Task Condition Positive Negative Neutral 
Ambiguous Valence 6.3 (1.0) 1.9 (1.0) 4.1 (1.2) 
lJ1tensity 4.7(1.7) 3.7 (1.3) 4.5 ( 1.2) 
Clear Valence 5.6 ( 1.0) 2.5 (.8) 4.1 (.6) 
Intensity 3.9 (1.8 3.1 ( 1.8) 2.6 (1.4) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
Ratings of valence and intensity in the clear condition were less extreme than in the 
ambiguous condition. There are significant differences (i .e., all p's < .01) between 
ratings of the positive and negative images in the clear and ambiguous conditions 
indicating that positive ratings were less positive and negative ratings less negative 
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in the clear condition. This suggests that the explicit instruction to 'neutralise' affect 
in the clear condition was effective. 
The subjective data were also included to test the hypotheses driven by the 
conjecture or current theory using more ecologically valid measures. As was noted 
previously, the self-report findings should only be taken as an incidental test of the 
hypotheses. Their primary role was as a manipulation check and it is not reasonable 
for them to perform 'double duty. ' They are included in this and the following 
chapter for reference. In the clear condition, EI test scores were correlated positively 
with valence ratings for negative pictures (p = .38, p < .05 one tailed) which 
indicates that participants who scored highly on the EI test rated the negative images 
more positively. There were no other significant correlations between EI scores and 
ratings of valence or intensity in the clear condition. Thus the prediction that higher 
EI would be associated with a more positive, less intense impact of affective stimuli 
was partly supported. The correlations between self-report measures of affect and EI 
test scores in the different experimental conditions are presented in table 7.2 below. 
Table 7.2. Correlations between El test scores and self-report measures of 




Subgroue Am.P Am.N C.P C.N Am.P Am.N C.P. C.N. 
El test score (Overall, N = 33) -0.10 -0.23 0.16 0.11 -0.06 0.00 0.06 0.38 
El test score (high, N = 17 ) -0.11 -0.25 0.52 0.16 -0.01 -0.14 0.15 0.53 
El test score (low, N = 16) -0.47 -0.13 0.04 0.06 -0.22 0.10 0.09 0.22 
Note: Am. Prefers to the ambiguous positive condition, Am. N to the ambiguous negative condition, 
C. P. to the clear positive condition, and C. N. to the clear negative condition. Different rows display 
correlations in either the overall sample, the high-scoring group, or the low-scoring group. Bold 
numbers are significant at the p < .05 level. 
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To assess the awareness and flexibility conjecture with the self-report data, the 
sample was split into high-(N = 17) and low- (N = 16) scoring EI subgroups, split at 
the mean (M = 146). In the low-scoring group, EI scores were correlated negatively 
with intensity ratings of the positive pictures (p = -.47, p < .05, one tailed). This is 
the neutralisation effect that was expected with low-E! individuals reporting being 
more positively affected by the stimuli but middling scorers reporting less impact 
(i.e., more neutral) of the stimuli. In the high-scoring group there was a positive 
correlation between EI test scores and ratings of intensity in the clear positive 
condition and ratings of valence in the clear negative condition. It is strange that the 
relationship is positive regardless of the type of affect induced, but in any event it is 
the correlation between EI test scores and reactivity in the entire sample that is of 
interest, not the high-group only. These results seem to indicate weak support for the 
conjecture but do not allow rejection of the nuiJ hypothesis in favour of current EI 
theory. Again, these self-report values should be taken as preliminary, incidental 
tests as their primary purpose was to serve as a manipulation check. 
SCR amplitude data were extracted using a similar procedure to what was done in 
chapter 6. Figure 7.1 displays the average waveforms in each of the picture 
categories in each experimentaJ condition. This waveform displays a negative trend 
which is common to SCR responses even after z-transformation. This negative trend 
does not adversely impact the data as it is individuals' amplitudes that are of interest, 
not group mean responses. The region of interest remains unchanged: approximately 
two to four seconds after stimulus presentation. 
Figure 7.1 Average waveforms for experimental conditions to·r the entire 
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Table 7.3 displays the descriptive statistics for the physiological indices of affective 
state. Again, these are presented for reference. The low and negative values are due 
to a relaxation trend in all conditions. Regardless of condition, participants displayed 
decreased arousal in response to the successive stimuli and this was not due to order 
as the images were displayed in a random order. The self-report data indicate that the 
manipulation was effective so it would be redundant (and tautological) to use the 
physiological data as a manipulation check as well. As in chapter 6, the data in Table 
7.2 are averages of individual amplitudes after z-transformation, thus they are 
expressed in terms of standard deviations from the individual's overall session mean. 
Table 7.3 Descriptive statistics for physiological measures of affect 
Affective Condition 






















The physiological data provided partial support for the hypothesis based on the 
flexibility and awareness conjecture. As with the self-report data, the sample was 
split into high- and low-scoring sub-groups with a cut-off score near the mean (142; 
M = 146, N's = 20, 13, respectively). A moderately strong positive correlation 
between EI scores and SCR amp in the ambiguous positive condition was observed 
(p = .47, p < .05) but no significant correlation was found in.the ambiguous negative 
condition (p = .34, p > .1). In the high-EI group, a significant correlation between EI 
score and SCR amplitude was observed in the clear positive condition (p = -.41, p < 
.05) indicating that higher EI was associated with weaker reactions _to the positive 
stimuli. This finding supports the hypothesis made according to current EI theory. 
No significant correlations were observed in the clear condition when the entire 
sample was analysed. These findings are illustrated in figures 7.2 and 7.3, which 
show, just as in the previous study, a relationship between EI scores and SCR 
amplitude amongst low-E! individuals in the ambiguous condition which disappears 
in the entire sample. A small SCR indicates a smaller increase in anxiety, so figure 
7.2 suggests that very low-EI individuals were less reactive to the stimuli whilst 
mean scorers are not affected at all -i.e., they have 'neutralised' any effect of the 
stimulus. As in the previous study, this 'neutralisation ' effect is not present in the 
entire sample. The correlations between EI test scores and SCR amplitude in the 
various conditions are presented in table 7.4 below. 
Figure 7.2 The relationship between El scores and SCR amplitude in 
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This provides partial support for the conjecture-driven hypothesis as it suggests that 
low-EI individuals neutralise their affect in accordance with their EI whilst high-EI 
individuals do not predictably neutralise affect. Partial support was also provided for 
current EI theory. 
Table 7.4. Correlations between El test scores and SCR amplitude in the 
different experimental conditions. 
Z-Transformed SCR Am~litude 
El Subgrou~ Amb. P Amb. N Clear P. Clear N. 
El test score (Overall, N = 33) 0.01 -0.16 -0.17 0.1 
El test score (high, N = 20} 0.09 0.23 -0.41 0.14 
El test score (low, N= 13) 0.47 0.34 -0.21 . 0.16 
Note: Amb. Prefers to the ambiguous positive condition, Amb. N to the ambiguous negative 
condition, Clear P. to the clear positive condition, and Clear N to the clear negative condition. 
Different rows display correlations in either the overall sample, the high-scoring group, or the low-
scoring group. Bold numbers are significant at the p < .05 level. 
Figure 7.3 The relationship between El scores and SCR amplitude in 
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7.4 Discussion 
The self-report results suggest that that all of the manipulations in this study (i.e., 
affect and task clarity) were effective. In the clear condition EI scores were 
correlated positively with negative picture valence ratings (p = .38, p < .05, one 
tailed). This suggests that higher EI is associated with more positive ratings of 
negative pictures and thus is suggestive of some sort of affect regulation present 
amongst high-EI individuals that was not amongst low-EI individuals. In the 
ambiguous condition EI scores were correlated negatively with positive picture 
intensity ratings (p = -.47, p < .05, one tailed) amongst the low-EI scorers, 
suggesting that amongst low-E! individuals, increased EI is associated with 
decreased intensity of positive affect. High-EI individuals displayed no correlations 
between their EI scores and their self-report ratings of affective sta~e. Given that 
there were four potential correlations between EI and affective ratings per 
experimental condition (i.e., positive and negative valence and intensity) to find only 
correlation is only weak support for either the conjecture or current EI theory. 
However, the self-report data were mainly to be used as a manipulation check and 
these hypotheses test results should be taken as a reference only. 
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The physiological data were the data used to test the hypotheses. These data indicate 
partial support for the conjecture-driven hypothesis in the form of a significant 
correlation between low-EI participants' test scores and SCR amplitude (p = .47, p < 
.05) in positive ambiguous situations. There were no significant correlations between 
EI test scores and SCR amplitude when the entire sample was analysed. This seems 
to contraindicate current EI theory as it suggests that despite clear instructions, there 
is no connection between EI test scores and this particular indicator of reactivity to 
affect induction (and thus, affect regulation). However, EI test scores were correlated 
with SCR amplitude in the clear positive condition amongst high-EI individuals only 
(p = -.41 , p < .05). This unexpected finding suggests that given a clear task, high-EI 
individuals do regulate affect in line with the EI test scores. It also suggests that 
removing ambiguity in a task results in high-EI individuals regulating in line with 
their EJ test scores. 
Experimenter demand characteristics may seem to have been an issue in this study. 
The experimental manipulation requested that participants either regulate their affect 
(the exact wording was 'try to neutralise your emotions') or to simply 'do whatever 
you would normally do.' This is obviously an unsubtle manipulation and it could be 
argued that this instruction was an experimental demand characteristic and thus the 
method was flawed. However, this is unfair. Giving the participants clear 
instructions is hardly poor experimental design, in fact, it is normally a necessary 
requirement of a well-designed study. Without clear instructions, participants would 
have no idea what to do in the study and it would hardly be a useful experiment if 
the participants were not asked to do anything! It is not a flaw (demand characteristic 
or otherwise) when participants follow experimental instructions. A demand 
characteristic refers to situations in which experimenters give unintended cues to 
participants about how to behave or when the manipulation was actually not 
effective at all but participants unconsciously behave in a way that leads the 
experimenter to believe it was an effective manipulation. Neither of these situations 
applied to this study. The participants were given clear instructions and the 
manipulation check merely shows that they followed these instructions. An obvious 
manipulation is not problematic either, even in a within-subjects design, unless 
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deception is critical to the design. In this study, participants were clearly told what to 
do and there was no deception, so if they 'caught on' to what was being asked of 
them and unconsciously tried harder to perform what was being asked of them, this 
would merely reinforce the instructions. 
At this point two experiments have only yielded partial support for .the awareness 
and flexibility conjecture, and although one experiment and one psychometric study 
supported it, it may be appropriate to abandon this theoretical possibility. In this 
study, the critical condition was the ambiguous task condition and the predictions 
made about this condition were not well supported by the self-report data. Although 
the predicted null correlations between EI scores and reactivity (i.e., affect 
regulation) in the high-EI subgroup were found, it was only possible to reject the null 
hypothesis in favour of positive predictions in one of four possible comparisons. It 
would probably be dubious to build a theory on a collection of null findings, as nulls 
often defy more detailed explanations. Simply put, these null findings alone are 
insufficient to warrant endorsement of this conjecture without any sort of positive 
findings to accompany them. 
Current EI theory leads to the supposition that if there is any kind of link between EI 
scores and reactivity to affect induction (and thus affect regulation ability) it should 
be visible when participants are explicitly told to regulate. This study found that EI 
scores are only correlated with valence ratings of negative pictures in the clear 
condition but not with valence ratings of positive pictures or intensity ratings of 
either. The direction of the correlation found here was identical to that of Ciarrochi 
et al. (2000) which also involved a clear task. This is probably due in some part to 
the methods used here, but it seems unreasonable to completely dismiss these 
findings. Both the physiological and subjective data failed to strongly support the 
hypotheses based on current EI theory and the conjecture fared only slightly better. 
The self-report findings seem to have been of use in this study in that they served as 
a manipulation check and thus allowed the physiological indices to be used solely for 
hypothesis testing. Although the self-report findings could be examined as a 
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hypothesis test, any conclusions drawn from these data should be viewed as highly 
tentative. It would probably be best if these self-report findings were not used as 
hypotheses tests, however, as they do not in all cases match the physiological 
findings and as such might confuse the matter. In some ways, the results of this study 
provide approximately the same amount of support for EI theory as Austin's 
(2004;2005) inspection time work, so if one is inclined to interpret those findings 
(reviewed in chapter 2) as support for EI, then these studies ought to be interpreted 
the same way. It may be more conservative to interpret these studies (and their 
respective null findings) as evidence in opposition to EI, rather than in support of it. 
Regardless, a replication of this study would be necessary to draw a film conclusion 
about the either the conjecture or current EI theory. Again, the physiological 
measures should be the data used for any hypothesis tests. 
The physiological results prompt the same questions as the se1f-rep9rt results, and 
are largely similar. The awareness and flexibility conjecture made two non-null 
predictions and one was supported. Additionally, present EI theory prompted two 
non-null hypotheses, neither of which was supported. Thus the physiological results 
of this study seem to favour the conjecture over than present EI theory, but a 
replication is in order. 
This study improved on the prior study by including a self-report index of affective 
state in addition to the physiological measure but even with this addition it is still 
unclear whether the conjecture of current EI makes more accurate predictions. 
Because there was partial support for both theories (depending on the outcome 
measure) it seems sensible to replicate this study in order to determine if these 
results are anomalous. It may also be the case that the EI test used in chapter 5 (44-
item EIS; Austin et al., 2004) had a different pattern of associations than the test 
used in chapters 6 and 7, so it is probably sensible to use the EIS in the replication. If 
the conjecture is in some way 'bound' to the EIS, it will be clear from the results of 
this next study. Again, just as the cut-off points used were chosen to create generous 
circumstances so that if the conjecture failed to make accurate predictions it would 
be more clear that the conjecture is not worthwhile, if the EIS creates ideal 
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In this study, the awareness andflexibility conjecture and present EI theory were 
tested using a similar design to that of chapter 6. Based on the conjecture, it was 
predicted that higher EI would be associated with increased affect regulation (i.e., 
less reactivity), but only amongst low-EI individuals. High-EI individuals were 
expected to regulate affect in an unpredictable manner. These predictions were only 
tested in the 'ambiguous' experimental condition because it was expected that 
awareness and flexibility would play little role in participants' behaviour when they 
were given an explicit instruction. Present EI theory leads to the expectation that will 
be a (overall) correlation between EI scores and reactivity to the affect induction 
(i.e., affect regulation) when participants were explicitly instructed to neutralise their 
affect. After completing an EI test, participants' sldn conductance was recorded 
whHe they were presented with a series of images which they rated ·in terms of 
affective valence and intensity. The self-report and sldn conductance results 
provided partial support for the conjecture-driven hypotheses and very limited 
support for the hypotheses driven by current EI theory. These results cast some 
doubt on present EI theory but suggest that the conjecture is not a perfect alternative. 
Potential interpretations of these findings were discussed and it was concluded that a 
replication using a different EI test would help rule out whether or not the results of 
the previous two studies were due solely to the test used. 
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Chapter 8: Prompted Affect Regulation and the Awareness and 
Flexibility Conjecture- Self-report and Physiological Indices 2 
8.1 Introduction 
133 
The results of the prior study provided partial support for the awareness and 
flexibility conjecture and limited support for present EI theory. The results were 
similar to the findings of study 6, but it was determined that another replication 
would help clarify which results are robust across experiments. It also seemed 
sensible that this replication should make use of a different EI test to ensure that 
previous results were not observed solely because of the particular EI test used. 
The only meaningful difference between this study and the previous study is the use 
of a different measure to assess EI and this was done for two major reasons. The first 
reason was to determine if the results of the previous studies were due only to the EI 
measure used. Secondly, it seemed worthwhile to determine if using a different EI 
test would strengthen or clarify the findings. Austin (2004) and Farrelly and Austin 
(in press) used different tests for precisely this purpose. 
The logic of this study is identical to that of the previous study. Just as in the 
previous two studies, this study has been designed to test hypotheses based on either 
the conjecture or present EI theory using two experimental conditions. The intent is 
to determine whether or not EI test scores correlate with degree of reactivity to affect 
induction. Greater reactivity is indicative of less regulation thus this study 
investigates whether or not EI test scores are related to lab indices of affect 
regulation. The ambiguous condition has been designed to test the conjecture: given 
an ambiguous stimulus, it is expected that low-EI individuals will neutralise their 
affect in line with their EI scores (i.e., there will be a negative association between 
EI test scores and reactivity to the affect induction) but high-EI individuals will not 
(i.e., no such association). The clear condition is included to test cu~ent EI theory, as 
it would be expected that EI scores will correlate with affect neutralisation (i.e., a 
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negative association between EI test scores and reactivity to the affect induction) 
when participants are given explicit instructions to neutralise affect. 
As in chapter 7, self-report measures are included as a manipulation check and as an 
incidental probe of whether the self-report data return different findings than the 
physiological data. As was noted previously, it is not appropriate to use a single 
dependent variable to determine if the manipulation was effective and test the 
hypothesis. The predictions and results for the self-report investigation should be 
taken as an interesting aside only. The main role of the self-report data was to ensure 
that participants were indeed regulating affect when requested to do so in the clear 
condition. This frees the physiological data to be used to test the hypotheses. 
It may be argued that at this point a different experimental direction would be better 
than an additional replication of this study. The preceding experiments have not 
found conclusive evidence in favour or in opposition to the conjecture so perhaps it 
would be sensible to abandon this line of research. This is probably. a entirely 
sensible viewpoint, but in this case it was felt that thoroughness in one experimental 
paradigm would be preferable to a superficial survey of numerous research avenues. 
There are two sets of hypotheses for this study. Based on the conjecture, it is 
predicted that in the ambiguous condition, EI scores will correlate with SCR 
amplitudes amongst low-EI individuals only, and not amongst high-EI individuals. 
According to current EI theory, it is predicted that there will be an overall correlation 
between EI scores and SCR amplitude in the clear condition. The incidental 
predictions for the self-report data differ slightly. Because the self-report data are not 
'change' data (i.e. , they do not control for baseline affective status) they are more 
informative as a measure of how much a stimulus impacted an individual. Based on 
current EI theory it would be expected that in the clear condition, EI would be 
positively associated with ratings of valence (i.e., higher EI is associated with a more 
positive impact of the stimulus) and negatively associated with ratings of intensity 
(i.e. , higher EI is associated with less intense impact of the stimulus). This would be 
expected because higher·EI is associated with greater affect regulation abilities and 
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these abilities should insulate higher-EI individuals from the negative impact of 
stimuli. In the ambiguous condition it is predicted that EI test scores will be 
positively associated with valence ratings and negatively associated with intensity 
ratings amongst low EI individuals but there will be no correlation between these 
variables amongst high-EI individuals. 
8.2 Method 
8.2.1 Design 
The design of this study was identical to tbe previous study. Participants completed a 
measure of trait EI before taking part in the main experimental routine. During the 
experiment, self-report ratings of affective state and SCR were recorded while 
participants viewed images with either negative, neutral, or positive affective 
weightings in two experimental conditions (ambiguous or clear). Z-transfonned SCR 
amplitudes and self-report ratings of valence and intensity were correlated with 
scores on an EI measure in a counterbalanced within-subjects design. 
8.2.2 Participants 
Thirty seven (twenty-five female, twelve male) students of Edinburgh University 
took part in this study for pay. Their ages ranged from nineteen to thirty three (M = 
23.7, SD = 3.5) Participants were recruited using and advert on the student 
employment website and through personal contacts. They were paid £2.50 for their 
participation. 
8.2.3 Measures 
The 41-item adaptation of the EIS (Austin, SakJofske, Huang, & McKenney, 2004) 
was used in this study. Items are responded to on a 7-point Likert scale anchored at 
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'strongly disagree' and 'strongly agree' in a self-report paradigm si~ilar to that of 
personality and other trait EI measures. The reliability of the responses was 
acceptable in this sample (a= .73). 
8.2.4 Apparatus 
The same experimental materials were used in this study as in the previous study. A 
touch sensitive monitor was used to present all stimuli and also served as an input 
device for participants' self-report ratings of affective reaction. The computer 
program used to present the stimuli and record the indices of arousal (SCR and self-
report) was identical to that of the previous study and was designed by Paul Stevens. 
As in chapters 5-7, skin conductance was recorded at approximately 40Hz and all 
data were z-transformed. 
8.2.5 Procedure 
The procedure of this study was also identical to the previous study, with the 
exception that a different EI measure was used. Participants completed the EI 
measure before being attached to the SCR electrodes. After the experiment was 
explained to them, participants took part in either the ambiguous or clear condition 
in a counter-balanced order. In both experimental conditions, participants viewed 
images with positive, negative, and neutral affective loading and rated them for their 
valence (positive/negative) and intensity (mild/intense) while SCR was recorded for 
five seconds. All images were presented for five seconds and a random-length pause 
was included between pictures to prevent expectation effects. 
8.3 Results 
Table 8.1 displays descriptive statistics for the self-report indices of affect. These 
data were used primarily as a manipulation check but the incidental hypotheses are 
tested below as wel l. The data indicate that the manipulation was less effective than 
in the prior study. There are significant differences between the valence ratings of 
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positive and negative images between experimental conditions (t(37) = 4.12, p < 
.001; t(37) = -5.33,p < .001, respectively), one of which indicates that ratings got 
more extreme when participants were explicitly asked to neutralise their mood- the 
opposite of what was expected. There were no significant differences in intensity 
except in the neutral pictures conditions (t(37) = 6.17, p < .001). 
Table 8.1 Descriptive statistics for self-report indices of affect 
Affective Condition 
Task Condition Positive Negative Neutral 
Ambiguous Valence 3.7 ( 1.0) 4.0 ( 1.0) 3.8 (1.7) 
Intensity 4.2 ( 1.6) 3.9 {_].5) 4.1 (0.9) 
Clear Valence 4.7 (.7) 3.2 (.85) 4.0 (.5) 
Intensity 3.9 (1.3) 3.7 ( 1.4) 2.6 ( 1.4) 
Note: Values in parentheses are the standard deviations for the condition. 
To test the conjecture-driven hypothesis, sub-groups were formed based on a cut-off 
score approximately equal to the mean (M = 200) and EI test scores were correlated 
with the self-report ratings in the ambiguous condition. In the ambiguous condition, 
the low-E! sub-group (N = 19) showed a positive correlation between EI scores and 
ratings of the positive images (p = .60, p < .01) only. There was a relationship 
between EI test scores and self-report ratings in the overall sample which seems to 
support the prediction based on current EI theory. The association between EI and 
self-report ratings in the ambiguous condition in the high-EI group (p = .55, p < .01) 
was unexpected and seems to disconfirm the conjecture. Again, the results of these 
self-report hypothesis tests should be read as a reference only as the self-report 
indices of this study were included to serve as a manipulation check only. Table 8.2 
below displays the correlations between EI test scores and SCR amplitude in the 
different experimental and EI sub-group conditions. 
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Table 8.2. Correlations between El test scores and SCR amplitude in the 
different experimental and El sub-group conditions. 




Subgroup Am.P Am.N C.P C.N Am.P Am.N C.P. C.N. 
El test score (Overall, N = 37) 0.31 0.05 0.17 0.16 0.22 -0.37 0.05 0.12 
El test score (high, N = 18 ) 0.55 -0.13 0.37 0.32 -0.16 -0.16 0.05 0.15 
El test score (low, N = 19) 0.60 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.33 0.22 0.04 
Note: Am. Prefers to the ambiguous positive condition, Am. N to the ambiguous negative condition, 
C. P. to the clear positive condition, and C. N. to tbe clear negative condition. Different rows display 
correlations in either the overall sample, the high-scoring group, or the low-scoring group. Bold 
numbers are significant at the p < .05 level. 
Table 8.3 displays the descriptive statistics for the physiological indices of affect in 
the various experimental and affective conditions. As in the previous study, there 
was a relaxation trend in all conditions and as a result, some conditions initially 
appear to have resulted in a negative SCR amplitudes. These descriptive statistics are 
averages of individuals' SCR amplitudes after z-transformation and as such are 
expressed in terms of standard deviations from the individual's overall session mean. 
They are provided solely for reference. Group differences in SCR are not of interest 
here, rather it is the relationship between EI test scores and individual changes in 
arousal which is of concern. 
Table 8.3. Descriptive statistics for physiological measures of affect 
Affective Condition 
Task Condition Positive Negative Neutral 
Ambiguous Mean .04 -.07 .09 
S.D. .34 .24 .28 
Clear Mean .07 .06 -.06 
S.D. .30 .27 .32 
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Note: All values are expressed in terms of standard deviations off the mean (cr). 
After the sample was divided into high- and low-scoring sub-groups, correlations 
between EI scores and SCR amplitude in the ambiguous condition were tested. 
When divided at the mean (M =200, N = 18 in the high, 19 in the low), the moderate 
positive correlation between EI score and SCR amplitude amongst the low-EI 
individuals in the negative ambiguous condition approached significance (p = .33, p 
< .08) and there was no correlation between EI scores and SCR amplitude in the 
negative condition nor were there any correlations between EI scor~ and SCR 
amplitude in the high-EI group. These findings fail to support the conjecture-driven 
hypotheses. Figures 8.1 and 8.2 illustrate this slightly weaker 'neutralisation' effect 
which is present for low-E! individuals but which is not present in the entire sample. 
This indicates that the hypothesized relationship between EI test score and reactivity 
to affect induction exists for low-EI individuals but not for high-EI individuals. The 
predicted overall correlation between EI test scores and SCR amplitude was not 
observed and thus it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis in favour of the 
hypothesis driven by current EI theory. All of the correlations between EI test scores 
and SCR amplitude are presented below in Table 8.4. 
Table 8.4. Correlations between El test scores and SCR amplitude in 
different experimental conditions and El sub-groups. 
El Subgroup 
El test score (Overall, N = 37) 
El test score (high, N = 18) 
El test score (low, N = 19) 
Z-Transformed SCR Amplitude 














Note: Amb. Prefers to the ambiguous positive condition, Amb. N to the ambiguous negative 
condition, Clear P. to the clear positive condition, and Clear N to the clear negative condition. 
Different rows display correlations in either the overall sample, the high-scoring group, or the low-
scoring group. Bold numbers are significant at the p < .05 level. 
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Figure 8.1 The relationship between El scores and SCR amplitude in 
response to negative stimuli in the ambiguous condition -low-EI participants 
only 
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Figure 8.2 The relationship between El scores and SCR amplitude in 
response to negative stimuli in the ambiguous condition - entire sample. 
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Again, these figures illustrate the 'neutralisation' effect that disappears beyond a 
certain point- people with middling EI are not affected by the stimuli whilst very 
Iow-EI individuals show less reactivity. As in the previous studies, high-EI 
individuals' affective reactions do not correlate with their EI scores. 
8.4 Discussion 
The self report results showed that amongst low-EI individuals, EI scores were 
correlated with ratings of affective intensity in the ambiguous condition, but only for 
positive images, suggesting that higher-EI was associated with grea:ter intensity of 
positive affect for these images (p = .60, p < .01). These findings fail to support the 
conjecture. The lack of correlations between EI scores and self-report indices of 
affect in the clear condition indicate that the null hypothesis could not be rejected in 
favour of the hypothesis driven by current EI theory. Again it should be clarified that 
these self-report hypotheses are included and tested as a reference ~nly because it is 
not exactly appropriate to use the subjective measures as a manipulation check and a 
dependent variable. They merely serve as a superficial probe of whether or not the 
relationship between EI test scores and reactivity to affect induction depends on the 
measure used. 
The physiological data revealed a marginally significant correlation between EI 
scores and SCR amplitude, amongst low-EI individuals, in the positive pictures 
condition (.33, p < .07), but no correlations between EI scores and SCR amplitude 
for the high-EI individuals. There were no overall correlations between EI scores and 
SCR amplitude in the clear condition. Thus there appears to be partial support for the 
awareness andjlexibility conjecture but the null hypothesis must be retained instead 
of the hypothesis based on current El theory. 
In light of this replication which used a different EI measure from the previous two 
studies, it would seem that there is some degree of very limited support for the 
awareness and .flexibility conjecture. This topic will be discussed at length in the 
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next chapter, but it suffices to say here that altering the EI measure does not 
appreciably impact the results obtained from this series of studies. 
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The sample in this study was slightly larger than in the previous study, but as in all 
previous studies, it certainly could have been larger. Psychophysiological measures 
are characterised by large individual differences, so it is possible that a larger sample 
would reveal clearer findings. Sampling issues will be discussed in .more detail in the 
general discussion. 
The experimental manipulations in this study seemed less successful than in previous 
studies and it is difficult to understand why. The neutral images seemed to elicit the 
expected reactions, but the positive and negative images seemed to function 
differently in different experimental conditions, which themselves seemed to have 
the opposite effect from what was expected. For this reason, this experiment should 
probably carry slightly Jess weight than the preceding two studies, but despite this 
flaw, there was still some support for the conjecture. 
At this point, it seems unlikely that a future replication would shed any additional 
light on the conjecture or on present EI theory. Different EI tests could be used, as 
could different stimuli or any number of other small aspects of the experiment. 
However, these would be unlikely to drasticaUy alter the findings that have emerged 
from chapters 5-8. As such, these results are probably sufficient to draw some final 
conclusions about the conjecture and current EI theory. 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter was a replication of the previous study with a different EI test. 
Participants completed the EIS and then took part in an experimental session 
otherwise identical to the previous study. No conclusive support was found for the 
conjecture as the conelation between EI scores and SCR amplitude in response to 
positive pictures in the ambiguous condition only approached significance, but only 
for low-EI individuals. The lack of any overall conelations between EI score and 
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SCR amplitude suggests that the null hypothesis could not be rejected in favour of 
the hypothesis based on current EI theory. 
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Chapter 9: El and Flexibility in Coping 
The purpose of this study was to examine some predictions made based on the 
conjecture with a method that differed from the approach used in chapters 5 through 
8. This study was designed to methodologically different but to test similar 
predictions as were tested in those studies, but this study also includes some novel 
hypotheses which are appropriate to these data. 
9.1 .1 Coping Styles 
As was mentioned in chapter 1, EI has long been discussed alongside coping. The 
similarities between the two constructs are quite apparent as both concern how 
individuals manage the emotional content of their lives. Coping is also discussed 
frequently in popular psychology books but it is a more complex construct than is 
apparent from lay conversation. 
The word 'coping' actually refers to a number of emotion-related processes or 'styles'. 
There has been some disagreement and refinement of what precisely these styles are, 
but it is fairly well agreed-upon that there are four major coping styles: rational, 
emotion-focused, detached, and avoidant (Roger, Jarvis, & Najarian, 1993). These 
four styles refer (respectively) to an approach characterised by activity and 
reasoning, introspective consideration, emotional distancing, and denial. This 
categorisation into four styles is intuitively appealing and has also received 
psychometric support (Roger et al., 1993, Elkht, 1996). One modern instrument 
which can be used to measure coping styles is the Coping Styles Questionnaire 
(CSQ). This measure is based on previous measures which posited only three coping 
styles but it contains items which measure the fourth style, detached coping. 
Responses to the CSQ have been shown to support the four-factor structure which it 
was designed to measure and have also been shown to support the convergent and 
divergent validity of the measure (Roger et al., 1993, Elklit, 1996). It seems that the 
four coping styles are obliquely related to one another although these relationships 
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are weak enough in most cases to suggest a large amount of independence between 
the coping styles. More specifically, rational coping is moderately (i.e., r = -.5) 
negatively associated with emotion-focused coping, but the relationship between 
other coping styles are fairly weak and are often statistically nonsignificant. Scores 
on the CSQ have also been shown to correlate with personality scores. Specifically, 
it seems that scores on the emotional coping style correlate positive.ly with the 
ruminative, maladaptive aspects of neuroticism and that scores on the rational coping 
style correlate with the surgency aspect of extroversion (Roget et al., 1993). These 
connections between coping styles and personality processes seem to suggest that 
coping techniques have important ramifications for affective state. 
9.1 .2 El, the Conjecture, and Coping 
In some of the popular myths about EI, it is argued to be something that protects 
individuals from all maladaptive emotions or emotional processes. While this is 
almost certainly overstated, even the most conservative EI theorist would probably 
argue that there would be some correlation between EI test scores and measures of 
coping styles (e.g., the CSQ). A trait theorist might argue that the dispositions and 
self-beliefs that comprise EI (e.g., statements such as 'I know how to handle my 
reactions to bad news) are similar in content to what would be measured on an index 
of coping sty les. An ability theorist would argue that because high-EI individuals are 
more skilled at regulating their emotions, they would (almost by definition) be better 
at coping. 
Although the existence of sonze relationship between EI and coping styles is fairly 
obvious, it is less clear which coping styles would be more likely to be used by high-
or low-EI indi viduals. Rational coping seems very similar to EI in that both are 
concerned with using cognition to influence emotions. Specifically, rational coping 
seems similar to the affect regulation facet of EI, so it would seem that there would 
be a positive association between EI test scores and rational coping scores. Emotion-
focused coping also seems like it would be associated with EI. This form of coping 
involves introspection and reflection so it would seem likely that it would correlate 
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with the intra personal facets of EI. However, unlike intrapersonal EI, emotion-
focused coping tends to involve dwelling on the negative or unchangeable parts of 
the stimulus which requires coping (e.g., it's out of my control so I might as well get 
used to it), so it seems likely that a negative relationship between EI test scores and 
emotion-focused coping would emerge. Also, it is known that EI is negatively 
associated with neuroticism and that emotion-focused coping is positively associated 
with neuroticism, and although this is far from ironclad logic, it seems intuitive that 
EI would be negatively associated with emotion-focused coping. 
The remaining two coping styles are somewhat more difficult to connect to either 
trait or ability El. Coping through avoidance is a maladaptive technique that seems 
to have little to do with emotions at all. If anything, this style of coping is an active 
choice to not engage with one's affective state. That said, there do seem to be 
superficial similarities between low-EI individuals (i.e., people who are bad at 
identifying and handling their emotions) and people who simply avoid emotions 
where possible. The potential connection between these constructs is explored in this 
study. Although detached coping is similar to avoidance coping in that it also 
involves emotional disengagement, it is far more adaptive in that usually is 
characterised by an attitude of 'although it is out of my control, I'm going to do 
everything in my power.' Rather than simple avoidance, detached coping involves an 
effort to avoid the negative aspects of whatever stimulus one is coping with whilst 
simultaneously exploring what is within one's realm of control. The classic example 
for this sort of coping is a terminally ill patient. This sort of technique does not seem 
nearly as similar to EI as rational or emotion-focused coping do. It also does not fit 
snugly into the personality traits which are normally associated with EI (e.g., 
neuroticism and extroversion). 
The relationship between EI and coping was testing by Saklofske, Austin, Galloway, 
and Davidson (2007). It was found that trait EI was negatively associated with 
emotion-focused coping and positive associated with rational coping, just as would 
probably be expected according to either EI theory. However, they did not examine 
the potential relationship between EI and the other two forms of coping. 
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The detached and avoidant coping styles provide an excellent testing ground for the 
conjecture. In chapters 6 through 8, the ambiguous condition was the critical 
condition for testing the hypotheses based on the conjecture. As was noted in chapter 
6, stimulus ambiguity is essential for the conjecture to be observed, for if the 
response was clearly elicited, there would be no room for flexibility. The detached 
and avoidant coping styles provide exactly the ambiguity required to test the 
conjecture. As was just noted, avoidant coping is generally considered maladaptive 
and detached coping is generally considered somewhat adaptive. However, these two 
styles seem less clearly adaptive or maladaptive than rational or emotion-focused 
coping. That is, it is almost always a good idea to be proactive and assertive and 
almost always a bad idea to ruminate on a negative situation. The utility of the other 
two styles of coping is more situational. A voidance coping could well be a viable 
'second choice' of techniques when rational coping fails and in some circumstances 
(e.g., the death of a loved one) it may be the only sensible option. It is more difficult 
to be prescriptive with this style of coping or with detached coping. 
Thus these two styles of coping provide for an examination of flexibility which is 
similar to chapters 6 through 8. The conjecture leads to the prediction that high-EI 
individuals will display more variability in their employment of these coping styles 
because of their increased flexibility in response to the demands of the situation. 
Low-EI individuals on the other hand would be expected to be less variable in how 
they use these types of coping- they will either generally avoid it or generally utilise 
it. These are similar predictions to those made about the SCR data in chapters 6 
through 8. 
This study will also test the conjecture using another type of analysis. In chapters 5 
through 8,flexibility was operationalised as variability. This is a perfectly sensible 
operational definition, given that flexibility by definition entails change, dynamics, 
or variability. However, the nature of the conjecture and the nature of these different 




The coping style data examined in this study show how the incremental value of the 
conjecture to EI theory. It is already known that EI is related to rational and emotion-
focused coping. This is fairly straightforward, but as was already discussed, the 
relationship between EI and the other types of coping is not as clear if only existing 
EI theory is considered. The conjecture can help clarify how scores on measures of 
these other two styles of coping may relate to EI test scores. Specifically, the 
conjecture leads to the prediction that because of their increased flexibility, high-EI 
individuals would be more likely to use these two types of coping in situations 
where the other types of coping are not. In other words, the conjectUre makes 
predictions about which styles of coping high-EI individuals use over and above 
rational and emotion-focused coping. To use statistical language, the conjecture 
makes a prediction about how EI test scores relate to detached and avoidance coping 
when the variance from rational and emotion-focused coping is partialled out. That 
is, current EI theory informs us about how EI may relate to rational and emotion-
focused coping but is less useful for understanding the relationship between EI and 
avoidant or detached coping. The conjecture 'fills the gap' by make a prediction 
about how EI may relate to these remaining two styles of coping after controlling for 
the styles of coping we can already make predictions about. Thus the conjecture-
driven hypotheses for this study are a perfect example of how the conjecture 
provides an incremental theoretical step beyond existing EI theory. · 
Of course, it should be noted that the regression model used to test the conjecture 
here is not a direct measure of whether or not individual people do in fact switch 
coping styles to suit situations. It is not possible to measure strategic use of coping 
styles with either the CSQ or the EIS as neither. However, what this test will reveal 
is whether or not individuals as a group tend to use particular coping techniques in 
line with their EI scores, after the primary coping styles (rational and emotion-
focused) are controlled for. 
9.1.3 Specific theoretical issues 
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The preceding studies have all examined high- and low-scoring groups but the 
methods used to create these groups has not been discussed in any detail. This is an 
unacceptable omission given the importance of these groups. 
To assess the conjecture in chapters 5 through 8, the samples were split into high and 
low-scoring groups at some point on or near the mean score. As was discussed in 
previous chapters, the cut-off point used to divide groups is indeed ~m arbitrary 
decision and in the preceding studies, the most generous cut-off score has been used. 
Obviously this process of using the cut-off score which yielded the strongest effects 
provided an artificial 'boost' to the results in favour of the conjecture and all of the 
results argued to support the conjecture must be interpreted with this in mind. 
Equally obviously, no firm conclusions could be based on such a p~actice given its 
arbitrariness. However, the reason for this ultimately dubious practice was to allow 
for the best possible circumstances for the conjecture so that if the conjecture failed 
to make accurate predictions in spite of this methodological generosity, it would be 
even easier to discard the conjecture as a theoretical possibility. The intent was to 
use the most generous methods possible and then become more stringent if the 
conjecture was well supported. 
However, there are other options for creating sub-groups. A tempting option would 
be to use the mean or median value from a normative population. There are two 
major problems with this method, the first is that university students are not the 
normal population so assuming the mean from the normal population applies to them 
would be erroneous. This 'canned mean' problem is more important than it may 
seem. The accuracy of the population mean as a model for overall performance of 
any sample depends entirely on whether or not the sample comes from that 
population. It is patently obvious that high- and low-scoring autistic individuals 
would ~ot split according to the mean IQ of the normal population and the situation 
in EI research on university students is not entirely dissimilar. The most accurate 
mean model is the mean drawn from a given sample. The second issue is that many 
EI tests have not in fact been normed on the general population so it is not possible 
to know what the population mean is. 
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Still, some sort of external justification for using a sample mean as a cut-off would 
strengthen the methodology of this study. Although a mean or median split is 
entirely acceptable, using such procedures make it impossible to know if the 
participants are 'high-EI' or 'low-EI' in any objective sense because the sub-groups 
have been constructed based on a sample-bound value. Two simple. methods can be 
used to address this issue. One would be to examine past research on the El measure 
used on this study to determine how the mean value found in this study compares to 
other samples. Another option would be to use smaller extreme groups to test the 
hypotheses rather than make larger 'high' or 'low' groups. The latter approach is used 
in this study because if the extreme groups are created sensibly (i.e., using the top 
and bottom 10% of scorers) then it is almost certain that the participants in these 
extreme groups will be objectively 'high-EI' or 'tow-El'. The extreme groups 
approach is also used for expediency's sake (a meta-analysis of every available 
dataset for the EIS would be highly laborious and would only raise additional issues 
such as how a 'grand university student average' would be calculated) and because 
this approach has a historical precedent for being used to examine t~e relationship 
between test scores and theoretically-related variables. The use of extreme groups 
will allow more certainty that the high- and low-EI groups do in fact represent 
distinct sub-populations. 
9.1 .3 Hypotheses 
Based on the conjecture it is predicted that there will be a negative association 
between EI scores and avoidance coping amongst the tow-El individuals but that this 
relationship will not exist amongst high-EI individuals. A positive association 
between EI scores and detached coping is predicted amongst the low-EI individuals 
but it is also predicted that there will be no such association amongst the high-EI 
individuals. It is also predicted that when the variance attributable to rational and 
emotion-focused coping is partialled out, there will be a positive association between 
EI test scores and scores on detached and avoidance coping, due to the fact that they 
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are both probably adaptive and 'emotionall y intelligent' if rational coping can not be 
used for some reason. These coping styles will be the focus of this study, but as was 
previously mentioned, emotion-focused and rational coping are only used as 
co variants. 
9.2 Method 
9.2.1 Participants and Design 
An opportunity sample of 364 participants (258 females, 104 males, two non-
respondants) took part in this study. The participants were all university students in 
Canada. The mean age of these participants was 24 (SD 6.1). The participants 
completed the unadapted Schutte eta!., (1998) EIS, a personal ity measure, the CSQ, 
and also provided some self-reports of their exercise and lifestyle b~haviours. 
Responses to the EI and coping styles measures are analysed using a correlational 
design. 
9.2.2 Measures 
33-item EIS. The Schutte et al., (1998) EIS was used to measure trait El. 
Additional information about this measure is presented in chapter 4. In this sample 
the internal consistency reliability of this measure was high (a.= .90). 
CSQ. The shortened version (Elklit, 1996) of the Coping Styles Questionnaire 
(Rogers et al., 1993) is a self-report measure which uses Likert scales to test coping 
behaviours which assess four types of coping style: rational, ernoti~n-focused, 
detached, and avoidant. This measure has 37 items. In this sample the internal 
consistency reliability of rational coping and emotion-focused coping were 
acceptable (a.= .82, .76) detached coping was below acceptable levels (a.= .56) and 
avoidance coping bordered on acceptable (a.= .65). 
The additional measures used are described in more detail in Saklofske et al. (2007) 





The data presented in Saklofske et al.(2007) were analysed for this study. These data 
were collected by the primary researchers involved in that study. Prospective 
participants were told that the study was concerned with personal factors and health 
behaviours. 
To create sub-groups to test the first set of hypotheses, participants in the top and 
bottom 10% of scorers were assigned to the high-EI and low-E! groups, respectively. 
9.3 Results 
Table 9.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the EI measure and the four coping 
style measures. These values are for reference only and have no bearing on the 
hypothesis. 
Table 9.1 Descriptive statistics for El and coping styles measures 
Measure Mean SD 
El 123 14 
~~ ~ 5 
Ecope 17 5 
Dcope 13 2 
Acope 22 4 
Note: EI refers to scores on the EIS, Rcope to rational coping style, Ecope to emotion-focused coping, 
Dcope to detached coping, and Acope to avoidant coping. 
The first set of hypotheses was examined in a similar manner to chapters 5 through 8 
with the important exception that extreme groups were used. Those participants 
scoring in the 10% or less on the EI measure formed the low-EI group. This group 
was made of 35 participants ( M = 95, SD = 14). The top 10% of sc~rers formed the 
high-EI group. This group was comprised of 41 individuals with a mean score of 142 
(SD = 5). These sub-groups were used to examine the conjecture-driven hypothesis, 
although it would seem that there is prima facie evidence against the conjecture in 
the finding that this high-EI extreme group had much more consistent EI scores than 
their Jow-EI counterparts. 
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When only low-EI individuals were examined, there were no associations between 
EI test scores and either of the coping styles (all p's > .1 ). The null predictions 
amongst the high-EI individuals were supported by the finding that EI was 
nonsignificantly (all p' s > 1) related to avoidant and detached coping amongst the 
high-scoring sub-group. These findings do not justify a rejection of the null 
hypothesis and thus the first two predictions driven by the conjecture were not 
supported. 
Two hierarchical linear regressions were carried out to test the second group of 
hypotheses driven by the conjecture. There were two blocks entered into both of 
these analyses in order to test the hypothesis by determining if EI scores predicted 
detached and avoidant coping after the variance attributable to rational and emotion-
focused coping was partialled out. In both regressions, scores on rational and 
emotion-focused coping were entered as the first block and EI was entered as the 
second block. This is because it is already known that the coping styles are 
interrelated and because the hypothesis concerned whether or not EI predicted 
variance in detached and avoidant coping after controlling for rational and emotion-
focused coping. 
The analysis was then carried out to determine if including EI test scores in the 
regression model predicted a significantly larger amount of variance in the outcome 
measures (i.e., detached and avoidance coping) than rational and emotion-focused 
coping below. In other words, the incremental predictive utility of EI test scores for 
detached and avoidant coping styles was examined. A breakdown of the blocks (i.e., 
models) and their predictive utility is presented in Table 9.2 and 9.3. 
Table 9.2 Incremental predictive value of El for detached coping 
Model Variables 
Rcope, Ecope 












Note: Rcope refers to rational coping, Ecope refers to emotion-focused coping, El refers to the ElS, 
Sig refers to the significance of the R2 change between models. 
Table 9.3 Incremental predictive value of El for avoidant coping 
Model Variables r R2 change Sig 
Rcope, Ecope 0.338 0.1 09 0.01 
2 Rcope, Ecope, El 0.338 0 0.78 
Note: Rcope refers to rational coping, Ecope refers to emotion-focused coping, EI refers to the EIS, 
Sig refers to the significance of the R2 change between models. 
As is clear from Tables 9.2 and 9.3, the inclusion of EI as a second model did not 
account for any additional variance in detached or avoidant coping scores. Thus the 
second set of hypotheses based on the conjecture can not be supported and the 
results from this study fail to support any of the predictions made based on the 
conjecture. 
9.4 Discussion 
The results of this study failed to confirm any of the predictions made based on the 
conjecture. The first set of hypotheses predicted that EI would relate to avoidance 
and detached coping in a manner similar to the relationship predicted between EI and 
SCR amplitude in chapters 5 through 8. Namely, it was expected that there would be 
a correlation between EI test scores and avoidant and detached coping amongst the 
low-EI individuals but that this relationship would not be present amongst the high-
EI individuals. The predicted relationship amongst the Jow-EI individuals was not 
found (all p's > .1) and although the predicted nulls were found, it is probably 
inaccurate to argue that these nulls support the conjecture. This issue of 'nulls as 
support' is returned to in the discussion. 
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The second set of hypotheses predicted that due to their increased flexibility, high-EI 
individuals would be more likely to use detached and avoidant coping in situations 
where rational or emotion-focused coping failed or was otherwise inappropriate. In 
other words, it was predicted that once the variance attributable to ration or emotion-
focused coping was controlled for, there would be a significant relationship between 
EI test scores and avoidant and detached coping. This hypothesis was not supported 
as EI failed to predict a significant amount of variance in these types of coping when 
rational and emotion-focused coping were partialled out of the model. 
This study provides a rather conclusive end to this series of studies of the awareness 
and flexibility conjecture. The coping styles that were of chief interest in this study 
were expected to be excellent examples of the sort of variable that the conjecture 
would be most useful for. That is, the utility of these coping styles is highly 
situational and ambiguous (just like unprompted affect regulation) and thus should 
have been exactly the sort of emotion-related process that the conjecture would have 
been of great use in predicting. This expectation was not supported·by the data. 
It also seems that even when an extreme-groups paradigm is used, it is not possible 
to find clear support for the conjecture. The sub-groups formed in this study by using 
the top and bottom 10% of scorers were highly different from one another (M = 142, 
95, respectively) but it was not possible to find any evidence for the conjecture-
dliven hypothesis using this more refined technique of sub-group creation. 
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The internal consistency reliability of the detached and avoidant coping measures 
was less than ideal in this study and could have contributed to the lack of support for 
the conjecture. However, this sort of defence seems rather stretched. First of all, it 
was only detached coping which had notably low internal consistency reliability and 
this was almost certainly due to a relatively small number of items (only 7). 
Secondly, the possibly dubious nature of the coping style measure would be of far 
more concern if the conjecture had been supported than, as was found here, if the 
conjecture was not supported. To put it simply, the conjecture has received support 
that is limited at best and, frankly put, it is probably not the methodology which 
needs refinement. The results of this study clearly fail to support any of the 
hypotheses made based on the conjecture and as such the only responsible 
conclusion to make is that the conjecture is probably not a useful addition to EI 
theory. It is with this in mind that general issues are discussed. 
156 
157 
Chapter 10: General Discussion 1 - Relevance and Interpretations of 
Findings to Present El theory and the awareness and flexibility 
Conjecture 
The purpose of the studies in this thesis was to test hypotheses based on either 
cuiTent EI theory or the awareness and flexibility conjecture. A psychometric 
investigation, a series of four lab experiments, and a simple regression analysis were 
caiTied out for this purpose. The results from these studies generally failed to support 
the conjecture. The findings from these studies also failed to provide conclusive 
support for the hypotheses driven by cuiTent EI theory. This chapter examines the 
findings in more detail, their relevance to their respective theories, and also explores 
other reasons these findings may have OCCUlTed. 
10.1 Review of Findings 
1 0.1.1 Findings Fail to Support Predictions based on Current Theory 
The studies in this thesis have largely failed to support hypotheses based on current 
EI theory. The factor structure of EI tests fails a basic psychometric assumption, 
there was no overall correlation between EI scores and SCL change from baseline, 
and studies 6-8 all found no coiTelation between EI scores and SCR amplitude in the 
clear conditions. Chapter 9 did not examine any hypotheses based on cuiTent theory 
because the data analysed in that study have already been used to show that EI test 
scores conelate with coping styles. Although these findings were discussed in the 
various chapters, more detailed commentary about the relevance of these findings 
seems necessary. 
In chapter 4, a fundamental assumption underpinning EI theory - the assumption of 
factorial in variance- was shown to be false for EI tests. Factor solutions were not 
consistent between sub-groups. Rather, it seems that high-EI and low-E! individuals' 
responses to EI questions have notably dissimilar factor loadings such that the 
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factors that underpin low- and high-scorers' responses are not constructed of the 
same items. This finding would be analogous to finding that the fluid and 
crystallised ability factors extracted from IQ test results differed according to IQ 
level such that a verbal item only loaded on crystallised ability in one sub-group. If 
such a finding occurred in IQ research, it would violate what is known about 
intelligence, and now a similar dilemma faces EI researchers, for this finding not 
only violates the assumptions behind EI theory but it also has important practical 
ramifications. This is why differentiation in IQ is so hotly contested. 
The finding that EI tests do not measure high- and low-scorers on the same 
dimension presents both theoretical and practical problems to the EI testing 
enterprise. In addition to the IQ analogy used above, this finding is also analogous to 
discovering a ruler that did not measure tall and short people on the same dimension 
(i.e., height). Not only would most people be very sceptical about the utility of such 
a ruler, but we might also wonder which of the two dimensions was correct. It is 
hard to know what exactly we should make of EI tests which do not measure all test-
takers on the same dimension, and it is hard to explain away these findings. Practical 
difficulties associated with factorial variance also present themselves. It is well 
known that differences in the explanatory power of the first principal component are 
associated with differences in reUability (Hartmann & Teasdale, 2005). A post-hoc 
examination of the data in chapter 4 revealed that there were substantial differences 
in the alpha estimates (sometimes up to a .15) between high- and low-scoring 
groups, so it would appear that differences in factor structure are associated with 
important practical differences. Thus it would seem from the results of chapter 4 that 
EI tests are beset with considerable theoretical and practical difficulties as a result of 
their factorial variability. 
The results of Chapter 5 also contraindicated the hypothesis made according to EI 
theory. It was predicted in this study that there would be a simple negative 
correlation between EI score and reactivity to affect induction (SCL change from 
baseline). This connection was taken to be indicative of a relationship between EI 
test scores and a lab-based instantiation of affect regulation: smaller reactivity to 
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affect induction is indicative of affect regulation. However, there was no discernable 
correlation between El scores and SCL changes in baseline and this seems to suggest 
that higher EI is not associated with greater abilities at regulating affect at all. Were 
there a correlation in either direction it would be possible to integrate the finding into 
current El theory (i.e., EI relates to a 'control' or 'sensitivity' effect), but the lack of 
any relationship (similar to the findings of Ciarrochi, Chan, & Caputi, 2000) is 
difficult to understand in light of current EI theory. 
The studies in chapters 6 through 8 also failed to support the hypotheses driven by 
current EI theory. These studies were very similar to one another as each contained 
an experimental condition in which all participants were explicitly instructed to 
neutralise any emotions they felt while viewing the stimuli. All participants seemed 
to understand the instructions, yet there simply were not any overall (i.e., the entire 
sample) correlations between EI scores and SCR amplitudes in any of the clear task 
conditions in any of the experiments. It was not possible to reject the null hypothesis 
in favour of the hypotheses drawn from current EI theory, save for one exception in 
the self-report data. Of course, the self-report hypotheses were meant to be incidental 
only, so this single significant finding is less convincing than the nulls in the SCR 
data are. 
These failures to reject the null hypothesis are surprising. As was noted in the 
introduction, there have been a few attempts to investigate the link between EI test 
scores and lab-based 'mood regulation' tasks. Petrides and Furnham (2003) and 
Ciarrochi et al (2000) found connections between EI and affect regulation but the 
direction of the correlations differed, possibly due to different methodology: in the 
Ciarrochi eta!. (2000) study, participants were asked to perform a judgment task 
which would transparently require a 'clear mind' and thus might well have prompted 
them to regulate affect; such a prompt was not present in the Petrides and Furnham 
(2003) study. Although the two studies found that EI related to affective reactivity in 
different ways, the reliable finding in both was that EI has some effect on reactivity 
to affect induction. Chapters 6 through 8 essentially re-created the two experimental 
situations represented by these two studies: a condition in which participants were 
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explicitly prompted to regulate affect and a condition in which they_ were not. These 
studies should have detected any link between EI test scores and reactivity to affect 
induction (i.e., affect regulation). A connection between EI level and affect 
regulation was only very rarely found in these studies, regardless of which EI test 
was used. 
Thus it seems that current EI theory receives hardly any support from the results of 
these studies. The null hypothesis could be rejected in favour of the experimental 
hypotheses only twice. At face value, the most sensible conclusion seems to be that 
the results of these studies fail to support EI theory, but potential mitigating factors 
are discussed below. 
1 0.1.2 The conjecture is not supported 
The data from these studies provided virtually no support for the conjecture. 
Although some hypotheses were supported, at least as many were not. In some 
studies, it was possible to reject all of the null predictions in favour· of the 
conjecture-driven hypotheses, but in other studies it was only possible to do so in 
some cases. A review of the findings of these studies would help highlight the few 
areas in which this conjecture succeeds. 
Unlike chapters 6 through 8, chapter 4 was designed such that the hypotheses were 
mutually exclusive - either EI tests are factorially invariant or they are not- and the 
results from that study support the conjecture over current EI theory. The results 
revealed evidence of factorial variance in EI tests and although this is problematic 
for current EI theory it fits well into the conjecture. According to the conjecture, 
ambiguous stimuli such as EI tests (in which a single item often represents a 
multitude of situations and 'correct' responses) are expected to elicit predictable 
responses from low-E! individuals but unpredictable responses from high-EI 
individuals due to the high-EI individuals' greater awareness of the variegated 
solutions possible to the ambiguous item andjlexibility in employing these various 
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solutions. In short, according to the conjecture it is expected that high- and low-
scoring individuals will answer EI tests in a different manner because EI functions in 
a different manner for them. As was explained in chapter 4, it is possible to rule out 
any future discussion about tests results because of these psychometric flaws, but 
such a standpoint rules out a great deal of potentiaJJy meaningful discussion, 
especially if there are noun-flawed EI tests. Of course, the ideal situation from the 
perspective of the conjecture would be EI tests which were factorially invariant and 
were also capable of measuring awareness and flexibility. However, it is only 
possible to use the tests which already exist, so it may be more sensible to withhold 
judgment on these 'flaws' and instead take the test results at face value and discuss 
what theoretical importance factorial invariance might have. If this theoretical 
exploration is allowed, chapter 4 seems to provide fairly robust evidence that 
responses to EI tests are more in line with what would be predicted according to the 
conjecture than what would be predicted according to current EI theory. 
Chapters 5 through 8 provide very limited support for the conjecture. The hypotheses 
made in these chapters were all similar and it was possible to reject the null 
hypothesis in favour of some of them with the physiological and (incidental) self-
report results. The correlations between EI and reactivity to the mood inductions 
varied from study to study (e.g., positive images rather than negative images). 
Overall, about one half of the correlations predicted according to thjs theory were 
found in the physiological data but the incidental self-report data were less positive. 
This is hardly unequivocal support but it is also indicative that there is some sort of 
limited effect here. 
It would be tempting to claim that the nulls that were predicted and found in these 
studies support the conjecture, but this must be examined closely. Although the 
conjecture predicts that high-EI individuals will not regulate affect in a predictable 
manner (i.e., there will be no correlation between EI test scores and reactivity to the 
induction due to their increased awareness andjl.exibility) and although these nulls 
were indeed found, it may be very difficult to know that these nulls are indicative of 
the operation of awareness and flexibility and not some other mech~nism. Studies are 
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normally designed to create a state of affairs that should a positive finding be 
obtained, there is no way to rule out the desired explanation. This certainty is elusive 
with nulls. It could easily be claimed that any nulls found are simply a result of test 
unreliability, methodological flaws, or any number of competing explanations and 
thus that the conjecture does not receive any support from these nulls. However, 
such an argument seems inconsistent. It is not clear why any potential issues with 
these studies would cause the null findings but not play a role in the positive findings 
(e.g., if the nulls are due to reliability issues, then it must be asked how the positive 
findings occurred in spite of the issue). Simply put, if doubt is cast on the nulls, then 
it must be cast on the positive findings as well. Presumably there might be some 
flaws that apply to nulls (e.g., because they are non-effects it is probably useless to 
ask how such a non-effect occurred) and not to positive findings, and any objection 
to the use of nulls as support for the conjecture ought to be based on one of these 
unique flaws. 
That said, the issue is less about what caused the null findings and t;nore about the 
logic behind using a null finding to support a theory. Simply put, it is indeed possible 
to obtain null findings due to the operation of some mechanism but it is also possible 
to obtain those findings due to chance, poor methods, or any of the reasons 
mentioned above. It is not possible to discern why a lack of any relationship was 
obtained, so if a theory is built around null findings it could very well be built around 
an actual mechanism, but it could also easily be based on chance, poor methods, etc. 
It may be possible to accurately conclude that a null finding supports a theory, but it 
is impossible to be certain and is just as likely that the null findings occurred due to 
some other factor(s). This would result in a theory built entirely on these other 
factor(s) , not the mechanisms proposed in the theory. In defence of these studies, 
only results which reject the null hypothesis in favour of a positive prediction are 
argued to support the conjecture. The methods used in this thesis should probably 
also be given some credit because the experiments were designed conscientiously 
and it is hard to conceive of an issue that would affect only those comparisons which 
resulted in null findings. Still, it is probably more conservative to base any 
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conclusions about the conjecture solely on the positive findings and regard the nulls 
as interesting but unconvincing. 
This thesis does not seem to support the conjecture. There does seems to be some 
kind of effect which occurs in accordance with the conjecture but the strength and 
reliability of this effect is debatable and thus so is the veracity of th~ conjecture. Few 
of the positive predictions were supported and predicting nulls is of little use for 
developing a theory. That said, there seems to be as much support for the conjecture 
in these theories as there was for EI theory in Austin's (2004) and Farrelly and 
Austin (in press) studies of EI and lab-based inspection-time tasks. If the accurate 
null predictions are accepted as evidence then these studies support the conjecture 
considerably more strongly. It seems the most responsible conclusion to make is that 
these studies show that neither the conjecture nor current EI theory make accurate 
predictions about how EI might relate to affect regulation, at least in terms of skin 
conductance. 
10.2 Possible other Explanations for these Findings 
Of course it is possible that methodology alone is responsible for these findings. 
Much of this thesis was concerned with a very specific operational definition of a 
specific facet of EI theory and it is certainly possible that other experimental 
paradigms might find evidence in favour of current EI theory. With the exception of 
chapters 4 and 9, the studies only investigated the physiological and self-report 
indices of affect in response to an affect manipulation and the lack of any correlation 
between these indices and EI scores (in overall samples) does not necessarily mean 
that other indices would not correlate with EI test scores. Of course, chapter 9 
partially mitigates this limitation. 
It is possible to question the suitability of physiological indicators into account and it 
is possible that if different indices of affect were used the results would have been 
markedly different. As was noted in the introduction to this thesis, physiological 
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methods are characterised by massive individual differences and it could be argued 
that they are therefore inaccurate and these results are unconvincing. It might also be 
argued that because emotions are first of all a personal, subjective experience rather 
than change in SCR amplitude, the physiological indicators are irrelevant. Although 
individual differences and the importance of subjective aspects of emotion are real 
issues, it is possible to defend the methodological choices made for these studies. 
Individual differences in SCR and SCL are indeed large, but the transformation 
procedures used in these studies correct for them, even if they are incapable of 
forcing physiological data to fit parametric assumptions. It is not exactly fair to 
argue that large individual differences necessarily lead to inaccuracy -people vary 
greatly in their musical taste, this hardly means the notion of musical taste is 
irrelevant. The relevance of physiological indices of affect may be contested by 
affect theorists, but it should be noted that chapters 7 and 8 included incidental self-
report measures as weU as physiological measures and both measures yielded nearly 
identical results. 
It is also worth noting that only trait EI tests were used in this thesis. The null 
correlations between EI test scores and reactivity to affect induction (i.e., affect 
regulation) may be due solely to the properties of the EI test. If the test does not 
measure affect regulation particularly well, it is perhaps unsurprising that results on 
it do not correlate with other measures of affect regulation. The primary reason why 
ability EI tests were not used here is because of the expense associated with using 
such measures and the inability to examine raw item data. The study carried out by 
CiatTochi eta!. (2000) used ability measures, but it would still be of use if future 
research could examine whether or not there is a relationship between ability EI test 
scores and reactivity to affect induction. 
These findings are limited in scope. As was introduced in chapter 6, only one 
physiological indicator of affect was used in this thesis: skin conductance. There are 
numerous other physiological indicators which could have been used and it is 
entirely possible that EI tests predict activity in other physiological correlates of 
affect (e.g., heart rate, pupil dilation, etc) even if they fail at predicting SCR or SCL. 
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It would be irresponsible to over-generalise these findings and claim that EI theory 
does not work simply because the indices used in this study do not correlate with EI 
test scores. The most sensible conclusion seems to be that the results of these 
experiments do not support current EI theory but it is possible that these results are 
simply due to a limited (i.e., only SCR, SCL, and self-report indices of affect were 
used) number of indicators of affect. The use of a different outcome measure in 
chapter 9 partially addresses this limited scope, but it is still accurate to say that the 
findings in this thesis only investigate a limited theoretical area. 
10.3 Relevance of Findings to Current El Theory 
The findings of these studies do not fit well into what would be expected according 
to either trait or ability EI, though the difficulty is more pronounced for ability El. 
The psychometric and experimental studies seem to indicate that current EI theory 
does not make predictions that are borne out in the data. These findings are 
immediately relevant to this theory but also lend themselves to more fine-grained 
analysis and it is to this aim that the discussion will now tum. 
The results of chapter 4 can be interpreted in a couple of ways in light of current EI 
theory. As was noted above, the method of interpreting the results favoured here is to 
accept the findings of the tests at face value and to argue that the results indicate that 
responses to EI tests are more similar to what would be predicted according to the 
conjecture than according to current EI theory. This interpretation was favoured over 
the more conservative interpretation that merely states that EI tests are flawed 
because discarding EI tests out of hand dramatically limits the possible areas of 
discussion. It is not possible to fully endorse both interpretations simultaneously and 
although it would be tempting to argue that the EI tests are inaccurate for measuring 
current EI and not 'conjecture EI', this argument is neither fair for consistent. Both 
of these interpretations call current EI theory into question to different degrees: 
either EI tests are flawed and thus so is the theory which prompted them or the tests 
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are acceptable and the results from them supports an alternative theory. Either way, 
the findings suggest current EI theory leaves something to be desired. 
Yet it has been consistently reported (e.g., Austin, Saklofske, Huang, & McKenney, 
2004; Petrides & Furnham, 2000) that EI tests have unclear factor structures which 
vary between reports, so it may be claimed that differences in factor structure do not 
contraindicate EI theory as much as it might initially seem. Although the findings in 
chapter 4 were fairly robust, it could be that EI tests simply need a great deal of 
revision and any issues they have shoul.d not be taken too seriously. Unfortunately, 
this defence runs headlong directly into the argument that EI tests are flawed and 
thus so is the theory that prompted them. That is, if EI tests are so flawed, then it is 
unclear why they are used and why any findings (whether in the predicted direction 
or not) should be taken seriously. In other words, an attempt to defend EI theory 
from the findings in chapter 4 by pointing out that EI tests have difficult factor 
structures fails because of the second interpretation. It should be noted that the EI 
tests used in this study are fairly new so the findings of chapter 4 should probably be 
interpreted generously. It is not possible to entirely dismiss the 'bad' findings from 
chapter 4 (unless one also wanted to dismiss the 'good' findings as well) on the 
grounds that El tests are new, but it is probably appropriate to interpret the results of 
that chapter leniently. 
It may also be the case that the differences in factor structure found in chapter 4 
could be incorporated into current EI theory. It should be noted that these measures 
are trait measures designed to asses a collection of self-beliefs and behavioural 
tendencies and not necessarily skills. It is not entirely necessary that a measure of 
self-beliefs have identical factor structures in high- and low-scoring groups because 
it may be that these respective groups' self-beliefs or behavioural tendencies are 
meaningfully different and factorial differences are merely detecting a real 
difference. Of course, if EI is viewed as an ability, more difficulties present 
themselves. It would need to be made clear which mechanisms or properties ofEI 
skills could cause them to be so different from normal skills and abilities. A normal 
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skill (e.g., penalty kick ability) can be measured on one dimension (e.g., % of 
attempts made) and it is unclear what could cause EI skills to require two or more 
dimensions. In fact, it would seem that any attempt to explain these findings in the 
frame of ability EI theory might lead to something similar to the conjecture rather 
than a straight-forward integration into current EI theory. 
The results of the remaining chapters also seem to present a difficulty to current EI 
theory. In all but one comparison it was found that EI test scores do not correlate 
with indices of affect regulation when the entire samples were analysed and when 
participants were given clear, explicit instructions to regulate. Yet it is possible that 
part of individual differences in affect regulation ability is an individual difference in 
how 'necessary' it seems to regulate. The stimuli were selected based on how they 
tend to make participants feel (lAPS ratings of valence and arousal) but perhaps 
inducing a particular affective state is an entirely different matter from prompting 
affect regulation. Perhaps people with good regulation abilities differ from one 
another in how necessary they feel regulation is. They might all be affected equally 
but differ from one another in whether they feel that it is 'worth it' to regulate. 
Similarly, it is possible that multiple EI skills compete with one another for the 
dominant effect. As previously suggested, Petrides and Fumham (2003) highlight a 
'sensitivity' effect of EI and Ciarrochi, Chan, and Caputi (2000) highlight a 'control' 
effect, both of which lead to opposing findings. Perhaps something similar is at work 
in the studies of this thesis. Perhaps high-EI individuals are both more 'sensitive' 
and capable of 'controlling' their affect, but these two abilities compete against one 
another in a way that obscures any overall correlation between EI test score and 
evidence for affect regulation. Either of these suggestions would complicate EI 
theory somewhat but might be able to make sense of these findings. 
The possibility that 'control' and ' sensitivity' compete and the responses of 
participants defy prediction due to this competition seems unlik~ly given the 
constraints of these experiments, but it may still be the case. Current EI theory posits 
that both sensitivity and regulatory ability are part of EI and either or both could be 
in play in any given situation. Perhaps the null findings of these studies are not due 
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to any failure of current EI theory, but rather reflect the correct functioning of two 
conflicting skills simultaneously. If each stimulus prompted each participant to make 
a choice between two competing responses then a great deal of noise in the data is 
hardly surprising. This state of affairs seems unlikely, at least in chapters 6-8 which 
included a 'clear' condition in which all participants were requested to neutralise 
their affect. Surely if EI is comprised of both the ability to neutralise and the ability 
to be sensitive, then an explicit request to neutralise should override the sensitivity 
reaction and thus a neutralisation effect should be observed. This w'as not the case 
and as such it seems unlikely that this 'opposing skills' proposition is likely. 
Regardless of whether or not any particular explanation is successful, it is also worth 
discussing the prospect of theoretical re-explanation more generally. The findings of 
this thesis stand at odds with what would be predicted based on current EI theory and 
while it may be the case that theory could be expanded or altered to suit the data, 
such theoretical adjustments may be considered dubious by some. Surely any 
expansion of current theory must be congruent with the existing findings- it would 
not be acceptable to add something such as murderous tendencies to any theory of EI 
-so the suggestions above and in general any theoretical expansion must make sense 
in light of current EI theory. These 'competing' or 'hierarchical' skills may well 
make sense, but it would be necessary to show that they make sense in light of the 
rest of EI theory. More importantly, any post-hoc explanations must also make 
testable predictions. These requirements may seem pedantic or obvious but fairly 
grave mistakes have been made in the past when attempts to justify theories in the 
face of contradictory evidence. 
It also seems worth nothing that altering current EI theory by adding additional 
layers would be similar, at least in spirit, to the conjecture. As was noted in chapter 
3, the conjecture is itself an extension to EI theory rather than a replacement. The 
suggestions for theoretical expansions above are only two amongst any number of 
possibilities, including the conjecture. Certainly these various suggestions differ 
from one another, but they are all similar in the respect that they may account for 
why EI theory fails to make accurate predictions in this thesis. If a theorist is open to 
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the enterprise of suitably altering EI theory in one manner, then it seems only 
reasonable to at least consider the possibility of others. In other words, if the 
possibilities above are entertained, then the conjecture is probably also worth 
considering, especially as it makes some limited number of accurate experimental 
predictions. 
Chapter 9 did not asses any hypotheses based on current EI theory specifically 
because it was already certain that the data analysed in that study would support 
current EI theory. However, this is not any attempt at duplicity. Hypotheses based on 
current EI theory were not tested in this study simply because the data examined in 
chapter 9 had already been presented as support for current EI theory by Saklofske et 
al (2007). This indirect support seems to favour existing EI theory and is discussed 
below, this chapter provided no support for the conjecture. 
The results of these studies provide similar amounts of support for current EI theory 
as previous studies have. Previous experimental studies provide limited support for 
EI. Ciarrochi et al (2000) found that only some of their predictions were borne out 
and while Petrides and Furnham's (2003) findings supported their predictions more 
robustly, Austin (2004) and Farrelley and Austin (2005) found limited support for EI 
theory in that approximately a quarter of the positive predictions were supported. 
The studies in chapters 4-8 found only one significant correlation between EI test 
scores and indices of affect regulation out of more than ten comparisons and thus 
there is little evidence in favour of current EI theory. It simply must be suggested 
that perhaps EI theory needs be seriously adapted based on the findings of this thesis. 
It is difficult to know what to do with a theory which makes accurate psychometric 
predictions (see introduction) with tests that do not exactly test what they are 
designed to (chapter 4) but which makes few accurate lab-based predictions. A strict, 
conservative researcher might argue that EI theory should be discarded because of 
the poor experimental evidence in its favour. This may be overly harsh as there does 
seem to be some evidence that EI generates accurate experimental predictions, but it 
is not transparent how much evidence is necessary to decide that EI is an 
experimentally valid construct. Of course, there are no hard and fast 'rules' in 
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science regarding what constitutes support for a theory. However, it can probably be 
safely claimed that this thesis, which found support for only one hypothesis out of 
over ten, provides very limited evidence in favour of current EI theory. Perhaps 
Austin's (2004) finding that only a specific subscale ofEI tests predicted emotional 
inspection time performance can be constituted as support even if this significant 
finding came along with several nulls, but the studies here do not even provide that 
much support. 
To conclude, the studies of this thesis have immediate relevance to EI theory. The 
obvious interpretation is that these findings cast some doubt on current EI theory as 
very few of the predictions that were made were actually supported. It may also be 
possible that if EI theory is suitably expanded or slightly altered then it could 
account for these findings, but the conjecture is probably not suitable to explain 
these findings given that the conjecture received so little support. It should also be 
repeated that these findings are necessarily limited in scope to physiologicaJ aspects 
of arousal only. 
10.4 Relevance of these Findings to the Conjecture 
The awareness andflexibility conjecture is the suggestion that part ofEI is 
heightened awareness of the variety of ways an individual emotional situation could 
be resolved and greater flexibility in enacting these various solutions. The results of 
the studies in this thesis provide very limited support for this conjecture in that a fair 
number of the hypotheses which it prompted were supported. This support was 
limited at best and there are numerous theor~tical issues worth discussing. 
The results presented in chapter 4 support the hypotheses driven by the conjecture 
rather than the hypotheses generated according to current EI theory but these 
findings could be construed in other ways. It was found that the dimensional 
structure of EI tests differs between EI subgroups and this was what was predicted 
based on the conjecture- high-EI individuals were expected to answer EI questions 
in a different·manner (i.e. , above and beyond simply scoring higher) than low-E! 
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individuals. Specifically, it was found that factor loadings in different sub-groups 
were only weakly correlated with one another and this finding, effectively a null, 
was contrary to the strong correlation expected based on current EI theory and 
classical test theory. However, as was discussed above, using a null finding to 
support a theory is difficult. The lack of correlation between factor loadings could 
have been due to any number of fac tors and the nature of null findings makes it 
difficult if not impossible to determine what exactly the cause was. As such it could 
easily be argued that the null findings do not necessarily support the conjecture and 
there is no responsible defence from this criticism- such is the risk that is run when 
a null is predicted. However, the findings of this study do illustrate how the 
conjecture might have been able to explain a finding that does not fit well into 
existing EI theory. 
Chapter 5 was the first study to make any positive (i.e., non-null) predictions based 
on the conjecture and the hypotheses were both supported. The conjecture leads to 
the expectation that people low in EI (i.e., below the mean) would regulate their 
affect in line with their EI level whilst people high in EI would regulate their affect 
unpredictably. This simple test of the conjecture did indeed show the expected 
results. According to scatterplots of the data, it appeared that for sub-mean scorers, 
increased EI had a neutralisation effect. That is, participants with very low EI scores 
were greatly affected by the affect induction (and in the direction expected - i.e., the 
negative film caused an SCL increase), middling scorers had virtually no change in 
SCL at all, and high-EI individuals' SCL changes were erratic and scattered. In other 
words, for sub-mean scorers, increased EI was associated with smaller changes (i.e., 
neutralised) in affect but this relationship disappeared for the high-EI scorers. This is 
exactly what was predicted according to the conjecture. This findi ng seems to free 
the conjecture from the trap which it had fallen into in chapter 4: it is no longer 
necessary to draw support from nulls alone. The positive predictions made by the 
conjecture in this study were supported by the data as were the nulls and although it 
is possible that it was due to a lack of any explicit request to neutralise affect, this 
possibility is explored in later chapters. It would seem that although this experiment 
was somewhat unsophisticated, it did support the conjecture. 
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Chapters 6 through 8 introduced more complexity to the studies. As was explained in 
chapters 4 and 6, ambiguity is central to the conjecture because the flexibility aspect 
of the conjecture is only applicable when multiple solutions are present. Choice in 
response is essential for flexibility. However, it was also necessary to include a 'clear' 
condition which explicitly requested that participants neutralise their affect for 
reasons also described in chapters 4 and 6. The inclusion of these two conditions 
provided a way to test current EI theory and the conjecture simultaneously without 
necessarily placing them in opposition to each other. Chapters 7 and 8 were 
replications of chapter 6 which also included incidental self-report measures of 
affective state to serve as a manipulation check and as a tentative exploration of 
whether the hypothesized relationship between EI test scores and reactivity to affe.ct 
(i.e., affect regulation) existed in self-report data. 
The results of chapter 6 only allowed the rejection of the null hypothesis in favour of 
one positive hypothesis based on the conjecture- the predicted relationship between 
EI test scores and affect reactivity occurred in the low group for the negative image 
ambiguous condition. The predicted nulls were found as well, but it is probably more 
sensible to focus on the positive findings. It is unclear why this neutralisation effect 
only occurred for the negative images. The conjecture suggests that low-EI 
individuals are characterised by predictability in their responses to stimuli, but 
perhaps even low-EI individuals are aware that positive stimuli and positive feelings 
could prompt numerous reactions. It isn't hard to imagine any participant thinking 'I 
feel happy, why should I change this?' Or perhaps the combination of a lack of any 
explicit instruction and the increased ambiguity of positive stimuli interacted to 
prompt even low-EI individuals to behave in a variety of ways. It may also be that 
the lAPS images used to induce positive affect functioned so variably between 
individuals (e.g., an image of waterskiing might have an opposing or negligible 
effect on two different people) thatjlexibility was ensured simply by the individual 
variation in reaction to the stimuli, let alone variation in neutralisation. Regardless of 
the reasons behind the failure of one experimental hypothesis, the correlation 
between EI scores and SCR in the negative images was as expected. More generally, 
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the main experimental manipulation between 'clear' and 'ambiguous' seemed very 
important as the correlations that were present in the ambiguous condition 
disappeared entirely in the clear condition. Thus the findings of chapter 6 seem to 
support the conjecture in an immediate, clear manner, albeit more weakly than the 
findings of chapter 5. 
Chapters 7 and 8 yielded very similar results but the incidental tests of the self-report 
data resulted in few cases in which the null hypothesis could be rejected. The studies 
in these two chapters were nearly identical to chapter 6 save that self-report ratings 
of affective state were collected along with SCR data and participants. The findings 
of these studies varied from one another in some respects but on the whole both 
yielded results which allowed the null hypothesis to be rejected in favour of the 
conjecture-driven hypotheses in some cases. In both studies a greater number of 
correlations were predicted than were found, especially in the self-report data which 
mirrored the findings of chapter 6. 
Chapter 9 used a different method for creating the high- and low-EI subgroups, used 
a different dependant variable, and used an additional operational definition of 
flexibility. This study of the relationship between EI test scores and coping styles 
found no support for the conjecture-driven hypotheses and this seems to indicate that 
whatever limited support found for the conjecture was due largely tb methodological 
decisions and not a real effect. 
It is difficult to know precisely what to do with findings that support only some of 
the predictions made and what rema~ns is the decision between two less than ideal 
alternatives. It is hard to conceive of a reason for why the neutralisation effect would 
occur in different experimental conditions in different studies and the fact that the 
effect was found in the positive and negative conditions in different studies seems to 
rule out the explanation based on the notion that positive stimuli are too ambiguous. 
Even if these unpredictable findings can be explained it is still difficult to ascertain 
how much support these studies provide for the conjecture. Certainly some of the 
hypotheses were supported (roughly half in the physiological data) but it is not clear 
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whether or not this is sufficient evidence to accept the conjecture. It is also uncertain 
whether a halfway supported conjecture would make for a sensible addition to 
existing theory. 
As was explained above, it is normal for a study to be arranged such that hypotheses 
based on two theories are mutually exclusive, but even though this was not done in 
studies 6 through 8 it is still possible to use the standard 'selection based on 
alternatives' method to arrive at a conclusion about the conjecture. It should be noted 
first of all that in chapters 4 and 5 the conjecture-driven hypotheses were supported 
at the cost of those hypotheses based on current theory. Certainly, the fact that in 
chapters 6 through 8 the hypotheses based on the conjecture and current EI theory 
were not mutually exclusive makes a decision slightly less clear- it is possible that 
both theories could have been unsupported or supported- but because of the way the 
results did emerge, it seems clear that current EI theory was not supported and the 
conjecture received very limited support. Of course, the goal of the conjecture was 
not to replace current EI theory but to be accepted as a useful theoretical addition, 
but even this limited aim did not receive enough experimental justification. 
If nothing else this thesis highlights the importance of ambiguity in EI research 
questions, though this additional factor should not be too surprising. It may be 
worthwhile to further examine the finding that ambiguity is a critical undercurrent in 
EI research. Chapter 4 showed that EI tests which use items that represent a 
multiplicity of situations (i.e. , are ambiguous) are psychometrically. and theoretically 
problematic for current EI theory. Chapters 5 through 8 showed that in an ambiguous 
situation there are important differences in how low- and high-EI individuals use 
their El skills and that including an explicit, clear task, reduced these differences. 
There doesn't appear to be any way to avoid the fact that ambiguity and the use of 
EI-related skills are intimately linked. This should not surprise anyone given the self-
evident ambiguity of emotional situations and problems. As was explained in chapter 
3, most emotional problems have numerous solutions and as has been noted since the 
birth of EI theory (see Matthews, Roberts, & Zeidner, 2002), the 'no correct answer' 
problem is a major stumbling block for measuring El. The results of these studies 
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seem to suggest that the 'no correct answer' dilemma is also important in the lab. 
This difficulty is hardly insurmountable and can be incorporated into either current 
EI theory or the conjecture fairly easily. The relevance of ambiguity to the latter has 
already been explained several times and it seems to slot into current theory simply 
by noting that it is hardly surprising that participants behave unpredictably in the 
absence of a clear task. The entire purpose of instructions is to ensure that 
participants engage in a certain behaviour to the best of their ability and it is hardly 
contrary to current EI theory to show that participants behave unpredictably when 
they lack instructions, especially in something as novel and ambigu.ous as an SCR 
affect induction paradigm. As unsurprising as the importance of ambiguity is, it is 
still noteworthy. Future studies of EI-related skills will need to be carefully designed 
with this finding in mind. 
It should also be clarified again that the conjecture was not introduqed to refute 
current EI theory, merely to expand upon it. There are certain sub-skills which seem 
to not fall within the purview of the conjecture. That is, it is hard to conceive of a 
way in which a skill such as emotion recognition would be subject to awareness or 
flexibility, rather, high-EI probably just results in greater ability to recognise 
emotions. 
1 0.5 Conclusion 
The most responsible conclusion seems to be that the conjecture was not well 
supported enough in these studies to be accepted as a useful theoretical addition to 
existing EI theory. The findings of this thesis also fail to provide any notable amount 
of support for existing EI theory. 
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Chapter 11 : General Discussion 2 - Experimental Limitations, 
Recommendations for Future Studies, and Conclusion 
11.1 Limitations 
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There were flaws in several of the studies in this thesis, some of which were 
addressed by subsequent studies and some of which were not. Some were legitimate 
methodological choices which can be defended and some are flaws which should be 
corrected in future work. 
11.1.1 Chapter 4 
One of the flaws of chapter 4 was that a limited assortment of EI tests was used. 
Although all of the tests were multidimensional, widely-used EI tests, there was only 
one ability EI test used and most of the measures were short measures (i.e., 50 items 
or less). In a way, our 'sample' of EI tests only represented fairly short EI tests. It is 
possible that the findings of this chapter do not apply to longer tests of El. This 
seems somewhat unlikely because the tests used in that chapter represent three 
different formulations of EI theory (Salovey & Mayer's (1989) original three-branch 
theory, Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios' (1999) four-branch theory, and Bar-
On 's (2002) five-branch model) with four different tests. Simply put, the findings of 
chapter 4 were robust across nationalities and tests, so it seems like~y that we can 
generalise these findings to other EI tests. 
Another issue with this study was the lack of any deeper investigation into the causes 
of the factorial variance. It was argued that the dimensional variability between EI 
subgroups was due to the increased action of awareness and flexibility, but there was 
no way to be certain from these data. Aside from the complex logic presented in that 
study, there is no clear, let alone convergent, indicator that participants were indeed 
expressing more awareness or flexibility. Of course this study was designed to be an 
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introduction rather than the cutmination of several studies. Psychometric findings are 
often considered less convincing than experimental findings. 
Additional minor flaws are discussed in that chapter, but it is probably accurate to 
say that this study is more informative about the psychometric properties of El tests 
than it is about EI theory or the conjecture. This study also highlights the importance 
of experimental studies in evaluating psychometric claims. 
11.1.2 Chapter 5 
The flaws of chapter 5 are discussed in that chapter but there are issues of more 
general relevance as well. The film stimuli used in this study could have resulted in 
some kind of demand characteristic. It was certainly clear from even the first several 
seconds what kind of affective reaction the film clip was selected to elicit and it is 
possible that participants only reacted to it in the expected manner because of this 
cue. It seems unlikely that such a demand characteristic could happen. Although it is 
possible to 'fake' skin conductance readings (by clenching muscles, breathing 
rapidly, etc), doing so requires conscious effort and by definition, demand 
characteristics are unconscious, so for a demand characteristic to be problematic, it 
would have to somehow convince the participant to actively 'fake' his responses. 
Even if this were possible, the question of motivation presents itself. It is not clear 
why a participant would actively 'fake' his/her responses, whether there was a cue 
present or not, given that they were not being rewarded for the 'correct' response, 
nor were there any tasks to be completed during or after the stimuli, Even if all of 
these impediments to demand characteristics (i.e., difficulty in 'faking', the crossing 
from unconscious cue to conscious 'faking', and motivation) were overcome, it must 
be recalled that this was a study of affect regulation. Even if participants were being 
subtly directed to emotionally react in the desired manner, the study examined 
changes from baseline over the course of a minute- i.e., relative rather than absolute 
values. That is, for such a cue to be problematic, it would have to cause participants 
to somehow react such that their changes from baseline were systematically different 
in different film categories. This seems highly unlikely. 
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More globally, the method of affect induction used in this study could be called into 
question. A strident defender of current EI theory might suggest that 'true' EI 
operates only in less constrained situations. That is, the argument might go that 
because this study used such a limited type of affect induction (film stimuli) it failed 
to accurately represent actual affective situations. Or perhaps in order for EI to 
function properly, the stimulus that induces affe.ct must include more social content 
or context. In other words, this study could be criticised for lacking sufficient 
ecological validity to accurately reproduce the conditions which are necessary for EI 
skills to be observed. This complaint seems less than compelling. EI is often claimed 
(e.g., Bar-On, 2002) to be a robust, global set of skills which make a powerful 
impact in quality of life and in observable behaviour. It seems contradictory to claim 
that EI skills, self-beliefs, or behavioural tendencies (e.g., affect regulation) are 
robust and global yet these same skills, self-beliefs, and tendencies can only be 
observed under certain experimental conditions. Surely if EI is robust, it should be 
possible to observe its effects under a variety of experimental circumstances. 
Additionally, it is a truism of psychological research that ecological validity stands 
in opposition to experimental precision. As was explained in chapter 1, the aim of 
this thesis was to use a precise, 'objective' measure of affect in a strict experimental 
paradigm. So even if this study lacks ecological validity, it is considerably more 
precise than would be possible in something like a field study or an experiment in 
which affect was induced by a confederate or something similar. Certainly other 
means of affect induction should be used to test EI theory or the conjecture, but the 
fact that this particular technique resulted in poor support for current theory can not 
be mitigated by an appeal to ecological validity. It is possible that EI skills only 
operate under certain affect-inducing conditions, but there is no real a priori reason 
to believe this is true given that is usually claimed to affect all areas of life 
(otherwise less stringent methods would have been used in these studies) and such an 
argument seems more of a distraction than a real criticism. 
Another major issue with this study as well as chapters 6 through 8 is the arbitrary 
nature of the high/low group split and the importance this split mak.es to the 
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hypothesis test. If the groups are divided had been divided by a cut-off score whkh 
was only slightly different, the pattern of results would have been drastical.ly 
different. This arbitrariness seems problematic but it does not seem catastrophic. The 
purpose of these studies was a preliminary test of whether or not the conjecture had 
any currency. Put simply, the groups had to be cut somewhere and a point on or near 
the mean seemed sensible. Median and mean splits are very common when 
psychometric tests are used to divide participants into sub-groups. The purpose of 
these studies was to set up experimental conditions which would allow the 
conjecture to function if it has any utility whatsoever. Groups were split according to 
a score near the mean to divide the sample roughly in half but some flexibility was 
employed in the group splits to provide conditions generous enough for the 
conjecture to succeed. Obviously, the failure of the conjecture to make accurate 
predictions even under such generous conditions is informative. 
However, the median/mean split approach is less than ideal because the group 
divisions are entirely sample bound and there is a lack of any external justification of 
these division criteria. An extreme-groups approach would have been preferable 
because it would have allowed some certainty that the subgroups' EI scores were 
meaningfully different from one another. This is the approach used in chapter 9. 
11 .1.3 Chapters 6 through 8 
One issue with these studies was that the hypotheses driven by the conjecture and 
current EI theory were not written to be mutually exclusive. Rather, the ambiguous 
condition was included to test the hypotheses based on the conjecture whilst the clear 
condition was designed to test the hypotheses based on current EI theory. The result 
of this arrangement was that it was possible for both groups of hypotheses to be 
supported (or unsupported) at the same time. That is, it would be possible with this 
arrangement to have both theories supported or not supported at the same time. Were 
this outcome to be observed, it would not be possible to rule out one theory in favour 
of the other through the normal 'selection by rejection' process. As was explained in 
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the previous chapter, it is still possible to arrive at conclusions based on selecting 
from two alternatives even without a set of hypotheses arranged to be mutually 
exclusive, but it is also worth explaining the arrangement which was used. 
The hypotheses were arranged in such a manner because it was not the purpose of 
this thesis to replace existing EI theory with the conjecture. The arrangement used in 
chapters 6 through 8 was essentially two experiments combined in one- the 
ambiguous condition tested the conjecture and the clear condition tested current EI 
theory. Each condition made positive predictions according to a theory and tested 
them, so in effect each condition was an independent test of a theory. By arranging 
the study in this way it was possible to test both theories at the same time and by 
comparing them to their own respective nulls rather than to each other directly. This 
seems appropriate given the incremental (rather than 'confrontational') nature of the 
conjecture. Perhaps this arrangement was less than ideal, but given that the purpose 
of the studies was not to replace EI theory, but to augment it, it seems appropriate. 
At no point was it argued that the conjecture would replace existing EI theory. 
It should also be noted that even though the experimental logic was not arranged 
such that the two theories were mutually exclusive to one another, it is still possible 
to decide between them. The two theories were assessed by rejecting the nulls which 
accompanied each experimental hypothesis and this seems like it should be 
sufficient. It seems reasonable to compare two theories based on whether or not the 
null hypothesis could be rejected in favour of a positive prediction made by that 
theory. It might also be acceptable to compare theories based on the ratio of times 
the null hypothesis was rejected to the number of overall predictions made. This 
manner of assessing the theories allows each to be measured according to its own 
merits rather than necessitating a choice between them. 
Another issue with chapters 6 through 8 was the specificity of the operational 
definition. As was discussed in chapter 1 and above, emotion is a vast, complex 
behaviour and the use of such a strict definition of affect in this study is a limjtation. 
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Although chapters 7 and 8 also included subjective ratings of affective state as an 
incidental check of whether or not the EI-reactivity link existed in subjective data as 
well, the chief interest of this thesis was physiological indices of affect. Perhaps 
participants' affective reactions were being misrepresented or over-simplified by the 
SCR measure. SCR readings were only taken for a five-second duration and as such 
it is possible that the 'window' of observation missed some important aspect of the 
physiological response. It is unlikely that the five-second window missed important 
findings as even this limited window was sufficient to see participants' reactions to 
the stimuli as well as their gradual habituation to the setting. If observations had 
been made for ten seconds, very little additional information would have been gained 
and it is likely that a more extreme relaxation trend would have been observed. More 
to the point, as was mentioned above and in chapter 1, this thesis was specifically 
interested in if and how EI skills are observable in a precise laboratory setting. 
Previous studies (e.g., Ciarrochi, Chan, & Caputi, 2000; Petrides & Fumham, 2003) 
used subjective methods of affect induction and affect measurement, but this thesis 
was designed to address the dearth of concrete, 'objective' evidence of EI. It would 
be difficult to thoroughly investigate EI using a precise laboratory ~etting and a more 
ecologically valid or observational study in a single set of experiments. It is also 
hardly a flaw that this study used a well-validated, highly precise measure of affect. 
It is certainly possible that the measure used here missed out on some facets of the 
affective response, but this would be the case with any single measure of affect. 
Unless every possible index of affect was recorded, the 'you missed a spot' argument 
could be made, so although it is a valid complaint, there were legitimate reasons 
behind the use of physiological measures in this thesis and because this may be the 
first SCL/SCR study of EI, it seems unduly harsh to apply this criticism. 
11.1.4 The Conjecture and Certainty 
One of the major flaws of aU of the studies is that there was no independent check of 
flexibility or awareness. This was noted briefly above but is worthy of deeper 
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discussion. To put it simply, these studies have been designed such that variability in 
responses has been construed as flexibility but there is no guarantee that this should 
be the case. This is a similar issue to the 'support from null findings' issue discussed 
in the previous chapter. 
In chapter 4, dimensional variability was taken as evidence for the increased action 
of flexibility and awareness and while this is certainly a reasonable interpretation it is 
not the only one. It is possible that some other theory could explain why the EI test 
responses of different EI subgroups had different factor structures, despite the 
obvious expectation that the same factor structure would run through all responses. 
In fact, some other explanations were presented in the previous chapter. These 
possibilities or others are certainly interesting and worthy of investigation. 
The issue with these experiments is not that the operational definition of flexibility 
was behavioural or psychometric variability. This is a perfectly defensible definition 
given that the very word 'flexibility' entails by definition variability. Just as lower 
reaction time is used to operationally define processing speed, greater behavioural 
variability can be used to operationally define flexibility. Moreover, chapter 9 
provides an additional operational definition of flexibility as increased use of highly 
situation-dependant skills when more generally useful skills have already been 
employed. The issue in these studies is not the way a single operational definition 
was used, the flaw is slightly more subtle. 
What would have been ideal is a second definition of variability in each study 
because the operational definition used is self-referential. Any study which uses a 
single operational definition is in some way tautological and the way most 
researchers avoid this problem is by running many studies each of which use slightly 
different operational definitions. Although chapter 9 and the inclusion of self-report 
measures in chapters 6 through 8 address this flaw, this thesis would have been 
stronger for having a greater number of operational definitions. Also, the operational 
definitions in these studies are functional, but they are not particularly well-
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developed. It is not clear how either of these aspects of the conjecture functions, how 
it may differ between participants, or how it relates to overall EI, amongst other 
issues. This is a problem which should be addressed in future studies. Although the 
theory behind the conjecture is explained in chapter 3, the explanation is purely in 
the abstract and does not address the possibility that the conjecture was not 
responsible for the findings in these studies. It is certain that if some sort of 
provisional support was granted to the conjecture, future experimental studies would 
be necessary to determine if there are better ways of operationalising the conjecture. 
It can only be said that the operational definitions here do indeed function across 
numerous different studies, so although it is certainly possible that something other 
than the conjecture could have caused these results, they are also congruent with 
what the conjecture predicted. 
Another issue regarding certainty was the potential for type I errors in these studies. 
Especially in later chapters, multiple correlations coefficients were calculated and it 
is possible that the few that were found were simply due to chance. A simple 
Bonferroni correction would reduce all of the findings here to non-significance, but 
alternative corrections would be provide a balance of rigour and power. Of course, it 
has been concluded that the conjecture is probably not worthy of future 
investigation, so the possibility of type I error merely reinforces this conclusion. 
11.1.5 Sampling 
Another limitation to this thesis was the use of students for samples. This is a 
problem that a large number of psychological studies faces and it would be tempting 
to simply wave away this criticism for the fact that it impacts most studies equally, 
but this issue is of particular import for EI studies. 
Many times the 'sophomore problem', the issue of using university undergraduates 
(many in their second year) can be ignored because it is difficult to conceive of a 
way in which undergraduates differ from anyone else, but in the case of EI, this 
problem may not be so easily ignored. Because EI is such a socially relevant set of 
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skills and because it is posited that EI increases with age, it is possible that EI differs 
meaningfuLly between undergraduates of different ages, degrees, or social activity. 
Because the undergraduate experience is a tumultuous mix of socialisation, personal 
exploration, and personality development, it is plausible that undergraduates are 
meaningfully different from people who are already settled in careers. Thus it may 
not be accurate to infer that findings based on undergraduate behaviour are 
representative of how non-undergraduates behave. It is often assumed that findings 
from studies that use undergraduates can be extrapolated to the normal population 
but this may not be the case for this thesis. 
However, it is also possible that undergraduates do not meaningfully differ from 
other young people. There is certainly something unique about the undergraduate 
experience in that it involves education, but in all likelihood, most if not all people 
aged eighteen to twenty one go through a similar period of personal exploration, 
socialisation, and personality development- even if this period lacks lectures. 
Simply put, it seems unlikely that undergraduates differ from non-undergraduates of 
the same age in terms of their EI. So perhaps the real issue is age-related, as it has 
been reported that EI test scores are positively associated with age (Van Rooy, 
Alonso, & Viswesvaran, 2005). It seems more likely that there is a meaningful 
difference in EI between old and young people. An issue related to this will be 
mentioned below in the recommendations for future research. 
It could also be claimed that the sample sizes in this thesis were unacceptably small, 
at least in some chapters. Specifically, the sample size in chapter 7 was very small 
due to the equipment issues and outliers that were only noticed after the study was 
completed. Chapters 5,6, and 8 had larger samples and although it is always possible 
to demand larger sample sizes, these seem to be reasonable. Large samples would 
have increased statistical power and this would have had important ramifications for 
these studies. The effect sizes here are doubtless smaller than those found by 
Petti des and Furnham (2003) who also had a small sample (N = 30), but the 
marginally significant effect sizes in these studies (i .e., p =.3-.5) seem large enough 
to be significant in a larger sample. Larger samples might also have helped correct 
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for the variability in physiological responses between participants. That said, the 
findings were fairly straightforward even if some studies' results contradicted others 
so it is unlikely that a larger sample would have drastically altered the findings. Of 
course, it is always desirable to have more participants take part in a study until the 
number reaches a point where it virtually guarantees significance. · 
11.2 Recommendations for Future Studies 
11.2.1 Psychometrics 
There are numerous avenues for psychometric investigation of the conjecture which 
expand upon the results of chapter 4. From a raw psychometric perspective, it would 
be worthwhile writing a measure which could be used to assess the conjecture. 
Responses to this measure could be correlated with criteria to determine if it has any 
predictive validity. The psychometric properties of any test based on the conjecture 
would be of great interest. It would be interesting to find out whether or not tests 
based on the conjecture could indeed pin down such a seemingly slippery concept as 
awareness or flexibility, what kind of factor structure such a test had. The scales 
developed to measure self-monitoring may be a useful model for testingjlexibility or 
awareness, as would the measure designed by Cheng (2001) to measure coping 
flexibility. Another worthy avenue would be to replicate chapter 4 using more 
sophisticated statistical procedures capable of determining if dimensional variability 
occurs after intelligence and personality variance has been controlled for. Another 
obvious question is whether or not normal EI and conjecture-based EI correlate at all 
as it would seem unexpected if they did not. In other words, future studies could 
examine whether or not the conjecture passes all of the tests that we expect every 
psychometric construct to pass. 
11.2.2 Affect Induction 
There is even more room for future studies of how affective reactivity relates to EI. 
The physiological paradigm used here could be retained but a confederate could be 
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used to induce happiness or distress in the participants. Or the same physiological 
recording could be taken while participants were presented with a longer, more 
complex stimuli (such as a conversation with a confederate or a film of a 
conversation) with precise time-stamped events which could be cross-referenced 
with specific SCRs. A myriad of possibilities present themselves as nearly all 
previous research in EI has been psychometric rather than experimental. 
The lack of prior research makes it difficult to recommend one affect induction 
method over another but it may be the case that the affect-relevant images used in 
these studies are inappropriate. Certainly the results from this thesis seem to suggest 
that using discrete images might result in little support for current EI theory but 
perhaps this is due to the images rather than the theory. This seems somewhat 
unlikely as the images used all had previous ratings of affective impact, but as was 
mentioned above, perhaps an image simply does not contain the necessary context 
and content to successfully induce affect. Or perhaps unlike film stimuli, images do 
not contain enough of the cues necessary to induce affect properly. Or perhaps the 
images were successful in inducing general anxiety or happiness but these rather 
vague feelings were not sufficiently specific to be recognised as actual affective 
states (e.g., happiness) by the participants. Any of these possibilities could be used to 
explain why the results of chapters 6 through 8 resulted in such poor support for 
current EI theory even if they failed to explain the results in chapter 5. Regardless, it 
is probably worth investigating what role induction method plays in outcomes. A 
study which contained two types of affect induction in the same paradigm would be 
useful in determining whether or not the induction method affected. the results. 
11.2.3 Other Experimental Arrangements 
Owing to the fact that there have been so few non-psychometric studies of EI, there 
is a great deal of room for future studies of affect regulation. It would be entirely 
feasible for an expe1imenter to have a confederate deliver some sort of distressing or 
elating news to participants of different EI levels and for observers to rate the 
participants' reactions. Or in an even less lab-bound study, an observation of how 
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high- and low-EI individuals behave in arguments or in jocular situations would be 
revealing. A study which used subjective indices of changes in affective state (i.e., 
control for baseline affective state in a manner similar to SCR or SCL) but was 
otherwise similar to chapters 6 through 8 could be worthwhile as it ·would augment 
the incidental indices used in those chapters. 
There are also other EI-related skills which could be investigated using experimental 
methods. At present, experiments have been largely concerned with affect regulation 
(e.g., Petrides & Furnham, 2003) or facial emotion display recognition (e.g., Austin, 
2004). There are at least two other EI-related skills: emotion utilisation and emotion 
comprehension. Under Bar-On's trait theory there may be up to thirteen more 
component skills, self-beliefs, or behavioural tendencies. It should be 
straightforward to measure some of them (such as the 'positive self-regard' facet of 
Bar-On's theory), but it would initially seem that some of these skills (e.g., emotion 
utilisation) would be difficult to operationally define for experimental study. Yet it 
would certainly be possible to fit these seemingly vague skills in the laboratory-
emotion comprehension ability could be measured as the number of 'meanings' 
associated with emotions, for example- and it would be important to do so. At least 
half of the skills associated with EI have not been examined in the lab and as was 
pointed out in chapter 1, experimental evidence is critical if a construct is to be taken 
seriously. 
11.2.4 Other Types of Flexibility and Awareness 
As was briefly noted above, this thesis used a somewhat limited number of 
operational definitions for awareness and .flexibility. Although circular logic was 
avoided by making different predictions for high- and low-EI individuals there is 
still a Jack of variety in the sorts of behaviours which could be taken as evidence of 
awareness andjl.exibility. One potentially interesting avenue would be interview 
data. That is, given that this conjecture is as yet only an interesting possibility, it 
would be interesting to see how high- and low-EI individuals describe their 
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approaches to emotional situations. It is possible that high-EI individuals would 
provide more numerous and more sophisticated responses to situations. It might even 
be fruitfu l if such interviews were combined with the aforementioned attempt to 
create a measure of awareness and .flexibility. A similar, ecologically valid 
operational definition for the conjecture would be negotiation skill. A study could be 
designed where high- and low-E! individuals (either selected with current tests or a 
hypothetical conjecture EI test) were asked to negotiate for a desired outcome or 
object either with a confederate or another participant. Certainly there are numerous 
other ways in which the component parts of the conjecture could be measured. These 
avenues were not explored in this thesis because it seemed a wiser course of action 
to look at EI and physiological reactions in depth rather than to examine several 
operational definitions only superficially. 
11.3 Conclusion 
This thesis was comprised of one psychometric study and four experimental studies 
of current EI theory and the awareness and flexibility conjecture. In each of the 
studies hypotheses were generated based on either of these two theories although in 
most of the studies, these hypotheses were not mutually exclusive. The conjecture 
received very limited support, as did the conjecture. An attempt could be made to 
'explain away' these findings, but these claims are ultimately unconvincing. It would 
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